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DEMOCRATIC SPEECH IN DIVIDED TIMES 
 




Democratic theorists have influentially argued that inclusive deliberation, where citizens 
voice their concerns and exchange justifications, is crucial to democracy. However, this 
deliberative ideal has come under sustained attack for being excessively utopian. As a 
result, to make this ideal more relevant and action-guiding, the present thesis 
investigates what norms should govern deliberation in political settings marked by 
severe social divisions. 
 
After motivating this project (Chapter 1), I defend the following account of 
deliberation. Although the requirement that deliberators appeal to shared reasons is 
morally attractive, even the weakest variant of this norm risks excluding too many 
considerations from the public deliberation of divided societies. To offset these 
exclusionary tendencies, I argue that public deliberation should give a greater role to 
emotionally-charged forms of speech, such as narrative (Chapter 2). Now, this last 
suggestion might seem overly inclusive, by opening the door for intensely angry 
narratives and for narratives expressing degrading or disrespectful views. In response to 
this ‘overinclusiveness’ concern, I argue 1) that degrading or disrespectful public speech 
is best countered through state-backed counterspeech, rather than through coercive 
legal norms that forcibly eliminate it from public discourse (Chapter 3) and 2) that 
narratives expressing anger in fact have a crucial epistemic role to play in divided 
societies, by enhancing our understanding of persisting injustices (Chapter 4).  
 
The final two chapters address a pressing worry: that the deliberative norms I advance 
demand too much of actual citizens. One might think that if citizens distrust each other 
and are highly ignorant about politics, they will be unable to deliberate fruitfully. But 
these problems are not decisive against my account. Chapter 5 investigates how the 
kind of public dialogue I defend offers important resources for rebuilding trust and 
goodwill in divided societies. As for political ignorance, Chapter 6 demonstrates that it 
is equally problematic for other political systems, democratic and non-democratic. Since 
this ignorance threatens all accounts, the solution is not to abandon inclusive 
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1. Democratic Discourse in Divided Settings 
 
Profound and wide-ranging divisions are a defining mark of contemporary politics. 
People disagree not just about what constitutes a good and fulfilling life, but also about 
the basic demands of justice, and how these should be satisfied.1 These ethical divisions 
run deep. They are rooted, partly, in the fact that different people who belong to 
different social groups often experience different facets of the social world.2 They work 
different jobs, reside in different neighbourhoods, make different acquaintances, and, 
accordingly, encounter different and often highly unequal challenges. Some are used to 
giving orders, others to taking them. Some are respected and admired, others ignored 
or vilified. Some are real estate magnates, others persistently struggle to pay their rent. 
With such different and partial experiences of the way the world is, people readily form 
conflicting views regarding how it ought to be changed.   
But ethical divisions do not simply result from contrasting experiences of the 
observable world. In addition, such divisions are consolidated by people’s broader 
philosophical commitments—for instance, metaphysical commitments regarding what 
kinds of beings populate the world.3 While a religious believer might hold that acts are 
made right or wrong by the divine commands recorded in biblical texts, atheists would 
staunchly disagree. So, even if they had the same sensible experiences of the world, and 
agreed about what empirical facts obtained, their broader philosophical disagreements 
might yet lead them to different moral convictions.  
Contemporary societies, then, standardly involve wide-ranging and deeply-rooted 
ethical divisions, which are partly sustained by social inequalities that give rise to 
contrasting experiences of the world. These inequalities often seem grossly unjust. Poor 
and uneducated citizens, for instance, regularly risk being exploited by their employers. 
Similarly, racial or religious minorities are commonly vulnerable to mistreatment or 
                                                 
1 I follow Raz (1998, 47), Waldron (1999, 105-106), Dryzek (2010, 89-91), Talisse (2009, 3-4), and Enoch 
(2006, 24) in claiming that contemporary societies involve disagreement not just on the good, but also on the 
basic demands of justice. This is consistent with Rawls’s (2001, 32-38) claim that there can be an “overlapping 
consensus” on justice, since that claim applies only to reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  
2 On the epistemic obstacles, including experiential obstacles, that contribute to disagreement, see Young 
(2000, 115-120) and Rawls (2001, 35-36). 
3 Valentini (2013, 181-182).  
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oppression at the hands of the majority. More generally, disempowered groups often 
live in a condition of domination: their fates depend on the arbitrary decisions of far 
more powerful forces. How should we go about realising justice in such non-ideal 
circumstances? In other words, by what means should we strive to eliminate the unjust 
social inequalities that plague existing societies, when these societies also involve wide-
ranging and deeply-rooted ethical divisions?4  
Democratic politics, with its emphasis on inclusive public speech, lies at the heart of 
the answer. In the struggle against injustice, one of the most central practices involves 
agents bringing forward their concerns, revealing their experiences, denouncing 
abhorrent conventions, and demanding public justifications of others. Examples 
abound. Legislators passionately defend same-sex couples’ right to marry. Judges 
publicly condemn redrawing political districts to disenfranchise particular social groups. 
Whistle-blowers expose the corruption of public officials. And citizens take to the 
streets to oppose, loudly and resolutely, wanton police violence against racial minorities.  
Political philosophers have long acknowledged this insight in their normative 
theorising. For the past three decades, the dominant tradition of democratic theory—
deliberative democracy—has placed inclusive processes of public discourse at the heart 
of the democratic ideal. While the universal and equal right to vote is of course an 
essential feature of democratic decision-making, deliberative theories of democracy 
insist that exchanging reasons in the public sphere is no less central.5  
And yet, the deliberative ideal of democracy has come under sustained attack from 
a host of critics who contend that it is too idealised.6 According to this challenge, 
standard formulations of this ideal advance a vision of inclusive public discourse that 
abstracts away from the pervasive divisions and unjust power asymmetries that 
characterise actual societies. Consequently, the ideal is too distant to guide our actions 
in the near future. Perhaps democratic deliberation is a powerful way of realising justice 
when participants share some ethical common ground, have similar experiences of the 
world, and like each other. But this tells us very little about the justice-promoting 
powers of democratic discourse in divided contexts like our own, where public speech 
is routinely used to degrade others, where speakers rage at other citizens, and where 
                                                 
4 For discussion of the conception of justice I am presupposing, see Chapter 1, Section 2. 
5 For early accounts, see Manin (1987) and Elster (1997). Mansbridge et al (2010) supply an overview.  
6 E.g., Posner (2003), Shapiro (2003), Green (2010), Somin (2013), Parvin (2015), Brennan (2016), Achen and 
Bartels (2016).  
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participants are sometimes neither knowledgeable nor goodwilled enough to learn from 
the input of others. In a searing indictment which captures this sceptical outlook, 
Richard Posner concludes that deliberative democracy is “a pipe dream hardly worth 
the attention of a serious person”.7   
While many are tempted to jettison the deliberation-centred ideal of democracy, the 
prominence of inclusive public speech in historical and contemporary struggles for 
justice suggests that doing so would be a mistake. Instead, what we must do is adapt 
our philosophical models of inclusive deliberation to make them more relevant. This is 
the challenge that I will be taking up in this inquiry. What would democratic public 
discourse have to be like, we should ask, for it to be as close as possible to non-ideal 
conditions, with their divisions and injustices, while remaining an effective tool for 
realising justice? To put this question slightly differently: what are the minimal 
conditions—or ‘threshold’ conditions—that must hold for inclusive deliberation to be a 
promising way of combatting injustice? 
Various types of conditions bear on the effectiveness of public deliberation. Its 
effectiveness at advancing justice depends, among other things, on what norms regulate 
(formally or informally) the content and form of public deliberation, what symbolic and 
material inequalities obtain between participants, and who counts as a participant in the 
first place. After motivating this project (Part 1), I will primarily be concerned with the 
issue of what norms should regulate democratic public deliberation (Part 2). However, I 
will also investigate the symbolic and material conditions that are most intimately 
bound up with the successful implementation of these discursive norms—in particular, 
I will consider what attitudes and dispositions these norms require participants to 
possess (Part 3).  
What is a discursive norm? Broadly understood, it is a conventional rule that 
regulates or constrains speech. To illustrate, consider some of the norm-related 
questions I will be examining. Must deliberative participants appeal to reasons that are 
shared by other participants? Do expressions of immoral or degrading views have any 
place in democratic discourse? And even supposing that a speaker’s public utterance 
expresses considerations that are morally appropriate and shared, should she 
nevertheless refrain from voicing those considerations with negative emotions, such as 
anger or resentment? As these examples suggest, discursive norms can be more or less 
                                                 
7 Posner (2003, 163).  
4 
 
formal, depending on how strong the moral reasons underpinning them are. For 
instance, because degrading speech is commonly taken to engender deeply problematic 
harms, the salient question is whether it should be restricted by formal legal rules, 
which impose coercive sanctions on offenders. By contrast, hardly anyone suggests 
legally restricting the expression of profound anger per se, or legally prohibiting appeals 
to non-shared reasons. Instead, the relevant norms in such debates tend to be informal 
rules, which are either unenforced or enforced less intrusively, for example through 
verbal expressions of disapproval. 
Although the question of what norms should regulate democratic public 
deliberation in non-ideal contexts is pressing, and although critics of deliberative 
theories of democracy have long lamented their irrelevance to such contexts, 
democratic theorists have yet to address this question in a sufficiently sustained and 
integrated way. A natural place to look might be the vast literature on public reason. 
Public reason theorists have developed extremely detailed analyses of the kinds of 
reasons that are capable of legitimating political power. However, their primary focus in 
fact tends to differ from my own. In the first place, many public reason theorists simply 
supply standards for the public justifiability of political power, while maintaining that 
these standards needn’t constrain actual deliberative processes of justification.8 
Furthermore, public reason theorists who do supply standards for actual deliberative 
processes—for instance, Rawlsian public reason theorists—tend to be primarily 
interested in ideal theory. That is, they investigate what norms should regulate public 
deliberation in contexts that are substantially better than actual.9 To be clear, this is not 
to say that public reason theory is irrelevant to my inquiry, or that its prescriptions are 
necessarily inappropriate in actual circumstances. Rather, the point is that it remains an 
open question—which I will explore—to what extent the detailed prescriptions public 
reason theorists make for ideal theory are also valuable in non-ideal conditions. 
What about philosophical work on public discourse that concerns itself with non-
ideal conditions? On the one hand, much of it is driven by specific practical problems. 
Consequently, it tends not to be integrated with a broader account of democratic 
discourse. Consider, for example, examinations of whether legal restrictions should 
                                                 
8 E.g., Vallier (2015, 155-156), Gaus and Vallier (2009, 65-66), Lister (2008, 281-282). 
9 E.g., Rawls (1997), Quong (2011, esp. 139, 143; 2017, Section 8), Joshua Cohen (1989), Estlund (2008).  
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curtail degrading hate speech,10 and discussions of anger’s political role.11 As we will 
see, these examinations have developed crucial conceptual resources for understanding 
the moral concerns associated with hate speech and angry speech. However, they are 
commonly carried out in isolation from broader theories of democratic public 
deliberation. What is lacking here, then, is a systematic account of how the particular 
norms being defended should fit together with other norms regulating democratic 
discourse.   
On the other hand, many democratic theorists concerned with non-ideal conditions 
face the opposite problem: they defend the value of democratic discourse broadly 
construed in non-ideal circumstances, but without closely examining specific discursive 
constraints. Most prominently, “agonistic democrats” such as Iris Marion Young 
emphasise the key role played by inclusive speech in opposing unjust power structures. 
As such, agonistic theories of democracy are acutely sensitive to the grave power 
asymmetries and divisions that characterise non-ideal societies. But agonistic democrats 
seldom explore what particular norms should govern the content of public discourse at 
great length. This is partly for principled reasons—namely, that they are often hostile to 
constraints on the content of democratic speech.12 Though my investigation is in many 
respects deeply indebted to Young’s democratic theory, I am not in principle hostile to 
such constraints, and therefore wish to examine them more closely. 
Still, we should not overstate the point. Some democratic theorists have aimed to 
develop systematic accounts of democratic public deliberation that offer guidance in 
divided societies.13 My disagreements with them are more substantive in nature, and I 
will discuss them in the course of my inquiry. Even so, it is worth noting that even 
Sharon Krause, who has developed one of the richest such theories by combining the 
insights of moral psychology, democratic theory, and feminist thought, nevertheless 
offers only a relatively brief discussion of how we should address the degrading speech 
which plagues existing democracies (compared, say, with legal philosophers and 
philosophers of language who examine hate speech), and of the distinctive place of 
anger in public deliberation. 
                                                 
10 E.g., Waldron (2012).  
11 E.g., Nussbaum (2016a), Srinivasan (2017). 
12 Young (2000). See also Mouffe (1999), Tully (2005), Schaap (2006), and Dryzek (2010). On Dryzek’s 
nuanced position, see note 67, Chapter 2. 




In light of this overview, we can better appreciate the desiderata that my account of 
democratic public discourse will seek to satisfy. I will articulate and defend a normative 
account 1) that explores what particular norms should regulate public deliberation, 2) 
that focuses on non-ideal political contexts, with their divisions and injustices, and 3) 
that gives a sense of how these particular norms should be integrated with one another. 
In the process of doing so, I will strive to bring into closer dialogue the valuable strands 
of research cited above.  
I will defend the following account. As a means of preventing domination, 
participants in formal deliberative arenas should appeal to shared considerations. 
However, because little is shared between participants in divided societies, this first 
norm risks excluding important considerations from public speech. To offset these 
exclusionary tendencies, public deliberation should simultaneously give an important 
role to emotionally-charged and non-argumentative forms of speech, such as narrative. 
While this last suggestion might seem overly inclusive, by opening the door for deeply 
angry narratives and eventually for narratives expressing degrading or hateful views, we 
should not wholly reject this implication. Anger-infused narratives, when used skilfully, 
perform a crucial epistemic function in divided democracies, by enhancing our 
understanding of persistent injustices. As for speech expressing degrading or hateful 
views, there are strong (though defeasible) grounds for thinking that we should allow 
and authoritatively denounce it, rather than legally prohibit it. 
Now, severe distrust and widespread ignorance may limit the justice-promoting 
powers of public deliberation, thus understood. Put differently, it might be thought that 
unless citizens trust each other and satisfy a threshold of knowledge, they will be unable 
to engage fruitfully with one another. Nevertheless, these problems are not decisive 
against my account. Firstly, the kind of public dialogue I advocate offers key resources 
for rebuilding trust in divided societies. As for widespread political ignorance, I will 
demonstrate that it is at least as problematic for alternative political systems. In this 
light, we should rather understand the inclusive deliberation I advocate as a much-
needed—though imperfect—antidote for ignorance.  
Before outlining this argument more fully, an important qualification is needed. I 
am offering a philosophical framework relating to democratic public deliberation. The 
primary aim of such a framework is to enable a better understanding of the theoretical 
possibilities for regulating public deliberation, and of the kinds of costs—moral, 
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epistemic, and other—associated with them. These theoretical insights can and should 
incline us towards certain discursive norms. But this stops short of allowing us to make 
highly detailed prescriptions regarding what specific norms we should implement in 
specific political settings. Such detailed prescriptions depend on various empirical 
questions, including, for instance, what the political circumstances are, and whether it is 
possible to institutionalise given norms under these circumstances. Accordingly, the 
task of making precise policy prescriptions cannot be performed solely by political 
philosophers. While philosophy’s conceptual insights contribute to generating 
theoretical hypotheses that inform and guide empirical research, the specialised 
knowledge of social scientists and policy-makers is needed to test and refine these 
hypotheses.14 In what follows, I will therefore strive to indicate where my argument 
depends on empirical assumptions, where further empirical research is needed, and in 
what respects this renders my argument defeasible.  
 
2. Outline 
2.1.  Motivating the Project 
 
Chapter 1 diagnoses a problem for democracy. It introduces a dilemma that plagues 
attempts at advancing justice in non-ideal circumstances. Although democratic 
decision-making should be understood as an attempt to navigate between the horns of 
this dilemma, I will show that a version of the same dilemma ultimately resurfaces within 
democratic theory, albeit in a slightly less severe form. 
In laying out this problem, this chapter serves two main functions. The first is 
motivational. While democratic decision-making is an improvement on the alternatives, 
the fact that it does not fully avoid the dilemma it sets out to resolve remains deeply 
problematic. Now, the more a normative model of democracy requires that pre-existing 
thresholds of justice be met, the more it runs afoul of this dilemma. This insight gives 
us powerful reasons to reorient our theorising about democracy and democratic 
deliberation as follows: we should strive to articulate a conception of deliberative 
democracy that is as close to non-ideal conditions as possible, while remaining capable 
of realising justice.  
                                                 
14 On this methodology, see Estlund (2008, 12-15) and Waldron (2012, 11-17). 
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The second function has to do with conceptual framing. Framing democratic theory 
as an attempt to address this initial dilemma 1) will clarify how democratic deliberation 
is in principle meant to advance justice. At the same time, it 2) will enhance our 
understanding of how theories of democracy might go wrong, thereby yielding a useful 
taxonomy of existing deliberation-oriented theories of democracy. Relatedly, keeping 
the horns of this dilemma in sight will serve to remind us of the pitfalls that must be 
avoided in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2.  Norms of Democratic Public Deliberation 
 
Chapters 2 to 4 take up the question of what norms, formal or informal, should 
regulate the content and form of democratic public speech in non-ideal conditions. 
Chapter 2 considers a commonly-suggested norm, the Shared Reasons Constraint, 
according to which deliberators must appeal to considerations that are suitably shared. 
On the one hand, considerations of domination strongly support such a constraint: 
requiring that deliberation be framed in terms of shared reasons facilitates the 
contestation of political power, and thereby prevents such power from being exercised 
arbitrarily. Nevertheless, recent work in social epistemology reveals that this constraint 
risks being overly exclusive. In divided democracies, different social groups have 
radically different experiences of the social context. The significance of these 
experiential divides is amplified by what Miranda Fricker calls “hermeneutical 
injustices”, injustices that strip individuals of the conceptual resources needed to 
articulate their meaningful experiences and concerns.15 In such contexts, even the 
weakest formulation of the Shared Reasons Constraint excludes some utterances that 
should have a place in public debate. After examining the limitations of traditional 
strategies for mitigating this problem, I advance an alternative strategy. To offset the 
Shared Reasons Constraint’s overexclusiveness, we should give a greater role to non-
argumentative and to emotionally-charged forms of speech in public discourse. 
Emotionally-charged narrative, I suggest, helps to communicate experiences between 
divided groups. In so doing, it enriches the pool of shared resources from which the 
Shared Reasons Constraint proceeds, and thereby mitigates its exclusionary 
implications.  
                                                 
15 Fricker (2007). 
9 
 
Chapter 3 considers an opposite concern: that combining the Shared Reasons 
Constraint with discursive norms that invite emotionally-charged personal narratives 
may be too inclusive. In particular, it may open the door for public assertions of deeply 
disrespectful views. Focusing on public hate speech, I investigate whether this 
‘overinclusiveness’ requires supplementing the norms advanced in Chapter 2 with a 
coercive legal norm suppressing degrading contributions. I argue against doing so. 
Defenders of legal bans often operate with an unrefined understanding of what it 
means to counter hate speech with more speech. Specifically, they overlook the role 
that the state can play in endowing ‘counterspeech’ with authority. Robust state-
sponsored counterspeech, I suggest, constitutes a morally preferable means of defusing 
the harm in hate speech. Admittedly, in non-ideal conditions, state-sponsored 
counterspeech remains an imperfect solution to hate speech. However, I will show that 
the weightiest objections to such counterspeech can be turned, with even greater force, 
against coercive legal bans. Note, though, that this argument remains defeasible. I focus 
on Waldron’s account of what makes hate speech harmful, which itself builds on the 
work of feminist and critical race theorists. While highly influential, this account is not 
the only one. A fuller case against coercively eliminating expressions of degrading 
contents from public deliberation would have to demonstrate that the argumentative 
strategy I deploy can be extended to other kinds of harms. For many of the harms 
discussed in the literature, this undertaking will be in significant part empirical.  
Chapter 4 complements Chapter 2 in another way. While Chapter 2 recommended 
giving a greater role to emotionally-charged narratives in public discourse, Chapter 4 
substantiates this claim by examining angry narratives, specifically. It is commonly held 
that publicly expressing anger is counterproductive for justice. I resist this challenge by 
articulating a crucial sense in which angry narrative can be epistemically productive. 
Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasise the 
distinctive phenomenology of emotional experience, I contend that conveying anger to 
one’s listeners can play an indispensable role in alerting them to previously-overlooked 
injustices, and in enhancing their understanding of these injustices. Finally, I defuse the 
most powerful objections to this defence, partly by exposing how they overlook the 





2.3.  The Attitudinal Presuppositions of Public Deliberation 
 
The previous chapters defend a set of discursive norms that help advance justice in 
non-ideal conditions. But what symbolic and material conditions must already obtain 
for these norms to be successfully implemented? In particular, how far does their 
implementation require participants to have attitudinal dispositions that are actually 
lacking in the real world, where status-based and material inequalities are rife? The final 
two chapters consider two attitudinal dispositions: the disposition to extend goodwill 
and trust to one’s interlocutors, and the disposition to seek out and accept reliable 
information.  
Deliberative theories of democracy, some critics have forcefully objected, require 
more trust and goodwill than obtains in divided societies. Chapter 5 develops a two-
pronged response to this worry. First, drawing on the systemic approach to 
deliberation, I argue that the effectiveness of public deliberation at advancing justice 
demands less goodwill than the objection suggests. Second, even if it were too 
demanding, features of public deliberation that are widespread in non-ideal 
conditions—namely hypocrisy, anger, and even the occurrence of abhorrent speech—
have properties that can be harnessed to rebuild goodwill in divided societies. This 
might seem counterintuitive: prima facie, these features of public speech seem wholly at 
odds with trust and goodwill. But I will contend that this commonly-held intuition 
should be challenged. Importantly, moreover, the properties of non-ideal democratic 
discourse that help generate goodwill are consonant with the discursive norms that, on 
independent grounds, I defended as means of realising justice. Hence, this defensive 
exploration lends further support to my normative picture of democratic public 
deliberation.   
Finally, Chapter 6 addresses the worry that ordinary citizens tend not to be disposed 
to seek out and accept reliable information. The resulting political ignorance constitutes 
one of the most daunting obstacles to using democratic public deliberation to combat 
injustice. This is because the justice-promoting powers of deliberation typically depend 
on participants already satisfying some threshold of knowledge. Nonetheless, I argue 
that public ignorance is not a special problem for deliberative theories of democracy. 
On the contrary, ignorance proves equally problematic for the normative political 
models, democratic and non-democratic, which are touted as remedies. Thus, departing 
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from deliberative democracy on this basis is misguided. Far from being the source of 
the problem, inclusive deliberation is best understood as an attempted solution to the 
difficulties stemming from widespread ignorance. Given that these difficulties are 
ubiquitous, and given the promise of deliberative innovations, both conceptual and 
































































DEMOCRACY AND DIVISION: 




What is justice? This question has preoccupied a wide range of political philosophers, 
historical and contemporary. Just as Plato devotes most of his Republic to identifying the 
essence of justice, in the city and in the soul, so Rousseau’s aim in The Social Contract is 
to delineate a political order that reconciles justice and utility.1 Similarly, Rawls asserts at 
the outset of A Theory of Justice that, since “justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions”, he intends to develop a systematic picture of justice in an idealised 
society.2 
However, a second question lurks in the background of these philosophical 
projects: given what justice is, how should we go about realising it, from where we are? 
Take Plato. Having depicted the just city, he considers how it might actually be brought 
about. Plato suggests that justice cannot be achieved unless philosophers rule.3 
Unfortunately, as he concedes, the corrupt nature of actual politics makes it nearly 
impossible for philosophers to access power without compromising their motivation to 
realise justice.4 Rousseau likewise acknowledges the problem without offering a 
satisfying solution. Achieving his ideally-just state requires instituting an egalitarian 
order. But since hierarchical institutions have warped the moral psychology of actual 
people, they are unlikely to be able, let alone willing, to realise such an order. Rousseau 
ultimately invokes the ominous figure of a godlike legislator, who supplies imperfect 
beings with laws constituting the just political order.5  
These two cases suggest that, without necessarily being their primary focus, the 
question of how to promote justice in the actual world has long puzzled theorists of 
justice. In recent years, this puzzle has not only persisted, but has become a central 
concern of political philosophers. Charles Mills, for example, has influentially argued 
                                                 
1 Rousseau (1973[1762], 181).  
2 Rawls (1999, 3).  
3 Plato (2007[c. 380 BC], 473c-e). 
4 Ibid., 490e-496e. 
5 Rousseau (1973[1762], 194-197).  
14 
 
that by focusing on ideal justice in his Theory, Rawls ends up neglecting the question of 
how justice should be advanced in our world. Unless political philosophy gives greater 
emphasis to the latter question, Mills continues, it risks being irrelevant to our most 
pressing political concerns, and eventually constituting a counterproductive distraction.6  
A major driving force underlying this trend is the growing emphasis by political 
philosophers on the profound divisions that characterise contemporary societies.7 As 
we saw earlier,8 contemporary non-ideal societies are divided over very many ethical 
matters. Individuals disagree not only regarding what the good life involves, but also 
regarding the basic demands of justice. These divisions are reinforced, in part, by 
pervasive social inequalities. Different groups occupy different and often highly unequal 
social positions, and experience different and often highly unequal constraints. 
Consequently, they frequently come to view the world in radically different ways, and 
form contrasting opinions regarding how we should change it. 
These deep divisions have made the question of how to go about realising justice 
more salient, partly because they give rise to a more philosophically challenging version 
of that question: 
 
The Promotion Problem: How should we go about promoting justice, given that 
actual non-ideal conditions are characterised, among other things, by wide-
ranging disagreement on what justice involves? 
 
How is this version more challenging? If everyone agreed on what justice means, the 
question would reduce largely to the problem of identifying the most efficient means of 
advancing justice. Many (though not all) challenges involved in doing so concern social 
scientists rather than political philosophers. By contrast, starting from a situation of 
ethical division raises difficult philosophical issues, including: what are the moral costs 
of exercising power over others in ways that they find unacceptable? Who should 
exercise that power? And what is the appropriate epistemic attitude to persisting moral 
disagreement? 
                                                 
6 Mills (2005, 168). For how the question of advancing justice has taken centre-stage within the ideal/non-
ideal theory debate, see also Sen (2009) and Gaus (2016). 
7 For examples of this trend, see Raz (1998), Waldron (1999), and Valentini (2013).  
8 See Introduction, including notes 1-3.  
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 The present chapter examines the highly influential view that, in such non-ideal and 
divided settings, the appropriate way to go about promoting justice is via democratic 
decision-making. While I strongly sympathise with this view—which I call the 
Democratic Solution—the primary purpose of this chapter is to diagnose a serious 
problem it encounters. We can put the problem as a dilemma: in non-ideal, divided 
political settings, either existing accounts of democratic-decision-making seem 
unpromising as ways of promoting justice; or they presuppose prior non-democratic 
exercises of power that are morally and epistemically suspect, as well as insensitive to 
background contexts of power.  
 Importantly, the purpose of this argument is not to dismiss democracy as a way of 
promoting justice. It remains, I believe, the best solution we have to the Promotion 
Problem. Instead, the purpose is to motivate a project (which the rest of the thesis 
pursues) of reconceptualising the democratic ideal for non-ideal conditions, so as to 
minimise the extent to which it runs afoul of the above difficulties. 
 The argument will proceed as follows. I begin by outlining and critiquing two 
opposite responses to the Promotion Problem. The first, which recommends simply 
forcibly imposing justice in divided contexts, faces important moral, epistemic, and 
power-related difficulties. The second, which responds to these difficulties by adopting 
a more modest political aim than justice (such as peace or order), is too pessimistic. 
These two approaches constitute the two unsatisfying extremes between which the 
Democratic Solution aims to navigate (Section 2). With this initial dilemma in place, I 
introduce the Democratic Solution. The inclusive deliberation it prescribes, I suggest, 
seems a prima facie promising way of realising justice. Nevertheless, I then argue that 
the Democratic Solution ultimately faces a serious problem: a version of the dilemma 
we started with resurfaces within democratic theory. Indeed, either democratic decision-
making presupposes non-democratic uses of force that generate moral, epistemic, and 
power-related difficulties, or it seems ill-adapted to promoting an ambitious aim such as 
justice (Section 3). I conclude by examining what this means for the democratic 
promotion of justice in non-ideal settings. While this chapter aims to dampen some of 
the optimism pervading democratic theory, it is not wholly negative. I offer this 
diagnosis of democratic theory’s ills not to pronounce it dead, but to motivate the 




2. Motivating the Democratic Solution: A Dilemma 
 
The present section raises and critiques two initial responses to the Promotion 
Problem. Before proceeding, an important clarification is needed. Some of the 
arguments I will offer when critiquing these responses appeal to intuitions regarding 
what justice involves. For instance, I sometimes presuppose that oppressive hierarchies 
and domination are prima facie unjust. But if I am myself relying on a contentious 
understanding of justice, how can I hope to convince those who do not share these 
views? Aren’t I ignoring the pervasive disagreements about justice discussed in the 
introduction? 
To address this worry, let me clarify my aim. My intention is not to convince 
absolutely everyone that we should go about promoting justice in a certain way despite 
vast disagreements about the meaning of justice. Instead, insofar as my arguments rely 
on disputed intuitions about justice, I intend to show something more modest: that if 
you share these moral concerns, you are committed to certain ways of promoting 
justice in divided contexts.9 
More specifically, in this and subsequent chapters, I will be relying on the following 
broad egalitarian intuitions about justice. Justice, I am assuming, requires treating 
human beings with respect as free and equal persons. Positively, this means upholding 
human beings’ basic capacity to lead autonomous lives, whereby they consider, commit 
to, and pursue goals that are dear to them. Negatively, this requires eliminating 
hierarchical social relations that prevent human beings from meaningfully exercising 
that capacity. Thus, I am assuming that unequal social relations such as domination 
(roughly: being at the mercy of others’ arbitrary decisions) and oppression (roughly: 
being denied basic opportunities to pursue one’s cherished goals or to develop one’s 
skills) are prima facie unjust.  
Over the course of my argument, I will elaborate on specific features of this picture 
of justice, particularly the idea of domination. In the meantime, it is worth noting that 
although these intuitions about justice are inevitably contested by some citizens of 
contemporary democracies, they are consistent with a wide range of philosophical 
                                                 
9 Talisse (2009) attempts to achieve this more ambitious aim by appealing only to non-ethical epistemic 
premises. Similarly, Waldron (1999, 160-161, 298-301) strives to avoid relying on disputed ethical premises by 




views about justice, both inside and outside of the liberal tradition.10 Having clarified 
this, let us now consider two opposing answers to the Promotion Problem. 
 
2.1. The Moral Imposition Solution 
 
An initial answer to the Promotion Problem runs as follows: 
 
The Moral Imposition Solution: In conditions of wide-ranging ethical 
disagreement, insofar as one has the power forcibly to impose one’s views 
regarding what justice demands, one should simply exercise that power. 
 
By ‘simply’, I mean that the use of force is not constrained by prior collective 
procedures, such as the characteristically democratic procedures of having all those 
concerned vote on the issue, or of offering justifications for one’s use of force to those 
subjected to it and allowing them to respond.  
 This solution calls to mind Plato’s philosopher king and Rousseau’s legislator. But a 
better example in our context is Augustine. Augustine explicitly asks how we should 
react to moral disagreement between conflicting religions. In response, he affirms the 
need forcibly to compel heretics to comply with justice, as defined by what he deems 
the true religion.11 “Why shouldn’t the church […] force her lost sons to return”, 
Augustine asks, “when her lost sons have themselves compelled others to be lost?”12 As 
the rhetorical question emphasises, there is something naturally appealing about this 
approach: if justice matters greatly, and if one has the power to do so, why not simply 
forcibly impose justice on dissenters? 
 A more recent example, which might seem less alien to modern ears, is Young’s 
activist. In “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”, Young stages a dialogue 
                                                 
10 In the liberal tradition, these intuitions are closest in spirit to Elizabeth Anderson’s (1999, 313) “relational” 
egalitarianism, which “seek[s] a social order in which persons stand in relations of equality […] as opposed to 
a hierarchical one”.10 But they are also consistent with more “distributive” liberal egalitarian views of justice. 
According to these views, justice is not essentially about equalising social relations. Rather, it is about 
equalising distributions of opportunities for welfare, resources, or advantage. E.g., Arneson (1989), Dworkin 
(1981b), G.A. Cohen (1989). Despite this disagreement with Anderson, however, distributive views typically 
acknowledge that opposing hierarchical relations (such as domination or oppression) may be instrumentally 
necessary for justice. E.g., Arneson (2000, 341-342). Finally, this picture of justice is consonant with the views 
of some theorists who are more sceptical of the liberal tradition. Young (1990, 37-38), for example, explicitly 
affirms that justice requires eliminating relations of domination and oppression. 
11 Augustine (2001[c. 147], 178). 
12 Ibid., 187-188. 
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between an activist and a deliberative democrat. Recall that deliberative democracy 
(which Section 3 will outline more extensively) is a conception of democracy that gives 
a central role to inclusive public dialogue. Young’s activist rejects the idea of engaging 
in such dialogue, which he deems naïve in contexts involving entrenched divisions. 
Instead, he recommends promoting justice through direct action. Direct action involves 
disruptive behaviour (including sit-ins or demonstrations) which might result in 
breakage, and perhaps even violence (in self-defence).13 Young’s activist illustrates the 
Moral Imposition Solution in two ways. First, he responds to disagreement by engaging 
in the direct, forcible promotion of what he believes is just. Second, in doing so, he 
eschews democratic procedures of exchanging justifications concerning his use of 
force. 
 Now, Young acknowledges that her activist represents a valuable perspective, but 
nevertheless an incomplete one. Her aim is less to defend this activist wholeheartedly, 
and more to make democratic theorists engage more fully with his pragmatic 
concerns.14 More generally, while some contemporary theorists are closer to the Moral 
Imposition Solution than others—in particular, those who ascribe little importance to 
democratic procedures in legitimating power15—the ‘pure’ Moral Imposition Solution is 
largely rejected by contemporary theorists.  
 But although this approach to promoting justice is unpopular among most 
contemporary philosophers, engaging with it is fruitful given my broader aim. My aim, 
as advertised in the introduction, will be to show that the strategy of advancing justice 
via democratic processes—the Democratic Solution—ultimately cannot fully escape the 
difficulties which afflict the Moral Imposition Solution. In pursuing this aim, engaging 
with a stylised opponent is helpful. First, it helps bring out clearly the difficulties that 
the Democratic Solution will be introduced to avoid. Moreover, it highlights just how 
problematic it is that it inescapably runs afoul of some of them: the fact that, as I will 
argue, the Democratic Solution is vulnerable to similar problems as such an unpopular 
view should worry democratic theorists. With this perspective in mind, let us consider 
three problems with the Moral Imposition Solution.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Young (2001, 671-674).  
14 Ibid., 688. 
15 E.g., Brennan (2016), López-Guerra (2014, ch. 2).  
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a) The Domination Problem 
 
The first objection holds that simply forcibly imposing one’s conception of justice on 
others dominates them. And since, I am assuming, domination is unjust, this means 
that the current strategy for advancing justice is itself pro tanto unjust.  
 Domination, Philip Pettit explains, consists in subjection to “alien control”.16 B is 
subjected to A’s alien control when A has “the capacity, not subject to [B’s] direct or 
indirect check, to interfere in [B’s] choice”.17 That is, what options B has access to 
depends on A’s arbitrary or unchecked decisions. Consider two notable features of 
domination. First, having many good options available is insufficient for non-
domination. The slave of a benevolent master is dominated because, although he has 
many good options, the master could arbitrarily interfere with his options if she wanted. 
Second, having many options is not necessary for non-domination. This is because one 
can be subjected to power which restricts one’s options but which is not alien. This is 
the case of power which, because it is subject to checks, is forced to track one’s 
concerns.18 
 Returning to moral imposition, when A simply unilaterally forces her view of justice 
on B and is sufficiently powerful to do so, A is not subjected to systematic checks on 
B’s behalf. Consequently, A’s exercise of power is not forced to track B’s ethical 
concerns. Thus, B is subjected to A’s alien control. This domination is potentially quite 
serious. Insofar as B’s disagreement with A’s view of justice results from her deep-
seated ethical commitments, A is exercising alien power over aspects of B’s life that are 
central to her personal integrity.  
 Now, such domination could conceivably promote non-domination overall. Indeed, 
unchecked power might be used to establish a political order involving more 
accountable and just institutions. My point is that there are nevertheless strong pro 
tanto reasons based in the value of non-domination to seek an alternative to the Moral 
Imposition Solution: even if forcible imposition sometimes promotes non-domination 
(and therefore justice) overall, it would be preferable to find a way of promoting justice 
that is not itself dominating. Put differently, if a just state of affairs could be realised 
through a relatively peaceful strategy rather than through unchecked force, that would 
                                                 
16 Pettit (2008, 102-103).  
17 Lovett and Pettit (2009, 14).  
18 Pettit (2008, 116-118). 
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be morally preferable. Perhaps it will turn out that no such strategy exists.  However, as 
Section 3 will discuss, democratic theorists think one does.  
 
b) The Epistemic Problem 
 
The Moral Imposition Solution also seems inadequately sensitive to the epistemic 
obstacles individuals encounter in divided societies. Laws, social norms, and 
infrastructures often subject different social groups to different constraints. 
Accordingly, different aspects of society are visible to different groups.19 Sexual 
harassment in the workplace is likely to be comparatively more visible to women. 
Likewise, working-class inhabitants of Paris’s impoverished suburbs are likely to know 
more about housing conditions there than inhabitants of its affluent suburbs. Because 
of this asymmetric distribution of information, it is difficult for any single agent, who 
necessarily occupies a particular social position, to gather all the information relevant to 
fully understanding the social context. 
 In the first instance, these epistemic obstacles concern non-moral facts about the 
social context. But non-moral facts bear on moral judgments about justice in at least two 
ways. First, consider that such judgments come at all levels of generality. Some are 
general principles (‘justice demands that each have the opportunity to live 
autonomously’), whilst others are more specific (‘justice demands building affordable 
housing’). Specific judgments are often derived by combining a general principle with a 
non-moral fact (‘without affordable housing, individuals cannot live autonomously’).   
 Second, attention to non-moral facts can also influence one’s general principles. 
Moral principles, even highly general ones, almost invariably rely on factual 
presuppositions. A principle demanding that everyone have the opportunity to live 
autonomously presupposes that people can in principle live autonomously. More 
relevant to our purposes, imagine someone who never experienced poverty and its 
social determinants, let alone workplace harassment and discrimination. Having 
experienced a tight correlation between individual effort and reward, he may be more 
likely to arrive at the general view that considerations of desert and personal 
responsibility are central to distributive justice. 
                                                 
19 Anderson (2006, 11); Young (2000, 112-120).  
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 Thus, what non-moral facts one has ready access to contributes to shaping one’s 
ethical perspective. In turn, what non-moral facts are readily available depends 
significantly on one’s social position. So, ethical divisions at least partly reflect the 
epistemic partiality of different social positions. This conclusion, Robert Talisse notes, 
recommends a certain epistemic modesty in the face of ethical disagreement.20 We 
should take seriously the possibility that people disagree with us not because they are 
incompetent, but because they have relevant experiences that we lack. The Moral 
Imposition Solution sits in tension with such epistemic modesty: it prescribes 
responding to disagreement by unilaterally and forcibly imposing one’s views about 
justice. 
 Admittedly, epistemic modesty may sometimes be inappropriate. Some social groups 
may be epistemically privileged concerning what justice requires in particular areas of 
social life. While inhabitants of poor Parisian suburbs may have incomplete 
perspectives on society as a whole, they may be objectively better, ceteris paribus, at 
knowing how the housing crisis in these parts of Paris should be tackled. In such cases, 
it may be unwarranted for them to exercise epistemic modesty in the face of 
disagreement. To handle such cases, the final difficulty the Moral Imposition Solution 
encounters will apply regardless of whether one strongly believes, with good reason, 
that one is right about what justice demands. 
 
c) The Context of Power Problem 
 
The final challenge starts from the observation that the Moral Imposition Solution to 
the Promotion Problem is question-begging. Suppose I am a party in a moral dispute. 
The Moral Imposition Solution, as a practical guide to action, tells me that I should 
forcibly impose justice. Doing so requires me to endorse an answer to the question of 
what justice demands. But in the divided contexts under consideration, what justice 
demands is precisely what is in dispute. 
 Why is this problematic? Because the Moral Imposition Solution does not resolve 
the dispute at hand, but instead involves presupposing what is in dispute, it justifies 
forcible imposition not just by me, but by my opponent too. When my opponent turns 
                                                 
20 Talisse (2005, 428-430). 
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to this practical rule, it tells her to impose what she deems just. Thus, the Moral 
Imposition Solution can be equally deployed by all parties to the dispute.21 
 This conclusion might leave some relatively unfazed. Such indifference, I suspect, 
results from the following tendency: political philosophers reasoning about moral issues 
often place themselves in the position of the state deciding what to do. Once one does 
this, the problem might seem unimportant. If I am right, and have state power on my 
side, it matters little whether others want to forcibly impose their views.22 Only I will 
actually be able to do so. 
 But things look different when considering the non-ideal contexts in which we live. 
In practice, who is actually right and who has power often come apart. Across Europe 
and the US, for instance, many—sometimes majorities—have come to assent to far-
right conceptions of immigration justice, conceptions which sometimes recommend the 
oppressive deportation or mistreatment of migrants. Relatedly, Young concedes that 
the power her activist exercises in forcibly promoting justice is “a mere David to the 
Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors […] he opposes”. 23 In 
conditions such as these, the fact that the Moral Imposition Solution can be deployed 
by all is worrying. If those who are right about justice are not the most powerful, and if 
the Moral Imposition Solution legitimates imposition by all disagreeing parties, then its 
expected result will not be justice. It will be whatever the powerful take justice to mean, 
however misguidedly. Thus, the Moral Imposition Solution seems dangerously 
insensitive to non-ideal contexts of power.  
 Perhaps this critique reveals that I have misconstrued the Moral Imposition 
Solution. Young’s activist, for instance, might respond that not everyone is permitted to 
forcibly impose their conception of justice. Rather, he, unlike others, may do so 
because he is promoting what justice actually requires.24 This reply suggests adjusting the 
Moral Imposition Solution as follows: 
 
The Moral Imposition Solution*: In conditions of wide-ranging ethical disagreement, 
insofar as one has the power forcibly to impose one’s views regarding what 
                                                 
21 I am grateful to Chandran Kukathas for pressing this objection. Waldron (2006, 1371) articulates a related 
objection. 
22 E.g., Kolodny (2014, 203).   




justice demands, one should simply exercise that power, provided one holds correct 
views about justice. 
 
This version, the response concludes, is not ambiguous: it recommends imposition only 
by those who are right. 
 Nevertheless, the reformulated version remains just as ambiguous for all practical 
purposes. Since each party believes that they are actually right about justice, each is 
bound to infer from the principle that they should impose their conception of justice. 
What this suggests is that in context, any party—even the correct one—that claims that 
the principle legitimates their interference but not that of others is begging the 
question, by assuming what was originally in dispute: that they are actually right about 
what justice means.25 In practical context of disagreements, then, the principle can still 
be deployed by all parties. Hence, this reformulation fails to rescue the Moral 
Imposition Solution. 
 At this point, one might suggest another amendment to the Moral Imposition 
Solution. On this view, it should be understood not as what G.A. Cohen calls a “rule of 
regulation”, but rather as a “fundamental principle”. The former, for Cohen, are 
practical rules we adopt to guide action in social contexts, with a view to achieving just 
results. By contrast, a fundamental principle is a standard that tells us about the basic 
nature of justice. So, fundamental principles allow us to discern whether a state of 
affairs is good or bad from the standpoint of justice.26 Thus interpreted, the Moral 
Imposition Solution* asserts that it would be best, from the standpoint of justice, if 
only those who are actually right imposed their views. But it does not say that explicitly 
applying this principle in divided contexts will help realise this just outcome. In light of 
this reinterpretation, the challenge under examination seems misplaced. 
This reply, however, saves the Moral Imposition Solution only at the cost of 
rendering it unsuited to our purposes. As explained in the introduction, the Promotion 
Problem does not ask what the basic nature of justice is. Rather, it asks what standards 
should be collectively followed to advance justice in divided settings. Accordingly, in 
                                                 
25 Imagine what A, who is actually right, would say to her opponent B. A: ‘By the Moral Imposition 
Solution*, only I may impose my conception of justice.’ B: ‘Why?’ A: ‘Because I am actually right about what 
justice requires.’ B: ‘That’s where we disagree. I still think that I am right. So unless you give me a new reason 
for thinking otherwise, you haven’t given me a reason to think that the Moral Imposition Solution* 
legitimates your imposition rather than mine.’ 
26 Cohen (2008, 263-272).  
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Cohen’s terminology, it seeks to identify a rule of regulation that offers guidance in 
non-ideal conditions.  
 
2.2.  The Realistic Solution 
 
The Moral Imposition Solution, then, encounters three significant problems. Because 
these seem daunting, some philosophers adopt an opposite response to the Promotion 
Problem: 
 
The Realistic Solution: In conditions of wide-ranging ethical disagreement, one 
should refrain from trying to achieve a highly contested ideal (such as justice), 
and instead strive to achieve a more modest and uncontroversial ethical ideal 
(such as peace).27  
 
In what sense is this a realistic solution? According to its proponents, peace, by contrast 
with conceptions of justice or of the good life, is a thin enough ethical aim to be 
universally endorsed.28 Put differently, peace is a lowest-common-denominator ethical 
ideal.29 Because this consensus exists, peace can be pursued without encountering the 
three challenges developed above. Hence, this solution is ‘realistic’ in the following 
sense: in response to the realities of intractable disagreement and power imbalances, it 
adopts an aim that is more readily and unobjectionably realisable than justice. 
 To evaluate this solution, let us examine the concept of ‘peace’ more closely. On 
what Fabian Wendt calls the “ordinary” understanding of peace, peace is a compromise 
between conflicting parties that aims to establish stable, non-violent coexistence 
between them.30 The main problem with this interpretation of the Realistic Solution is 
that giving up on justice to pursue ordinary peace instead has highly unpalatable 
implications. While all parties to the compromise share an interest in achieving non-
                                                 
27 E.g., Kukathas (2003, 252), Gray (2000, 5-6), Horton (2010, 439), Wendt (2013, 576).  
28 Wendt (2013, 580). 
29 The Realistic Solution is not identical to what is sometimes called “political realism”. While some political 
realists—for instance, John Horton—might endorse the Realistic Solution, Wendt (2016) notes that the two 
can also come apart. To see why, consider that, according to Rossi and Sleat (2014), one of political realism’s 
central tenets is that politics is an autonomous sphere, whose distinctive norms are (at least partly) 
independent of moral norms like justice. By contrast, the Realistic Solution in principle encompasses the view 
that the aim of politics is to promote lowest-common-denominator justice. Indeed, its only essential feature is refusal 
to impose highly contested ethical ideals.  
30 Wendt (2013, 577). 
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violent coexistence, the balance of power between them is often very unequal. 
Therefore, stronger parties can extract greater concessions from weaker parties when 
agreeing on the terms of peace. Weaker groups might have to abandon key ethical 
practices or retain them only at the cost of living in a hierarchical order where stronger 
parties dominate them.  
 To illustrate, consider the 1598 Edict of Nantes, which marked the end of the 
French wars of religion, and whereby French Catholics adopted a more relaxed position 
towards Protestants. While it allowed Protestants to practise their religion, it also 
upheld Catholicism’s ascendancy: Protestantism was geographically restricted, 
Protestants could not marry, and they were required to pay taxes to the Catholic 
Church. Against a background of significant inequality, then, ordinary peace risks 
reproducing pre-existing disparities by institutionalising hierarchical relations. In this 
light, the Realistic Solution offers too pessimistic and unappealing a conception of 
politics.31 Politics should be more ambitious in its aim. 
 Proponents of the Realistic Solution might respond by endorsing a more ambitious 
conception of peace.32 Notably, Chandran Kukathas develops a conception of peace 
whereby different ethical communities refrain from interfering with each other’s 
internal ethical practices, and leave each other free to live as their conscience dictates. 
This conception is more ambitious than ordinary peace, as it rejects situations involving 
institutionalised hierarchical and invasive relations between stronger and weaker groups. 
Ambitious peace demands radical non-interference between groups.33  
 Some have objected that Kukathas’s ambitious peace still yields an unappealing 
picture of politics.34 But in our context, the principal problem is that this understanding 
of peace constitutes a very disputed ideal. Kukathas’s defence of ambitious peace 
hinges on the claim that individuals have a fundamental interest in living according to 
conscience.35 Importantly, Kukathas asserts not simply that living according to 
conscience is valuable. His ambitious peace presupposes that it is so valuable that it 
outweighs reasons to interfere with other groups’ internal practices, even when these 
are oppressive. 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 580. 
32 Ibid., 581-584. 
33 Kukathas (2003, 126-147).  
34 Okin (2002, 214-216). 
35 Kukathas (2003, 48-50). 
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  Consequently, Kukathas’s ambitious peace runs afoul of the difficulty the Realistic 
Solution was introduced to avoid.36 The motivation for giving up on justice and 
pursuing peace instead was that peace is a more modest and uncontroversial ethical 
ideal. Hence, using political power to pursue it allegedly avoids the difficulties facing 
the Moral Imposition Solution. But since the robust conception of peace Kukathas 
offers is a highly contested ideal, recommending that the state enforce this ideal 
replicates the Moral Imposition Solution’s problems.  
 Generalising from this failure, a difficulty confronts the Realistic Solution. If peace is 
defined in a truly thin manner, the resulting view of politics is deeply unappealing, and 
risks conducing to the institutional reproduction of unjust inequalities. If, however, one 
endorses a more robust conception of peace, it becomes a controversial normative 
ideal, so that imposing it replicates the problems outlined in 2.1. Admittedly, I cannot 
rule out in principle the possibility of a conception of peace that is both appealing and 
uncontroversial. But the task of developing such a conception seems extremely 
challenging: in deeply divided contexts, all but the thinnest views of peace seem bound 
to be contested. 
 
2.3. Conclusion: An Initial Dilemma 
 
Sections 2.1-2.2 suggest a general dilemma for promoting justice in non-ideal divided 
settings. On the one hand, the Moral Imposition Solution seems undesirable in light of 
three problems: it dominates disagreeing individuals, it is often epistemically 
inappropriate, and it is question-begging in a way that renders it dangerously insensitive 
to non-ideal contexts of power. On the other hand, insofar as it is distinguishable from 
the Moral Imposition Solution, the Realistic Solution yields a highly pessimistic picture 
of politics. By bracketing justice and embracing a more modest ideal (such as peace) 
instead, it risks reproducing rather than remediating existing injustices. This may seem 
an unacceptably high price to pay for avoiding the Moral Imposition Solution’s 
problems.  
 In what follows, I introduce the Democratic Solution and suggest that, because of 
democratic public deliberation’s instrumental and intrinsic relation to justice, it seems a 
promising way of navigating between the horns of this initial dilemma. But despite this 
                                                 
36 Wendt (2013, 584-585).  
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prima facie appeal, I then diagnose a problem for this approach: a dilemma similar to 
the one that motivates a turn to democracy ultimately resurfaces within the Democratic 
Solution (for a visual representation of this argument, see the diagram at the end of 
Section 3).    
 
3. The Democratic Dilemma 
3.1. The Democratic Solution 
 
How should we bring about justice in non-ideal circumstances characterised by wide-
ranging ethical divisions? The most popular proposal today is the following: 
 
The Democratic Solution: In conditions of wide-ranging ethical disagreement, we 
should promote justice via democratic decision-making processes.37   
 
A collective decision-making procedure is democratic, according to Thomas Christiano, 
just in case each member of the demos has “an equal say at a crucial stage of the 
decision-making”.38 Alongside most proponents of the Democratic Solution, I will 
focus on deliberation-centred conceptions of democracy. Broadly put, ‘deliberative 
democracy’ refers to the family of democratic theories that place inclusive processes of 
public reason-giving at the heart of the collective decision-making process.39 On this 
interpretation of democracy, having an equal say means not just having equal voting 
power, but also having an equal opportunity to participate, directly or indirectly, in 
public discussion aimed at influencing practical decision-making.  
 Before unpacking the notion of democratic public deliberation, note that my aim 
here is not to exhaustively characterise the best version of deliberative democracy. Prior 
to doing so, we must clearly understand the problems democratic theory encounters, 
and this chapter aims to diagnose such a problem. Instead, I now outline characteristics 
that almost any broadly deliberative conception of democracy accepts, while bracketing 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Benhabib (1996), Gutmann and Thompson (1996), Mouffe (1999), Waldron (1999), Young (2000, 
ch. 1), Williams (2000), Urbinati (2000), Bohman (2003), Krause (2008), Talisse (2009), Dryzek (2010, ch. 5), 
Anderson (2010, ch. 5), Mansbridge et al (2010), Landemore (2013), Shapiro (2016). 
38 Christiano (2006, 83). 
39 See note 37, this chapter. This broad understanding allows me to include Mouffe (1999) and Young (2000), 
who sometimes reject the label ‘deliberative democracy’ in favour of ‘agonistic democracy’ (discussed in 
Section 3.3), under this heading. I return to and criticise non-deliberative conceptions of democracy—e.g., 
Shapiro (2016)—in Chapter 6.   
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further controversies—to which I return in subsequent chapters—regarding what 
precise rules should govern the content and form of deliberation. 
 Concisely put, public deliberation is the public process whereby individuals mutually 
offer considerations for and against practical proposals with the aim of determining 
which proposal is supported by the best reasons. Several features of this definition are 
worth emphasising. First, the public exchange of justifications, or reasons, is central to 
deliberative democracy. Moreover, this exchange aspires to transform the opinions of 
participants so that they align with the best-supported proposals. Finally, for such a 
transformation to occur, participants must not only aim to persuade their interlocutors, 
but must also be willing to listen to others and to revise their positions in light of their 
contributions.40  
 Importantly, while participants should strive to persuade each other, culminating in a 
consensus is not a necessary mark of good public deliberation. Although earlier 
deliberative democrats suggested that successful deliberation tends towards a 
unanimous agreement,41 this view is now widely rejected. Instead, deliberation might 
well culminate in a majoritarian vote, which is itself followed by more deliberation in 
light of the information made available by implementing the vote’s result. There are 
two reasons for rejecting the requirement of consensus. First, achieving a consensus 
often seems infeasible in profoundly divided settings. Second, having some participants 
register disagreement with policies that are ultimately adopted can be positively useful: 
dissidents have an important role to play following votes in continuing to publicly 
scrutinise chosen policies.42  
 Note, finally, that although deliberation-centred democracy requires active 
participation by ordinary citizens, it is not synonymous with direct democracy. For 
most deliberative democrats, inclusive deliberation is intimately bound up with political 
representation. Citizens should deliberate with each other regarding whom they should 
elect, argue about whether their representatives are doing their jobs, contact those 
                                                 
40 For an overview, see Mansbridge et al (2010). Public deliberation is ‘public’ at least in the sense that it is 
about public or political affairs. Often, it is also public in that it is visible to and addressed to the demos 
generally. I say ‘often’ because, as Chapter 2 will discuss, the systemic understanding of public deliberation 
recognises the importance of having more closed deliberative spaces—e.g., consciousness-raising groups—
provided that the deliberation occurring in these spaces aims eventually to feed into more open 
deliberation—e.g., media communications, parliamentary debates.  
41 E.g., Joshua Cohen (1989, 22), Habermas (1996).  
42 E.g., Anderson (2006, 15-17), Mansbridge et al (2010, 66-67), Young (2000, 40-44). 
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representatives to demand justifications, and publicly criticise representatives who break 
electoral pledges.43 
 With this minimal account of deliberative democracy in mind, consider why the 
Democratic Solution constitutes a prima facie promising dissolution of Section 2’s 
dilemma. On the one hand, unlike the Realistic Solution, the Democratic Solution 
preserves the aim of realising justice. On the other, inclusive deliberation seems 
instrumentally and intrinsically valuable for justice, in a way that helps it address the 
Moral Imposition Solution’s three problems.  
 First, deliberative democracy is instrumental to justice. Inclusive deliberative 
processes, it is often argued, pool diverse social perspectives. In doing so, they help us 
identify just policies in contexts where relevant information is dispersed across a 
heterogeneous population.44 Therefore, deliberative democracy seems well-adapted to 
the epistemic difficulties that stand in the way of just policy-making.  
 Second, democratic procedures are also intrinsically valuable for justice, as they 
constitute a bulwark against domination (which, recall, I am taking to be prima facie 
unjust). Inclusive reason-giving processes allow citizens to vocally challenge political 
power and thereby make it more responsive to their concerns. Thus, these processes 
constitute a check on political power, which prevents such power from being exercised 
in a purely arbitrary fashion. Since domination just is arbitrary or unchecked rule, this 
means that deliberative democratic procedures are constitutive components of non-
domination.45 
 Finally, and related to this last point, weaker parties can use public reason-giving 
processes to make their concerns visible to the powerful and to hold them accountable. 
This makes the Democratic Solution more sensitive to non-ideal contexts of power, where 
those who know what is just often lack the power to forcibly impose it: since political 
change is driven by reason-giving rather than brute force, weak parties with valuable 
insights into what justice requires stand a better chance of effecting just change.  
 The Democratic Solution therefore seems an appealing response to the Promotion 
Problem. Nevertheless, while I take these considerations to constitute compelling 
                                                 
43 E.g., Urbinati (2000), Young (2000, ch. 4), Mansbridge (2003).  
44 On deliberation’s epistemic value, see Young (2000, 115-120), Anderson (2006, 10-15), and Landemore 
(2013, ch. 4). Chapters 2 and 4 expand on the epistemic value of democratic deliberation.  
45 On deliberation and non-domination, see Forst (2014, 201), Young (2000, 32-33), Pettit (2012, chs. 4-5), 




grounds for endorsing this solution, the remainder of this chapter aims to qualify this 
optimism. 
 
3.2. The Ambivalence of Democracy 
  
The picture of the Democratic Solution outlined above suggests that deliberative 
democracy produces a virtuous circle of justice. Inclusive deliberation pools different 
perspectives on the unjust social context. This enables weaker parties to make 
themselves heard, and to hold the powerful accountable. Greater justice results, which 
in turn facilitates the democratic process by further empowering weaker parties and 
increasing the degree to which powerful parties are accountable to them. 
 However, this picture presupposes that weaker participants can make themselves 
heard through public debate. But what if background circumstances are so unjustly 
unequal that this is false? Examples are easy to come by. Historically, women and 
people of colour have routinely been unjustly denied formal participatory rights. But 
even individuals who are granted formal participatory rights are regularly silenced. In 
the US, vast socioeconomic inequalities enable wealthy Americans to dominate public 
discussion, thereby drowning out the concerns of more vulnerable groups. Similarly, 
when disempowered groups have persistently been vilified in public discourse, their 
social standing might be so low that no one takes their contributions seriously. Last,  
but not least, participants’ claims are sometimes discounted or derided, for example if 
they are inarticulate or emotional, because they violate expectations regarding what 
counts as proper public discourse.  
 When these unjust exclusions exist to a very significant degree, powerful actors may 
not need to be responsive to weaker parties. If weaker parties cannot audibly voice their 
complaints, then, contra 3.1’s discussion, the powerful can simply ignore them. In fact, 
powerful actors may conceivably use public deliberation to amplify their power. 
Engaging in public deliberation that is biased in their favour by background injustices 
might enable powerful actors to promote their preferred policies with an air of 
legitimacy they would have otherwise lacked. As Young summarises, then, if we start 




we have a different circle: Where there are structural inequalities of wealth and 
power, formally democratic procedures are likely to reinforce them, because 
privileged people are able to marginalize the voices and issues of those less 
privileged.46  
 
The point is that the Democratic Solution presupposes that a certain threshold of 
background justice has been achieved. When it has not, formally democratic procedures 
may not only fail to promote justice, but may serve to amplify existing injustices.47 Put 
differently, there is a level of background injustice at which public deliberation will 
produce not a virtuous circle of justice, but a vicious circle of injustice.  
 What are the background threshold conditions for democracy to be capable of 
combatting rather than amplifying injustice? As the above examples suggest, they can 
roughly be classified into three categories.48 Democracy’s justice-promoting powers 
depend on: 
 
Formal Inclusion: The extent to which those who should be part of the demos 
are actually granted formal participatory rights, such as voting rights. 
 
Informal Inclusion—Material and Symbolic Conditions: The extent to which 
members of the demos have the material and symbolic resources needed to 
participate meaningfully in political life, such as wealth, cultural standing, 
education, leisure. 
 
Informal Inclusion—Norms of Public Deliberation: The extent to which the norms 
governing what counts as appropriate public discourse allow important 
concerns to be expressed by all members of the demos. 
 
Thus, democracy has an ambivalent relation to justice. Its ability to eliminate rather 
than amplify injustice depends on how well it includes members of the demos, which in 
turn depends on whether various kinds of background conditions are satisfied. 
                                                 
46 Young (2000, 34). 
47 On democracy’s ambivalent relation to justice, see also Forst (2012, 198-200), Shapiro (2003, 30-33), and 
Fung (2005, 401). 
48 For discussion, see Young (2000, 52-53) and Fraser (2009, 16-21).  
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Therefore, the following question arises: how should these threshold conditions, or 
basic justice, be realised or brought into being? The next section considers how 
democratic theorists can and have answered this question. These answers, I will 
suggest, ultimately replicate the dilemma we started with.  
 
3.3. Reproducing the Dilemma: Three Common Responses 
  
a) The Constitutionalist Response 
 
One common response recommends that deliberative democracy’s threshold 
conditions be forcibly realised independently of democratic decision-making.49 
Moreover, because these threshold conditions are presuppositions for the moral 
desirability of democratic decision-making, this view suggests that threshold conditions 
should be enforced against democratic decision-making, should the decisions made 
through inclusive deliberation and majoritarian voting conflict with these conditions. 
 This last point is most notably illustrated by philosophers who, like Cécile Fabre, 
endorse a form of constitutionalism. Here, I understand constitutionalism broadly as 
the claim that democratic decision-making processes should be constrained by a 
constitution. A constitution, on this view, enshrines certain basic rights and duties, 
including rights to participate politically on certain terms, and (if this is what effective 
democratic participation presupposes) certain socioeconomic rights. Its strictures must 
be enforced by unelected independent bodies, like judicial courts, even when the demos 
or its elected representatives produce a contrary decision.50   
 Unfortunately, this ‘constitutionalist’ response seems like a version of the Moral 
Imposition Solution, applied restrictively to the realisation of democracy’s threshold 
conditions.51 Accordingly, it encounters the familiar difficulties we outlined in 2.1. First, 
                                                 
49 E.g., Fung (2005, 401-404). 
50 Fabre (2000a), for instance, holds that basic rights, including the preconditions of proper democratic 
functioning (96-97), should be upheld by a coercively-enforced constitution (86-87), and that this 
enforcement should be maintained even against opposing majoritarian decisions (83-85). See also Blake 
(2005, 232-235), Rawls (1997, 766), and Pettit (2012, 220-225). Now, most constitutionalists recognise that 
constitutions can be changed through democratic decision-making, provided certain demanding conditions are 
met, such as supermajority voting. E.g., Fabre (2000a, 96), Rawls (1997, 772), Pettit (2012, 238). What this 
shows is that constitutionalism comes in degrees (varying with how demanding the amendment conditions 
are). Strictly speaking, then, my claim in this section is that insofar as constitutionalists empower an unelected 
minority charged with forcibly enforcing basic or threshold justice against democratic decision-making, they 
replicate many of the Moral Imposition Solution’s difficulties. 
51 See Walzer (1981, 384-388) for a similar claim.  
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having unelected agents impose threshold conditions, sometimes against the democratic 
procedures instituted to check political power, seems at least pro tanto in tension with 
non-domination.52 So, if we could find an alternative strategy that avoids dominating 
individuals when bringing about democracy’s threshold conditions, this would be 
morally preferable. 
 This first criticism of the constitutionalist response might seem wrongheaded. A 
constitution typically prescribes many checks on how political power can be exercised. 
So enforcing a constitution, one might think, is subject to checks and therefore does 
not constitute arbitrary rule, or domination.53 One problem with this response is that it 
presupposes the outcome of forcibly bringing about the constitution. Our question is 
how one should realise democracy’s threshold conditions in the first place. Before the 
constitution enshrining democracy’s threshold conditions and defining constraints on 
political power exists, non-democratic force used to bring it into being is not subject to 
those constraints. The French Revolution may have resulted in republican constraints 
on political power, but the revolution itself was not so constrained.  
 Admittedly, however, constitutions that aim to protect the conditions required for 
democracy to function well are already a political reality in many contemporary 
democracies. In the US and across Europe, legal constitutions protected by 
independent courts, like the US Supreme Court, are historically well-entrenched. 
Moreover, as Ian Shapiro notes, “written constitutions […] with independent courts 
charged to enforce them, are near-universal features of the new democracies that have 
swept the world since the 1970s”.54 In these cases, enforcing the constitution might 
well be subject to various checks and therefore non-dominating.55  
 Nonetheless, enforcing democracy’s threshold conditions non-democratically 
encounters the other difficulties that plagued the Moral Imposition Solution, even when 
we are enforcing an existing constitution rather than bringing one into existence. To 
begin, like the Moral Imposition Solution, the constitutionalist response seems 
epistemically immodest. As we have seen, politically-relevant information tends to be 
dispersed throughout society, making it difficult for any one person or group to gather 
all the information that is relevant to just decision-making. This epistemic obstacle was 
                                                 
52 See also Waldron (1993, 28), though he uses the language of autonomy, not non-domination.  
53 Pettit (2012, 236-237). 
54 Shapiro (2016, 41).  
55 For Bellamy (2008, 168-172) and Shapiro (2012, 329-332), constitutionalist provisions are dominating even 
in such cases. 
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one motivation for making decisions via inclusive deliberative processes. Accordingly, 
forcibly imposing democracy’s threshold conditions, independently of inclusive 
deliberative democratic processes, seems epistemically problematic.56  
 To appreciate this, consider that what exactly is needed for citizens to be capable of 
participating meaningfully in democratic public deliberation is a highly complex and 
contested question. Even if we agree that basic justice requires that citizens be able to 
participate in democratic life as social and political equals (as I have been assuming), 
how much material redistribution, what kinds of symbolic recognition, and what 
specific norms of political discourse are required for this to be possible remains an 
extremely challenging question. Consequently, even in societies that already possess a 
constitution purporting to protect the conditions for adequate democratic participation, 
there is often extreme disagreement concerning how these constitutional protections 
should be interpreted. Now, the disparate experiences that are distributed across the 
demos seem directly relevant to determining what citizens need for adequate 
democratic participation. Hence, leaving the task of realising democracy’s threshold 
conditions to non-democratic, unelected bodies seems (like the Moral Imposition 
Solution) epistemically insensitive to the social dispersion of information. 
 Accordingly, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, there is no shortage of court decisions 
interpreting constitutions that produced deeply unjust decisions. Consider a few US 
Supreme Court cases. Notoriously, the Supreme Court ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson that 
equality is compatible with racial segregation. In Schenk v. United States, it seriously 
curtailed freedom of speech by deciding that criticising conscription during World War 
I was similar to shouting fire in a crowded theatre. During World War II, it legitimised 
the indiscriminate ordering of Japanese Americans into internment camps. More 
recently, it drastically amplified the political repercussions of economic inequality by 
declaring, in Buckley v. Valeo, that limits on electoral spending were unconstitutional.57 
Examples like these support the epistemic argument against forcibly realising 
democracy’s threshold conditions independently of democratic processes of inclusive 
deliberation—i.e., independently of deliberation which involves ordinary citizens 
                                                 
56 For an epistemic critique of constitutionalism and judicial review, see Waldron (2006, 1376-1386). Fabre 
(2000a, 79-80) acknowledges this objection but brackets it and simply assumes that “the judiciary would do a 
good job of protecting rights”.  
57 Waldron (2006, 1376-1378). See also Shapiro (2016, ch. 4) for discussion. 
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directly or via their elected representatives.58 History is riddled with instances of 
unelected bodies like the Supreme Court making judgments that exacerbated existing 
injustices and took us further away from democracy’s threshold conditions. 
 Finally, like the Moral Imposition Solution, advancing democracy’s threshold 
conditions as the constitutionalist response suggests is problematically insensitive to 
non-ideal contexts of power. To see this, notice that we can interpret the 
aforementioned Supreme Court cases in two ways. On the above interpretation, they 
suggest that correctly ascertaining how to promote basic justice, or democracy’s 
threshold conditions, is very difficult unless we pool different social perspectives in 
inclusive democratic processes of reason-giving. A second and weaker interpretation is 
the following. Even if one thinks that a particular group is epistemically privileged 
concerning how to achieve basic justice, these cases remind us that, in non-ideal 
contexts, those who are powerful and those who are right about what basic justice 
demands seldom coincide. And it is the powerful who are in a position to enforce their 
views. Even if black Americans knew that racial segregation was clearly incompatible 
with democracy’s proper functioning, they were not in a position successfully to impose 
their views. The all-white Supreme Court was.  
 Thus, on the second interpretation, these cases manifest the problem that in 
contexts of disagreement, recommending the non-democratic imposition of basic 
justice begs the question of who should do the imposing. So, against a background of 
unjust inequalities where the powerful may have incorrect views regarding what basic 
justice and the proper functioning of democracy require, applying this recommendation 
may well be inimical to realising democracy’s threshold conditions.  
 In sum, the three challenges to the Moral Imposition Solution resurface to a 
significant degree against the popular view that we should simply forcibly impose 
justice up to the threshold where democracy becomes justice-promoting.  
 
b) The Agonistic Response  
 
In recognition of these problems, the Democratic Solution’s proponent might reject the 
idea of imposing democracy’s threshold conditions through non-democratic means. 
                                                 
58 This qualification is important: while the Supreme Court may deliberate—though Waldron (2006, 1382-
1386) expresses doubts about this—it is not an instance of democratic deliberation. Indeed, its deliberation 
does not include ordinary citizens or their elected representatives. For discussion, see Dryzek (2000, 15-16).  
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But if we do not impose these conditions, how do we realise them? One prominent 
family of democratic theories, agonistic democracy, responds by denying the question’s 
presupposition. To understand what I mean by this, consider two central features of 
agonistic democracy, as expounded by Chantal Mouffe. First, agonistic democrats 
criticise classical formulations of deliberative democracy for abstracting from real-world 
power relations. Power and antagonism, Mouffe claims, are ineradicable.59 So, a realistic 
conception of democracy should not abstract from them, but should rather take its 
starting point within existing antagonistic power relations. More specifically, “the aim 
of democratic politics is to transform an ‘antagonism’ into an ‘agonism’”.60 Whereas 
antagonism describes the relation between enemies, who are hostile towards each other, 
agonism is the relation between adversaries, who struggle with each other but do not 
question each other’s right to participate. For our purposes, what is significant is that by 
portraying democratic decision-making as embedded within antagonistic power 
relations, Mouffe seems to be denying that we should try to realise threshold conditions, 
where real-world power imbalances are significantly reduced, prior to democratic 
decision-making.  
 Relatedly, agonistic democracy tends to oppose restrictions on the content and form 
of reasons raised in public deliberation. Mouffe, for instance, rejects a conception of 
democracy that “eliminate[s] passions” from public discourse, and advocates an 
inclusive struggle between radically different ideas. Alongside other agonistic 
democrats, then, she sometimes suggests that even extreme ideas should be admissible 
in democratic discourse.61 In summary, agonistic democracy interprets democracy as 
taking place not in an idealised context where threshold conditions of basic justice are 
already satisfied but here and now; accordingly, it strives to accommodate the immense 
diversity of viewpoints that characterises actual societies.  
 While there is much to admire in the aim of making the democratic ideal more 
relevant to non-ideal circumstances, this position seems problematic in our context. If 
no effort is made to remedy existing antagonisms and power imbalances prior to 
democratic decision-making, and, relatedly, no effort to block hateful forms of extreme 
speech, why think that democracy will help us eliminate existing injustices? After all, the 
problem we raised in 3.2 was that against a background of severe injustice, formally 
                                                 
59 Mouffe (1999, 752). See also Young (2000, 49-51), Honig (1996, 258), and Schaap (2006, 257, 264).  
60 Mouffe (1999, 755). 
61 Ibid. See also Young (2000, 24, 49-51), Tully (2005, 206-208), and Schaap (2006, 269).  
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democratic decision-making might well generate a vicious circle of injustice instead. 
Sensing this problem, Young, who sometimes identifies as an agonistic democrat,62 
asserts that democratic theorists  
 
believe that the circle [of injustice] can be broken. In formally democratic 
societies with serious injustices it must be possible to promote social changes 
towards greater justice through democratic means63 
 
But what does Young mean by this “must”? Unless a reason is given for thinking that, 
contra the considerations raised in 3.2, formally democratic processes are bound to be 
justice-promoting, this seems worryingly like wishful thinking. 
 Mouffe might reply that I am misconstruing agonistic democracy. Perhaps her view 
is not that democratic politics is the transition from antagonism to agonism, but rather 
that it results from this transition. This would make sense of the kinds of processes 
Mouffe takes as paradigmatically democratic, since these processes do not seem to 
involve unfettered power or enmity. As mentioned above, Mouffe depicts democratic 
communication as a struggle between adversaries who profoundly disagree but 
nevertheless acknowledge each other’s right to defend their ideas. She later adds that 
participants in inclusive democratic communication are united by a “shared adhesion to 
the ethico-political principles of democracy”.64  
 Although this second understanding of agonistic democracy yields a more appealing 
picture of democracy, it is unclear how it is supposed to solve our problem. It clearly 
does presuppose the prior realisation of background conditions. Most obviously, despite 
sometimes suggesting the opposite, Mouffe ultimately excludes some appeals from 
public communication: in particular, participants must not challenge the “ethico-
political principles of democracy”. Even for agonistic democrats like Mouffe, then, 
some abhorrent extreme views should be excluded from democratic processes.65 
Consequently, the question resurfaces: how do we realise these background conditions 
which effective democratic public communication presupposes? On the second 
                                                 
62 Young (2000, 49-51). 
63 Ibid., 35.  
64 Mouffe (1999, 755). See also Young (2000, 25). 
65 On this point, see Knops (2007, 116-118).  
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understanding of agonistic democracy, agonistic democrats have not answered our 
problem.  
 Crucially, a new parallel with Section 2 arises: the difficulties agonistic democracy 
encounters parallel those that obstructed the Realistic Solution in 2.2. The Realistic 
Solution, recall, either effectively abandoned the aim of promoting justice, or 
reproduced the Moral Imposition Solution’s difficulties. Analogously, the agonistic 
response either effectively abandons the aim of realising democracy’s threshold 
conditions, or reproduces the problem of how we should impose these conditions. In 
this light, the agonistic response is to the problem of realising democracy’s threshold 
conditions what the Realistic Solution is to the Promotion Problem—that is, the 
broader problem of how we should go about realising justice in non-ideal conditions. 
Both solutions offer a conception of politics that takes as given unjust power relations, 
and that pursues an aim more modest than fully eliminating them. While the Realistic 
Solution aims for peace rather than justice, the agonistic solution suggests transforming 
rather than eliminating power relations within democratic politics. Both, in 
consequence, are hostage to existing injustices in a way that yields an unappealing 
picture of politics. And finally, both tend to shy away from this upshot, thereby 
reproducing the strategy they criticised in their opponents.  
 
c) The Meta-Democratic Response  
 
A final possible response does not deny that democracy’s proper functioning 
presupposes background conditions of basic justice, but argues that the best way to 
realise these conditions is through democratic deliberation on democracy itself. On this 
view, inclusive deliberation takes as its object the existing deliberative political system 
and asks how it should be improved. This approach is particularly popular among 
discourse-theorists, such as Habermas, Dryzek, Fraser, and Benhabib.66  
 To illustrate this ‘meta-democratic’ strategy, consider Benhabib’s discussion of who 
constitutes the demos. Benhabib declares that “membership in the demos, no matter 
how arbitrary initially, can be self-reflexively adjusted only by the demoi themselves”.67 
Put differently, deliberation should start from the currently-recognised demos, however 
                                                 
66 Habermas (2001, 774); Dryzek (2010, 12); Fraser (2009, 27-29); Benhabib (2006, ch. 2).  
67 Benhabib (2011, 165). 
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arbitrarily or unjustly it was formed. In turn, that demos’s reflexive deliberation will 
produce a more just delineation of the demos.68 As evidence, Benhabib notes how 
public deliberation in Germany led to new citizenship laws in 2000, which made 
acquiring German citizenship easier for residents—a change which, she suggests, 
resulted in a fuller realisation of democracy.  
 The problem with this view is that its advocates rarely distinguish between meta-
democracy before the democratic threshold conditions have been achieved and meta-
democracy afterwards. That it is meant to apply to both is clear, for instance, from 
Dryzek’s affirmation that meta-democratic deliberation should not simply occur in well-
functioning democracies,69 as well as from Benhabib’s above statement that meta-
deliberation starts from current conditions, “no matter how arbitrary” they are. Failing 
to distinguish between these two kinds of cases makes the meta-democratic strategy 
seem eminently plausible. Indeed, as Benhabib’s example shows, it is undeniable that 
democratic deliberation sometimes improves itself.  
 However, when we turn to the specific question of how democracy’s threshold 
conditions should be promoted, this seems an unpromising solution. I argued in 3.2 
that before the threshold conditions are realised, democratic deliberation may amplify 
injustice rather than remedy it. Therefore, for the meta-democratic strategy to be 
promising, meta-democrats either need to refute the argument offered in 3.2; or they 
need to demonstrate that there is a disanalogy between deliberation on democracy itself 
and normal deliberation such that the effectiveness of the former does not presuppose 
that a basic threshold of justice has already been attained. In the absence of arguments 
for either claim, the meta-democratic strategy is uncompelling. 
 Moreover, there are reasons to doubt that a successful argument for either claim is 
forthcoming. In contexts marked by deep background inequalities, democratic decision-
making does sometimes damage democracy itself. In the US, initiatives aimed at 
reducing the vast socioeconomic inequalities that stand in the way of genuine political 
equality have encountered immense legislative resistance. Instead, tax cuts enacted 
under the Bush and Trump administrations seem likely to exacerbate these democracy-
                                                 
68 Benhabib (2006, 451). 
69 Dryzek (2010, 146-147). 
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impeding inequalities.70 Meta-democracy, then, simply does not inevitably improve 
democracy.  
 In light of these difficulties, a third and final parallel appears: the popular meta-
democratic strategy is to the question of how we should promote democracy’s 
threshold conditions what the Democratic Solution is to the Promotion Problem. 
While the latter recommends promoting justice through democratic decision-making, 
the former asserts that we should promote democracy’s threshold conditions, or basic 
justice, through democratic decision-making. Predictably, then, they are threatened by 
the same ambivalence. Amidst vast background injustices, both risk promoting injustice 
rather than justice. 
 Having surveyed these three common democratic responses, let us take stock. The 
present section suggests that the Democratic Solution encounters a dilemma when 
addressing the question of how we should realise the threshold conditions needed for 
democracy to be an effective tool for promoting justice. If the answer is ‘through non-
democratic forcible imposition’, the challenges familiar from the Moral Imposition 
Solution resurface (3.3.a). If, to avoid these difficulties, we follow agonistic democrats 
in resisting the presupposition that we should eliminate significant unjust power 
imbalances prior to resorting to democratic decision-making, then it is unclear why 
democracy will advance justice rather than injustice (3.3.b). Finally, an attempt to go 
between the horns of this democratic dilemma by suggesting that the threshold 
conditions should be realised democratically unsurprisingly recreates the Democratic 
Solution’s ambivalent relation to justice (3.3.c). As I have stressed throughout this 
section, this democratic dilemma closely parallels the dilemma that motivated the turn 
to democracy (see diagram below). Hence, an uncomfortable result arises: the dilemma 








                                                 






4. Conclusion: A Diagnosis 
 
I began by outlining a dilemma for the Promotion Problem, the problem of how we 
should go about realising justice in non-ideal contexts characterised, among other 
things, by deep ethical divisions. On the one hand, recommending the non-democratic 
forcible imposition of justice evokes the ominous figure of Plato’s philosopher king, 
along with its familiar problems: its problematic relation to domination, its epistemic 
immodesty, and, perhaps most importantly, its insensitivity to non-ideal contexts of 




power. ‘Realistic’ responses that adopt a more modest aim for politics than realising 
justice, on the other hand, seem too sensitive to existing power imbalances. By taking 
too much of the background context as given, they allow politics and its aims to be 
taken hostage by pre-existing injustices.  
 
 4.1. The Inevitable Cost of the Democratic Solution 
 
In this context, I examined the view that the Democratic Solution can navigate between 
the horns of this dilemma. My first conclusion is that although there are good grounds 
for thinking that the Democratic Solution is the most promising way of promoting 
justice, it encounters a dilemma similar to the one it aimed to avoid. Unless democratic 
deliberation presupposes exercises of non-democratic moral imposition, it risks being 
co-opted by existing unjust power imbalances and becoming complicit in their 
reproduction.  
 So, if we want the Democratic Solution to effectively promote justice, it seems we 
cannot avoid the conclusion that some non-democratic forcible imposition is required 
in establishing democracy’s threshold conditions—i.e., the minimal conditions that 
must obtain for democratic deliberation to advance justice rather than injustice. In this 
respect, the constitutionalist approach to democracy is correct. Consequently, the 
Democratic Solution cannot fully escape the costs associated with the Moral Imposition 
Solution. 
 
 4.2. An Unhappy Conclusion 
 
What should we make of this initial conclusion? We can discern two types of reactions. 
The first, illustrated by agonistic democrats and meta-democrats, consists in seeking, 
unsuccessfully, an alternative way of realising democracy’s threshold conditions. Their 
vigorous denial that democracy must run afoul of the Moral Imposition Solution’s 
difficulties tacitly acknowledges how seriously problematic this conclusion is. 
 But not all political philosophers feel this way. In particular, constitutionalist 
democrats who explicitly bite the bullet by endorsing the non-democratic moral 
imposition of democracy’s threshold conditions might and sometimes do reply as 
follows: ‘Yes, the threshold conditions for deliberation to effectively promote justice 
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must be realised by non-democratic means. So what? The Democratic Solution is still 
better than the alternatives canvassed. It is better than the Realistic Solution because it 
does not abandon the aim of promoting justice. And it is better than the Moral 
Imposition Solution because, although there are indeed costs to undemocratically 
imposing justice, the Democratic Solution requires such moral imposition to a lesser 
extent. It only requires moral imposition up to the point where, although some injustice 
remains, conditions are sufficiently good for inclusive deliberation to produce a 
virtuous circle of justice. Hence, although it reproduces the dilemma we began with, it 
reproduces it in an attenuated form. The Democratic Solution’s problems should 
therefore not worry us.’71 
 My second conclusion is that, contra this second response, we should be deeply 
unhappy about this chapter’s primary result. The present chapter has shown not just 
that the Democratic Solution inevitably incurs certain costs, but also that these costs are 
serious. Indeed, I have argued that the difficulties the Democratic Solution encounters 
are similar in kind—if not quite in degree—as those faced by the Moral Imposition 
Solution. Given how crude and undesirable this solution is—as I noted in 2.1, 
contemporary philosophers widely reject it—it is a profoundly worrying result that the 
Democratic Solution faces the same (albeit somewhat attenuated) problems. 
Accordingly, as it stands, even if the Democratic Solution is the lesser evil among the 
alternatives canvassed, the evil it involves seems very significant in absolute terms.  
 
 4.3. The Challenge Remaining 
 
Even so, this last observation might give rise to a second ‘so what?’ question. 
Lamenting the problems that afflict the best solution to the Promotion Problem seems 
futile if nothing can be done about them.  
 In fact, however, there is something we can do about the unhappy result we have 
arrived at. The Democratic Solution runs afoul of the Moral Imposition Solution’s 
difficulties to some extent. To what extent it does depends on what the threshold is for 
democracy to be an effective tool for promoting justice. Different theories of 
democracy place that threshold in different places. More idealising theories of 
democracy, like Habermas’s, Cohen’s, or Estlund’s, outline an ideal deliberative 
                                                 
71 For a similar response, see Fabre (2000a, 96-98).  
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situation which abstracts almost entirely from the injustices and power relations that 
characterise actual politics.72 Such theories, then, set the threshold at which valuable 
deliberative democratic processes begin very high. By contrast, agonistic democrats 
place the threshold conditions much lower, if they recognise any such conditions at all. 
The lower the threshold, the less the Democratic Solution presupposes non-democratic 
moral imposition.  
 In this light, the challenge ahead should be to rethink deliberative democracy for 
non-ideal circumstances. More precisely, the rest of this inquiry seeks to address the 
following question: what would deliberative democracy have to look like for its 
characteristic discursive situation to be as close to actual imperfect conditions as 
possible, while remaining an effective process for realising justice in those conditions? 
Exploring this question will allow us to develop a deliberative theory of democracy that 
minimises the costs of moral imposition, without giving up on promoting justice. Put 
differently, it will help us achieve the best balance between the need to ensure that 
democratic processes are effective at realising justice and the need to avoid as far as 
possible the important costs associated with moral imposition. In this way, we can turn 
the ‘lesser evil’ into the least possible evil. Following the pioneering work of Iris Marion 
Young,73 then, what follows is an attempt to articulate a vision of democratic justice for 
non-ideal conditions.  
 More specifically, I will focus on what democratic public deliberation would have to 
be like to constitute an effective tool for advancing justice in non-ideal conditions. 
Hence, my primary emphasis will be on what norms should regulate the content and 
form of inclusive public deliberation (Chapters 2-4), and on the extent to which the 
attitudinal norms presupposed by such deliberation are compatible with existing 
material and symbolic background conditions (Chapters 5-6). The question of who 
exactly should be granted formal participatory rights is one that I set aside here.   
 Before proceeding, two observations are in order. First, as I have stressed, showing 
that the Democratic Solution encounters a dilemma that is structurally similar to the 
one that prompted its introduction is important, because it motivates rethinking 
democratic deliberation. But bearing this initial dilemma in mind also matters because it 
                                                 
72 Habermas (1996, 305-306); Joshua Cohen (1989, 21-23); Estlund (2008, 18-20). Bächtiger et al (2010) 
distinguish more broadly between Type I and Type II approaches to deliberative democracy, with the former 
placing the threshold higher than the latter.  
73 Young (2000). See also Williams (2000, 144-146), Chambers (2009), and Anderson (2010, ch. 5). 
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offers useful conceptual lenses for understanding what is going on within democratic 
theory. We have already seen in 3.3 that we can helpfully classify prominent theories of 
democracy based on what horn of the original dilemma they tend to run afoul of. For 
similar reasons, keeping this dilemma in sight will help us orient our thinking and avoid 
certain pitfalls while developing a non-ideal theory of deliberation. Indeed, when 
discussing specific norms and presuppositions of democratic deliberation, we can 
expect the horns of the dilemma to resurface in more localised forms.  
 Second, it is worth pausing to consider the place of philosophy in this project. 
Determining under what conditions inclusive deliberation is justice-promoting rather 
than injustice-promoting is partly an empirical task. That is, it depends partly on social 
scientists’ findings concerning the consequences of different discursive norms. But 
philosophy also has an essential role to play. To begin, suppose we have a model of 
democratic deliberation designed for ideal conditions. Finding out whether its 
recommendations remain desirable in non-ideal conditions requires knowing what the 
necessary preconditions of those recommendations are. And, as illustrated by the rich 
theoretical literature on trust and its relation to democracy (which Chapter 5 will 
consider) articulating and conceptualising such preconditions is a deeply philosophical 
task.  
 Furthermore, the conceptual and normative work performed by philosophers helps 
appreciate why non-ideal circumstances are sometimes part of what makes democratic 
discursive processes valuable in the first place. Take contexts where some citizens 
express degrading views about others. To determine why the counterspeech supplied 
through democratic public discourse is a valuable response to such utterances, we need 
to understand what kind of harm is produced by degrading utterances, and how 
democratic counterspeech relates to that harm. As Chapter 3 will show, philosophers’ 
extensive conceptual work on language is directly relevant to this aim.  
 More generally, then, political philosophy contributes to answering the present 
question by offering a conceptual framework that facilitates and enriches subsequent 
empirical investigations into precisely what deliberative institutions should be 
implemented. With these background motivations and considerations in mind, let us 




















SHARED REASONS AND THE  




In Chapter 1, I considered the attractive view that deliberative democratic processes are 
the most appropriate means of advancing justice in non-ideal conditions marked, inter 
alia, by significant ethical disagreement and pervasive inequalities. Deliberative 
democracy, recall, is a conception of democracy that gives a central role to inclusive 
public exchanges of reasons. Accordingly, the political equality it strives for involves 
giving citizens not only equal voting rights, but also an equal opportunity to participate, 
directly or indirectly, in public discussion. 
Such democratic decision-making, I argued, constitutes an unpromising tool for 
promoting justice unless certain background conditions, democracy’s ‘threshold 
conditions’, have already been achieved. The effectiveness of democratic processes at 
realising justice depends on several kinds of background conditions, including: to what 
extent those who should be in the demos are actually granted formal citizenship rights; 
how vast material and symbolic inequalities are; and what norms regulate the content 
and form of public deliberation.  
Finally, I conceded that these threshold conditions may sometimes have to be 
realised non-democratically. Because this comes with serious costs, democratic theorists 
should be concerned with the following question: what would deliberative democracy 
have to look like for its ‘threshold’ deliberative situation to be as close to actual non-
ideal conditions as possible, while remaining an effective tool for promoting justice? 
Answering this question should yield a vision of democracy that minimises the costs 
associated with non-democratically realising democracy’s threshold conditions, without 
abandoning the aim of advancing justice. 
In this chapter, and the following two, I examine this question in relation to the 
third kind of threshold condition. What rules should regulate the content and form of 
public deliberation in non-ideal conditions? The present chapter examines one of the 
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most widely defended discursive norms, the Shared Reasons Constraint, according to 
which participants should appeal only to reasons that are shared.1  
I will establish three claims. First, although there are powerful grounds, stemming 
from the value of non-domination, for upholding the Shared Reasons Constraint, 
recent work in social epistemology indicates that even the weaker variants of this 
constraint risk regulating the content of public discourse in an overly restrictive way. 
That is, they risk excluding too many considerations from public deliberation (Section 
2). Second, the three most popular strategies put forward by democratic theorists for 
offsetting this ‘overexclusiveness’ encounter serious difficulties, both individually and 
taken together (Section 3). Lastly, I propose that we can mitigate these difficulties by 
giving a greater role to non-argumentative and emotionally-charged forms of speech, 
like narrative, in formal and informal arenas of democratic public deliberation (Section 
4). 
In establishing these conclusions, I am departing from typical non-ideal theories of 
democratic deliberation in an important way. While the Shared Reasons Constraint has 
been a staple of theories that articulate norms for public deliberation occurring under 
more or less idealised conditions (as Rawlsian public reason theory notably does2), non-
ideal democratic theorists have more commonly been wary of this constraint.3 Part of 
what is distinctive in my approach, then, is the suggestion that there are powerful 
reasons to try to maintain a Shared Reasons Constraint in non-ideal conditions. The 
challenge then becomes how we can do so while minimising the extent to which this 






                                                 
1 Following Scanlon (1998, 18), I understand reasons as considerations that purport to count in favour of 
something.  
2 E.g., Rawls (1997), Quong (2011), and Estlund (2008).  
3 E.g., Mouffe (1999, 755), Young (2000, 49), Talisse (2009, ch. 2), Schaap (2006, 263-264), Waldron (1999, 
ch. 7), and Dryzek (2010, 86-93). See note 67, this chapter, for discussion of Dryzek’s position. Now, some 
non-ideal deliberative theorists do explicitly defend the Shared Reasons Constraint. E.g., Williams (2000, 130), 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996, ch. 2), and Krause (2008, ch. 5). However, Williams’s discussion of non-
ideal public deliberation is largely programmatic. As for other non-ideal theorists who embrace the Shared 




2. Sharing Reasons: A Defence and an Objection 
2.1. The Shared Reasons Constraint 
 
Most political philosophers agree that some constraints should regulate the content of 
publicly-admissible considerations. But disagreements abound regarding what those 
constraints should be.4 Here, I wish to examine one of the most widely defended 
constraints on the content of public deliberation. Consider an initial statement: 
 
The Shared Reasons Constraint: In public deliberation, one must appeal to 
reasons that are shared by all participants when justifying one’s claims.  
 
How exactly the various terms of this formula should be interpreted has been the 
subject of much debate. One source of controversy concerns the constituency of the 
Shared Reasons Constraint—i.e., who exactly is included under ‘participants’. Another 
concerns the precise site of the Shared Reasons Constraint—i.e., which specific forums 
of public deliberation this norm is meant to govern. I bracket the issues of constituency 
and site until Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Here, let us focus on the terms ‘must’ 
and ‘shared’.  
 The first thing to notice is that the Shared Reasons Constraint should not be 
understood as a coercively-enforced legal norm. John Rawls, who refers to this 
constraint as the “duty of civility”, is explicit about this: “this duty […] is an intrinsically 
moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty”.5 Thus, deliberators ‘must’ appeal to 
shared reasons in the sense that they are morally required to appeal to such 
considerations. But the moral reasons supporting this obligation do not warrant legally 
suppressing public utterances of non-shared reasons. Nonetheless, lighter and more 
informal types of conventional enforcement may be warranted. In a parliamentary 
setting, for instance, this might manifest itself in having the presiding officer verbally 
rebuke speakers who merely appeal to non-shared considerations.6 
 In what sense should publicly-admissible considerations be ‘shared’ by participants? 
According to the most influential interpretation, a reason is shared when it is acceptable 
                                                 
4 For an overview, see Mansbridge et al (2010).  




to all—that is, when all can accept that reason or consideration as normatively forceful. 
This interpretation is prominent in Rawlsian public reason theory. For instance, in his 
thoroughgoing rearticulation of the Rawlsian ideal, Jonathan Quong affirms that, to 
comply with the duty of civility, one must “offer a reason […] that will be acceptable to 
everyone in their capacity as free and equal citizens. Public reasons, on this Rawlsian 
approach, are thus shared reasons.”7 But this interpretation is also common among 
deliberative democrats working outside of the Rawlsian tradition. Famously, Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson enjoin deliberators to “appeal to reasons that are […] 
mutually acceptable in content”.8 In a similar vein, Sharon Krause advocates “framing 
arguments in terms of the common concerns that underlie the political order”9. Thus, 
“public reasons are constituted by the things we all care about”.10 
A standard example of a non-shared reason, on this interpretation, is an appeal to a 
specific religious worldview. That the Ten Commandments denounce killing is not a 
widely acceptable reason for outlawing murder. Notice, however, what the acceptability 
interpretation does not say. Firstly, this interpretation does not entail that the claim one 
is defending on the basis of acceptable reasons must also be deemed acceptable by 
others. If I defend tax cuts for the wealthy by appealing to their well-being, what 
matters is that you accept the consideration that well-being is valuable. But you may 
nonetheless deny that this policy would best promote it. Furthermore, the need to 
appeal to acceptable considerations does not necessarily prohibit appealing to one’s 
self-interest rather than to the common good. I could, for instance, publicly oppose tax 
cuts by declaring that well-being is valuable, and that they hinder my well-being.11    
Importantly, however, some theorists interpret ‘shared’ far more weakly. On an 
increasingly popular interpretation, which Daniel Weinstock has notably advanced, a 
reason is shared when it is intelligible to all—that is, when everyone understands its 
meaning.12 While an acceptable reason is also intelligible to those who accept it, the 
converse is false. I can be acquainted with the Bible and understand appeals to 
                                                 
7 Quong (2011, 261; see also 10-11, 263). See, similarly, Rawls (1997, 770-771). 
8 Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 57). See also Mansbridge et al (2010, 66), Williams (2000, 130), Habermas 
(1996, 22-23), and Joshua Cohen (1996, 100). Bohman and Richardson (2009, 274) defend a related view, 
according to which shared reasons are mutually accepted.  
9 Krause (2008, 156; see also 18, 112, 156-159). 
10 Ibid., 151.  
11 Mansbridge et al (2010, 73-80).  
12 Weinstock (2017, 647). See also Dowding (2018, 244), Vallier (2016), and Gaus (2010, 279-283).  
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particular divine commands, but nevertheless reject the view that they have normative 
force.13  
Intelligibility is not the only alternative to acceptability as an interpretation of 
‘shared’. Deliberative democrats have developed a wide range of competing 
interpretations, many of which occupy an intermediate position between acceptability 
and intelligibility. Gabriele Badano and Matteo Bonotti, for example, defend accessibility, 
which they take to be less permissive than intelligibility and more permissive than 
acceptability.14  
But this diversity is unproblematic for my present argument. In what follows, after 
suggesting that the Shared Reasons Constraint (in both its stronger and weaker 
variants) has considerable prima facie appeal (2.2), I aim to diagnose a problem for this 
norm: even its weakest interpretation—intelligibility—is in important respects overly 
exclusive (2.3). If this criticism holds for the weakest interpretation of ‘shared’, then it 
will also hold for intermediate alternatives. 
 
2.2. A Justification for the Shared Reasons Constraint 
 
A powerful justification for the Shared Reasons Constraint concerns the freedom of 
those subjected to political power. While this justification holds on various 
understandings of freedom, here I focus on freedom understood as non-domination.15 
Domination, recall, is subjection to arbitrary or alien control. One is subjected to 
another’s alien control when that other has “the capacity, not subject to [one’s] direct or 
indirect check, to interfere in [one’s] choice”.16 By contrast, being subjected to power 
does not dominate when that power is checked, so that it must track one’s concerns or 
interests.  
How does the Shared Reasons Constraint relate to freedom, thus understood? One 
suggestion is that unless A, who is subjected to coercive power, appeals to reasons that 
are shared by B, who exercises that power, B will remain unmoved by her demands. 
Thus, to make political power responsive to her concerns and interests, and hence non-
                                                 
13 E.g., Rawls (1997, 771), Vallier (2016, 598-615).  
14 Badano and Bonotti (manuscript). Furthermore, there is diversity within interpretations of intelligibility: 
Vallier’s (2016) definition of intelligibility is somewhat stronger than the folk definition I give above. 
15 See also McBride (2007, 176-179). Rawls (1997, 799-800) and Enoch (2015, 138) accept the broader point 
that the Shared Reasons Constraint advances freedom or autonomy. 
16 Lovett and Pettit (2009, 14).  
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arbitrary, A must appeal to considerations that are shared by those wielding power. In 
this vein, Krause observes that Martin Luther King’s demands for racial equality 
“became convincing to white Americans […] because they appealed (in a logical 
fashion) to things most Americans really cared about: security, opportunity, and dignity, 
[…] liberty and equality”.17 
Krause is right that appealing to shared considerations contributes to effective 
political contestation (and therefore non-domination). But the argument suggested 
above falls short of establishing that conclusion. As stated, it is compatible with the 
prudential recommendation that A appeal to values B recognises, independently of 
whether A herself shares them. To see why A and B should appeal to shared reasons, 
we must say more. Recall that democratic deliberation involves the exchange of 
justifications over time. Accordingly, when subjects make claims relating to an exercise 
of power, they typically do not do so in a vacuum. Rather, they are often responding to 
whatever justifications have been given for that power in an ongoing debate. Indeed, 
citizens often hold political agents accountable by poking holes in the justifications they 
have offered.   
Now, one’s ability to respond to a justification is substantially enhanced when that 
justification was made using a reason one shares. This is most obvious with 
intelligibility. If I do not understand the reason given to me, it is unclear how I could 
even begin to respond to it. If a theocratic government condemns me on the basis of its 
esoteric religion, and I do not comprehend many of this religion’s cryptic concepts, my 
ability to contest and check that condemnation is severely impaired, and I do seem 
subjected to alien power. 
But a similar observation holds with acceptability. Even when one understands the 
terms of the debate, it is not uncommon to feel incapable of responding to certain 
charges because one feels that the debate has been misframed, framed using reasons 
one does not accept. If I feel alienated from the reasons that have been advanced, it 
may be impossible to articulate the points I feel are genuinely important in terms of 
those considerations. Suppose a government rejects same-sex marriage on the grounds 
that it is unnatural. A political opponent may well experience difficulties arguing that 
same-sex unions are natural, and think that it is simply irrelevant whether they are. 
Naturalness, she might think, is not a normatively significant category. But this leaves 
                                                 
17 Krause (2008, 164). 
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her in an awkward position. Either she attempts to respond to the charge of 
unnaturalness, which is likely to distort the considerations she finds genuinely 
significant; or she does not, but then she leaves the justification that those in power 
find most compelling unanswered. Thus, because the power she is subjected to is 
justified in terms she profoundly rejects, she is unable to force it to track the 
considerations she deems fundamentally important. 
Consequently, the point underpinning the Shared Reasons Constraint is not simply 
the prudential suggestion that giving reasons one’s interlocutors understand and 
eventually accept helps make them responsive to one’s interests. It is also the insight 
that when one is given reasons one understands and accepts as a justification for political 
power, one is better able to hold that power accountable and make it less dominating. 
To ensure that, in a debate where participants exchange reasons over time, all 
participants are given reasons they understand and accept, the debate must be framed 
in terms of shared reasons.  
This freedom-based justification is defeasible: although there are powerful pro tanto 
reasons to embrace the Shared Reasons Constraint, these may be outweighed by 
countervailing considerations.  Having provided a defeasible case for this norm, then, I 
will now introduce what I take to be strongest consideration against it.  
 
2.3. The Overexclusiveness Problem 
 
Perhaps the most daunting objection to the Shared Reasons Constraint is that it is 
overly exclusive, or rules out too many considerations. This is especially evident on the 
strong interpretation of ‘shared’, where shared reasons are acceptable to all participants. 
As many critics have noted, given non-ideal societies’ deep divisions, it is likely that for 
most moral considerations, someone rejects them.18 Homophobes may find same-sex 
unions worthless and unnatural. White supremacists might judge that racial minorities 
are innately inferior. And some ideological doctrines, religious and non-religious, assign 
women to a subordinate role. It seems a deeply unwelcome result that, according to the 
strong Shared Reasons Constraint, we should therefore refrain from appealing to the 
values of loving same-sex relationships, of racial equality, and of gender parity as 
reasons for or against policies. 
                                                 
18 E.g., Williams (2000, 133-134), Talisse (2009, 52-56), Young (2000, 40-41), Enoch (2015, 118). 
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One might take this as grounds for reverting to the weak Shared Reasons 
Constraint, which only requires that reasons be intelligible to all. But what proponents 
and critics alike typically overlook19 is that overexclusiveness also plagues the weak 
Shared Reasons Constraint. Contemporary work in social epistemology brings this out 
particularly clearly. In recent years, social epistemologists such as Miranda Fricker, 
Kristie Dotson, Charles Mills, and Elizabeth Anderson have extensively explored and 
theorised the obstacles that prevent relatively disempowered groups from making 
important group-specific concerns intelligible to others.20  
According to these theorists, different social groups, who occupy different social 
positions based on their race, gender, class, and so on, systematically experience 
different constraints and enablements. Consequently, they may be radically ignorant of 
one another’s experiences and perspectives. This is particularly true, social 
epistemologists suggest, with respect to what privileged groups know about less 
privileged groups. For example, Mills and Anderson have both argued that because of 
wide-ranging segregation between white and black Americans, whites typically 
encounter very different facets of American society than blacks do. In consequence, 
significant portions of blacks’ daily lives remain invisible to whites.21  
These deep experiential divides, Fricker argues, generate a distinctive epistemic 
problem for disadvantaged social groups. In highly unequal societies, disempowered 
groups typically have less influence over the creation and diffusion of social meanings. 
Consequently, the pool of conceptual resources a society has for conferring meaning on 
activities and experiences ends up being especially adapted to dominant groups’ 
experiences. The upshot is that disadvantaged groups struggle to make sense of and to 
articulate their group-specific experiences: “some significant area of [their] social 
experience [is] obscured from collective understanding”.22  Fricker calls this unjust 
deficit of intelligibility a “hermeneutical injustice”.23 
In extreme cases of hermeneutical injustice, marginalised groups themselves lack 
the conceptual resources needed to make sense of their own experiences and concerns. 
Here, Fricker cites the case of sexual harassment. Before the concept ‘sexual 
harassment’ was developed in the 1970s, Fricker suggests, those experiencing it lacked 
                                                 
19 E.g., Vallier (2016, 602), Badano and Bonotti (manuscript). 
20 Fricker (2007); Dotson (2011); Mills (2007); Anderson (2010).  
21 Mills (2007); Anderson (2010, 44-50).  




the categories needed to fully understand the wrong they were being subjected to. Their 
experiences had to be conceptualised as mere instances of ‘flirting’ or ‘joking’.24 By 
contrast, in the more common case of hermeneutical injustice, although victims of 
hermeneutical injustice possess the concepts needed to make sense of their own 
experiences, some of their interlocutors do not.25 When this is the case, requiring that 
deliberators appeal to mutually-intelligible considerations—as the weak Shared Reasons 
Constraint does—keeps victims of hermeneutical injustice from appealing to concepts 
that are needed adequately to express important considerations or concerns.  
To clarify this, consider several examples social epistemologists have examined. 
Micro-aggressions, Dotson explains, are brief and commonplace slights and indignities 
directed at members of stigmatised groups, often automatically and unintentionally.26 
They include, for instance, a white person instinctively checking that she still has her 
wallet when a black person walks by. When these behaviours are systematic, and when 
they cumulatively tend to express a denigrating stereotype, they are reasonably 
experienced with indignation.27 Now, to someone who never experiences such 
behaviours, it might be puzzling how very slight actions could ever amount to more than 
a trivial offense. In other words, someone in this position could fail to grasp the very 
concept of a micro-aggression. Just as many pre-Leibnizian mathematicians were 
unable to conceive of how a sum of infinitesimals could amount to a finite number, 
such a person might be unable to conceive of how many involuntary slights could 
cumulatively compose something as morally problematic as an aggression. Accordingly, 
members of privileged groups might (and sometimes do) think that denouncing 
behaviours as micro-aggressions is misguided, and that those who do so are simply 
overly sensitive.28 In such instances, a public justification invoking the concept ‘micro-
aggression’ is ruled out by even a weak Shared Reasons Constraint, because the concept 
is unintelligible to some participants.    
Similarly, Fricker cites marital rape as an instance of hermeneutical injustice.29 Many 
states did not recognise marital rape as a crime until very recently. Some still do not. 
Importantly, what made criminalising marital rape difficult was partly the concept’s 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 152-153. 
25 Fricker (2013, 1319-1320). 
26 Dotson (2011, 246).  
27 See McTernan (forthcoming) for discussion of the injustice enacted by micro-aggressions. 
28 E.g., Lukianoff and Haidt (2015), Campbell and Manning (2015).  
29 Fricker (2007, 155).  
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perceived unintelligibility. To some, marital rape seemed a contradiction in terms, 
because rape presupposes a lack of consent, whereas marriage (as they conceived it) 
produces the relevant consent by definition. And indeed, even where marital rape is 
criminalised, public pronouncements denying the coherence of this concept remain 
common.30 Here again, certain extremely significant considerations were not even 
weakly shared because they invoked concepts that were unintelligible to some.  
Finally, and returning to same-sex marriage, the issue is not merely that same-sex 
relationships are not recognised as valuable, but also that what they are can be 
fundamentally misunderstood. Homosexuality, Fricker notes, was once classified by 
hermeneutical authorities as an illness or disorder. In the US, for instance, it remained 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) until 1973. And 
witness, even today, the tragically common amalgamation of homosexuality and 
paedophilia.31 In these cases, in addition to the value of same-sex relationships being 
denied, what same-sex relationships are is itself fundamentally not understood by some.  
Consequently, the Shared Reasons Constraint seems overexclusive even if we 
endorse its weak variant. Recent social epistemology indicates that when members of 
privileged groups are profoundly ignorant of vulnerable groups’ daily experiences, they 
are liable not to understand important considerations raised by members of such 
groups. Often, as the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice suggests, this is because 
they do not grasp crucial concepts that figure in these considerations. When this 
happens, even the weak Shared Reasons Constraint prohibits appealing to such 
considerations. But some of these excluded reasons, including those discussed above, 
intuitively should have a place in public discourse. Excluding them silences 
marginalised groups, and thereby prevents them from contesting an unjust status quo. 
More precisely: excluding the important reasons in question undercuts public 
contestation’s efficacy at advancing justice with respect to the policy issue on which the 
reasons were taken to bear. Therefore, there are powerful reasons to resist the Shared 
Reasons Constraint grounded in the value of freedom as non-domination.  
This result is unfortunate from the standpoint of freedom: pro tanto reasons 
grounded in non-domination support the Shared Reasons Constraint in some respects, 
and pull against it in others. On the one hand, receiving justifications in terms of non-
                                                 
30 E.g., Rothman (2015). 
31 E.g., Walker (2014).  
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shared reasons reduces individuals’ ability to contest exercises of power (2.2). On the 
other, requiring that individuals appeal to shared reasons holds the political agency of 
vulnerable participants hostage to the ignorance or ill-will of others (2.3). Either way, it 
seems we fail to satisfy important freedom-based reasons.  
In what follows, I critically assess the three most popular responses that deliberative 
democrats have developed to offset the problem of overexclusiveness. While these 
strategies are commonly presented together, they are conceptually distinct. 
Consequently, I will articulate them separately, to better discern the difficulties 
associated with each. I will, however, also evaluate how they might work jointly to 
overcome certain difficulties. In evaluating them, the question to bear in mind is this: 
how can we avoid making public deliberation overly exclusive, while responding as far 
as possible to the initial reasons for adopting the Shared Reasons Constraint? How, put 
differently, can we best weaken the trade-off between competing reasons grounded in 
the value of non-domination? 
 
3. The Limits of Three Influential Responses   
 3.1. Deriving new reasons from old ones 
 
An initial response acknowledges that the Shared Reasons Constraint may initially 
exclude important reasons, but insists that these considerations can become shared, and 
therefore admissible, via deliberative processes. Hence, the objection that some 
important reasons are currently excluded is not decisive against the Shared Reasons 
Constraint.  
 Krause describes the process through which new considerations are to be 
introduced as follows:  
 
Public reason […] always operates in medias res. […] Sometimes new 
principles are introduced into public dialogue, principles that previously were 
external to public reason. Yet in order for a new principle [to be introduced] 
it must connect up with some principles that are already subject to public 
agreement32  
                                                 
32 Krause (2008, 160-161). See also Rawls (1997, 784-786), Habermas (2008, 130-131), and Morgan-Olsen 
(2010, 235-238).  
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The idea, it seems, is that we introduce new reasons by showing that already-shared 
reasons support or make sense of these novel considerations. The process has a broadly 
inferential structure: new considerations are derived from, or translated in terms of, 
reasons that are already shared. Thus, through logical argument, public debate can 
produce a more adequately inclusive set of publicly-admissible reasons.  
 This derivation process notably echoes Rawls’s famous proviso in his “wide” 
understanding of public political culture. According to Rawls’s proviso, citizens may 
appeal to reasons that are not yet shared or public provided that, in due course, they 
give properly public reasons to support those appeals.33 A religious citizen could 
permissibly appeal to the Gospel story of the Good Samaritan, Rawls suggests, so long 
as they “do not stop there, but go on to give a public justification for this parable’s 
conclusions in terms of political values”.34 The recurring thought is that justifications in 
terms of non-shared reasons can be brought into the public sphere on the condition 
that they are shown to link up adequately to already-shared considerations.  
While this proposal—to derive new reasons from already-shared ones—is prima 
facie appealing, it is unclear how fruitful it would be in settings marked by deep 
divisions and injustices. The proposal envisions the democratic process as involving 
public debate that systematically improves itself. We start from an overexclusive set of 
publicly-admissible reasons, and thence derive novel reasons, which in turn enable us to 
integrate further legitimate concerns into public debate. But the expectation that public 
debate will be self-improving in this way is premature. If the initial set of shared reasons 
is sufficiently small and biased against certain participants—perhaps because others are 
ignorant of their experiences—the derivation process could instead be viciously 
circular, in the sense of reproducing the initial exclusiveness of public deliberation.35 To 
see this, imagine a highly inegalitarian society where the majority believes in a natural 
hierarchy based on sexual preference. Because equality and related moral concepts are 
not shared in this scenario, logically connecting the consideration that same-sex couples 
                                                 
33 Rawls (1997, 784-785).  
34 Ibid., 786. Note that Rawls’s proviso is slightly ambiguous. The shared reasons introduced in due course 
could be introduced either to support the non-shared considerations (as I have been suggesting) or directly to 
support the policy that the non-shared reasons aimed to justify. However, the latter option seems 
unsatisfactory: it allows deliberators to appeal to non-shared considerations that are dear to them only when 
these are redundant from a justificatory perspective. That is, it suggests that non-shared reasons can be given 
to support P only when some other consideration already sufficiently supports P. But citizens who are 
concerned that morally-important considerations are excluded from public discourse do not simply want to 
utter those considerations in public. They want to use those considerations to justify policies.  
35 Bohman (2003, 770). 
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should have the right to marry to existing shared reasons would be extremely difficult, 
if not impossible. Here, the initial exclusiveness of public discourse would prevent 
some valid concerns from being derived from already-shared reasons.  
One might reply that I am being too pessimistic. Even if in principle the derivation 
strategy can be inadequate when starting from highly exclusionary conditions, one 
might think that actual conditions are not like this. For instance, Krause observes that 
even in pluralistic polities like the United States, many evaluative concerns are shared. 
Indeed, equality, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are enshrined in the US 
Constitution.36 This, it might seem, makes it possible logically to derive many new 
reasons through public deliberation. ‘If we truly care about liberty and equality,’ 
proponents of same-sex marriage can argue, ‘then we are logically committed to 
respecting different lifestyles and recognising an equal right to marriage for same-sex 
couples.’ 
However, this reply overlooks another obstacle that stands in the way of deriving 
novel reasons. Despite invoking liberty and equality, the US Constitution was long 
interpreted as legitimating slavery. Likewise, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the US Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation by propounding the “separate but 
equal” doctrine. These cases remind us that even when a consideration x is widely 
recognised, this may well conceal deep disagreement over its correct interpretation. So, 
deriving a novel reason in a way that is likely to make it become shared requires not just 
connecting it with x, but more specifically connecting it to the audience’s interpretation 
of x. What is worse, Plessy v. Ferguson highlights that widely-held prejudices—say, beliefs 
in a natural hierarchy—may infect ‘promising’ values, like equality, so that they come to 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with existing injustices. Thus, even when a reason 
seems shared, disagreement over its interpretation and exclusionary interpretations may 
combine to obstruct attempts at analysing legitimate concerns in its terms.  
According to social epistemologists concerned with the social production of 
ignorance, this last difficulty is a common feature of non-ideal, divided societies.37 Mills, 
for example, suggests as much when commenting on contemporary understandings of 
equality and racism: 
 
                                                 
36 Krause (2008, 157, 160). 
37 E.g., Mills (2007), Fricker (2013), Stanley (2015, ch. 3), Talisse (2009, 63-64). 
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If previously whites were color demarcated as biologically and/or culturally 
unequal and superior, now through a strategic ‘color blindness’ they are 
assimilated as putative equals to the status and situation of nonwhites on 
terms that negate the need for measures to repair inequities.38 
 
Mills is saying that although equality is now widely affirmed, many understand it in 
colour-blind terms. Roughly, on this conception, racial equality is realised when no one 
is treated differently because of their race. This interpretation, Mills suggests, is 
incompatible with many concerns that black activists have defended on grounds of 
equality. To those who endorse a colour-blind conception of equality, the consideration 
that blacks are owed differential treatment (including reparations for historical injustices) cannot 
intelligibly be derived from considerations of equality. Indeed, as Mills notes, to them 
the real opponents of equality and “the real racists are the blacks who continue to insist 
on the importance of race”.39 Thus, such individuals will reject attempts at translating 
demands for reparations in terms of equality.  
For another example, consider again same-sex marriage. Suppose an advocate of 
same-sex marriage wanted to introduce the non-shared consideration that same-sex 
relationships are valuable into public discourse. And suppose she did so by connecting 
same-sex relationships to the idea of a loving relationship, where her opponents 
recognised that loving relationships are valuable. In response to similar arguments, 
opponents of same-sex marriage sometimes respond that true romantic love is 
essentially a relation between a woman and a man. Some religious believers maintain 
this restrictive concept of love because, citing Corinthians, they claim that true love is 
essentially godly, while same-sex relationships are sinful.40 Alternatively, if one believes 
that loving relationships are inherently healthy and valuable, but (in line with the DSM’s 
pre-1973 classification) that homosexuality is a disorder, then one is bound to think that 
same-sex relationships cannot be subsumed under the concept of a loving relationship. 
Still others might object, as some philosophers notoriously have, that same-sex 
relationships, in virtue of instantiating a form of narcissistic desire, are perversions of 
genuine love.41 More generally, the problem is the following: when deliberators hold 
                                                 
38 Mills (2007, 27-28).  
39 Ibid., 28.  
40 Halley (2017). 
41 Scruton (2001, 307-310). See, similarly, Finnis (2008, 390-396). 
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such contrasting concepts of love, there is no shared understanding of ‘loving 
relationship’ from which one might derive the consideration that same-sex relationships 
are valuable.  
These considerations suggest that, in divided settings, deriving novel reasons from 
the existing pool of shared considerations is very challenging. Although there may seem 
to be agreement on some shared reasons, this agreement is often more apparent than 
real: it conceals profound disagreement on how these considerations should be 
interpreted; and it obscures the fact that, in unjust circumstances, even seemingly 
promising considerations may be interpreted in ways that accommodate injustices. 
When the initial pool of genuinely shared reasons is highly limited, so too are the 
prospects for deriving new considerations on their basis. 
This is not to deny that novel reasons do over time enter public discourse and do 
become shared. Rather, the point is that if we want to conceptualise and prescribe 
processes through which they might do so, the strategy of logically deriving new 
reasons from old ones seems insufficient on its own. Thus, let us see how we might try 
to supplement this proposal.  
 
3.2. Restricting the Constituency 
 
When very few reasons are already genuinely shared, the prospects for deriving new 
shared reasons from old ones seem limited. In response, one solution aims to facilitate 
processes of derivation by adding some important considerations that not all actual 
citizens share to the set of publicly-admissible reasons. The idea is that, if the initial set 
of publicly-admissible reasons is enriched thus, it will be easier for participants to voice 
their demands and to introduce new important considerations on the basis of already-
admissible reasons. Indeed, they will have more resources from which to derive novel 
considerations. 
This strategy is most clearly exemplified by public reason theorists, particularly 
those working in the Rawlsian tradition, when they restrict the constituency of the 
Shared Reasons Constraint. The Shared Reasons Constraint, recall, says that 
deliberators must appeal to reasons that are shared by all participants when publicly 
justifying their claims. So far, I have been assuming that ‘participants’ refers to all actual 
adult citizens. But public reason theorists characteristically adopt a more restricted 
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understanding of the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency, by taking ‘participants’ 
to refer to idealised persons. Participants can be idealised in two ways: epistemically, 
when they are better at reasoning and responding to evidence than actual participants; 
and morally, when they have better values and motivations than actual participants. 
Note that although the parties are idealised, some subset of actual participants may 
satisfy the idealising conditions, while others may not. Often the former are labelled 
“reasonable”, and the latter “unreasonable”.42 
Rawls influentially illustrates this approach.43 He claims that the reasons given when 
justifying coercive power must be ones that “free and equal citizen[s] might reasonably 
accept”.44 To be reasonable involves, firstly, a moral idealisation. Reasonable 
participants view others as free and equal citizens and are therefore prepared to offer 
them fair terms of cooperation. Moreover, because reasonable citizens recognise the 
“burdens of judgment”—the many hazards that inevitably confront human 
reasoning—they do not expect or demand that others hold ethical views identical to 
their own.45 According to Martha Nussbaum, there is evidence that Rawls’s account of 
reasonableness also involves an epistemic idealisation: Rawlsian reasonableness, on her 
interpretation, requires upholding views that are basically coherent and responsive to 
new evidence.46  
That being said, many political theorists working outside of the Rawlsian tradition 
adopt a similar strategy. Krause, for instance, suggests that the test for whether a 
consideration is admissible in public deliberation is not whether it is endorsed by all 
actual citizens, but rather whether it could “be endorsed from within a suitably 
structured moral standpoint.” What makes concerns “endorsable in this context is that 
they can be affirmed […] from within a deliberative perspective that manifests equal 
respect.”47  
                                                 
42 Quong (2017, Section 3).  
43 Rawls (1997, 769-771). See also Quong (2017, Section 3). 
44 Rawls (1997, 770), emphasis added.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Rawls (1993, 58-59). See Nussbaum’s (2011, 24-25) discussion. 
47 Krause (2008, 163; see also 126, 132, 166-167). Additionally, see Estlund (2008, 4) and Gutmann and 
Thompson (1996, 55-56). A terminological note: Rawls, Quong, and Estlund are often labelled ‘public reason 
theorists’, whereas Krause and Gutmann and Thompson are frequently described as ‘deliberative democrats’. 
Typically, the latter care essentially about actual deliberative justification, whereas the former care primarily 
about the justifiability of institutions, though they often also care about actual justification. What matters here 
is that both restrict the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency. And since restricting its constituency is 
commonly associated with public reason theorists, I will generally use ‘public reason theorist’ to refer to 
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Thus, though Rawls’s account is the most influential, different theorists have 
offered many competing accounts of what the right level of idealisation is (and by 
extension, of what exactly constitutes reasonableness).48 Consequently, the arguments 
that follow will not depend on the specific moral and epistemic conditions Rawls builds 
into his idealisation. Instead, the moral costs that I will argue are associated with 
idealising the participants who constitute the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency 
should apply to the extent that we idealise them. 
Restricting the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency seems prima facie helpful 
when it comes to addressing the overexclusiveness problem. By excluding 
‘unreasonable’ participants who are insensitive to important descriptive or normative 
considerations when interpreting the Shared Reasons Constraint, idealisation prevents 
such actual persons from ruling out appeals to these considerations. Put differently, this 
strategy prevents the content of public deliberation from being held hostage by the 
perspectives of unreasonable citizens.  
However, restricting the constituency to reasonable persons is problematic in two 
respects. The first and most widely discussed worry concerns the fate of unreasonable 
people. Some theorists express the concern that excluding unreasonable persons from 
the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency means stripping them of their basic 
political status: unreasonable persons, Marilyn Friedman suggests, “will be treated like 
the bearers of a pestilence […] They will be denied the full protection of the system’s 
basic rights and liberties, particularly freedom of expression.”49  
As Quong has emphasised, however, Friedman’s articulation of this initial worry 
rests on a misinterpretation. Excluding unreasonable persons from the Shared Reasons 
Constraint’s constituency does not mean excluding them from the political community 
of citizens altogether. Actual unreasonable citizens, Quong insists, generally retain their 
basic legal and political rights, including the rights to vote, to stand for office, and even 
to publicly express unreasonable views.50 Indeed, recall that the Shared Reasons 
Constraint is a moral norm, not a legal one. So, contra Friedman, it does not necessarily 
require that anyone be legally prevented from expressing their views.  
                                                                                                                                               
advocates of this restriction. On the relation between justifiability and actual deliberative justification, see 
Vallier (2015). 
48 For discussion of this diversity, see Vallier (2011, 371-372) and Quong (2017, Section 3). 
49 Friedman (2000, 23). 
50 Quong (2011, ch. 10) 
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Unreasonable citizens, then, are not formally excluded from the democratic political 
community. Where they are discounted is in the theoretical process of determining what 
qualifies as a shared reason. What does this mean for actual non-ideal deliberative 
politics? Because they are discounted, some reasons that are not actually shared by 
unreasonable citizens will nevertheless count as shared. Citizens who embrace these 
not-actually-shared reasons will therefore be welcome, morally speaking, to appeal to 
them when justifying their political demands. Hence, to the extent that the Shared 
Reasons Constraint is realised, public deliberation will partly be framed in terms that 
unreasonable citizens do not accept and eventually do not understand. Moreover, 
although the Shared Reasons Constraint is not a legal norm, we saw in 2.1 that the 
moral reasons underpinning it may warrant lighter, non-coercive ways of upholding it. 
This may involve, say, ignoring the public complaints of unreasonable citizens, should 
they object that they cannot understand or accept some reasons that are being publicly 
appealed to. Indeed, such complaints are irrelevant if unreasonable citizens are not part 
of the constituency for whom considerations must be shared.  
In this light, even if Quong is right that restricting the constituency does not strip 
unreasonable citizens of formal citizenship rights, doing so nonetheless imposes a 
moral cost on them. Section 2.2 argued that the Shared Reasons Constraint is pro tanto 
desirable because it advances the freedom as non-domination of individuals subjected 
to power. Requiring that coercive power be justified using shared reasons enhances 
subjects’ capacity to contest that power. But consider now the position of unreasonable 
parties. Some, perhaps many, of the reasons raised in deliberative justifications are now 
unacceptable and eventually unintelligible to them. Consequently, they are relatively 
disempowered with respect to these justifications. Moreover, their objection to the 
presence of these reasons may eventually be ignored as irrelevant. Hence, it seems the 
Shared Reasons Constraint no longer protects them from domination. Insofar as this is 
so, idealising the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency undercuts the original 
rationale for that constraint.51 
Now, this initial problem does not entirely preclude idealising the Shared Reasons 
Constraint’s constituency. As 2.3 discussed, the overexclusiveness resulting from the 
non-idealised Shared Reasons Constraint in conjunction with the ignorance or 
immorality of some citizens (the unreasonable) exposes other citizens to domination 
                                                 
51 For a similar point, see Enoch (2015). 
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(those whose legitimate concerns are misunderstood or misrecognised). It may well be 
that sometimes, protecting the latter from domination warrants, all things considered, 
subjecting the former to domination. This is the conclusion Matt Sleat comes to. While 
he emphasises that the unreasonable are dominated when public justification is geared 
towards reasonable participants, his conclusion is not that this is impermissible. Instead, 
it is that violations of freedom are an unavoidable, if regrettable, feature of non-ideal 
politics.52  
This first concern, then, does not imply that restricting the constituency necessarily 
generates insuperable moral costs.53 Nevertheless, it does show that this proposal is 
problematic for our purposes: our aim, as stated when concluding Section 2, is to 
weaken the trade-off between dominating those whose legitimate concerns are not 
publicly recognised, and dominating those who do not recognise those concerns. But 
restricting the constituency does nothing to weaken this trade-off. Instead, it suggests 
how, given this trade-off, we can minimise domination. Accordingly, it should be a last 
resort, introduced only once we have exhausted alternative solutions aimed at 
weakening the trade-off.  
Idealising the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency generates a second, more 
serious, problem relating to non-ideal conditions. Existing democracies are non-ideal 
not just in that some individuals have unreasonable views, but also in that there is often 
a mismatch between who is right and who has power. Often, the unreasonable are also 
powerful. This, recall, is a recurrent theme of contemporary social epistemology: as the 
examples of marital rape, homophobia, sexual harassment, and micro-aggressions 
indicated, it is often the experiences and concerns of vulnerable groups that are 
misrecognised and it is dominant groups who misrecognise them. Public reason theorists 
sometimes obscure this point by focusing on cases where the unreasonable are 
marginal—for instance, religious extremists like the Westboro Baptist Church.54 
If the unreasonable are also powerful, however, idealising the Shared Reasons 
Constraint’s constituency is problematic. Such a norm welcomes debates that are 
framed in terms that unreasonable citizens may neither accept nor understand, and 
                                                 
52 Sleat (2013, 362-363). 
53 One might think that domination is not morally costly at all when it affects unreasonable citizens. I follow 
Waldron (2012, 146-150), Enoch (2015, 123), and Raz (1998, 32-34) in resisting this view. Indeed, ceteris 
paribus, a world where we can protect vulnerable groups without dominating the unreasonable—say, by 
convincing them instead—seems morally better. 
54 E.g., Blake (2005, 233), Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 63-69). 
66 
 
recommends ignoring their complaints concerning this framing. But this seems ill-
advised if they are dominant. If we fail to engage with the objections or concerns of 
powerful agents, we are unlikely to achieve political change. As mentioned earlier, 
King’s discourse was effective partly because, rather than ignore the concerns of the 
(often bigoted) white majority, he tried to speak a language they were responsive to. 
Similarly, Abraham Lincoln often appealed to legal grounds for ending slavery precisely 
because many of his Congressional interlocutors were unresponsive to the moral case.  
Hence, restricting the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency jeopardises one of 
the prime reasons for advocating inclusive deliberation. Such processes help hold the 
powerful accountable. By demanding justifications for their decisions, and publicly 
scrutinising those justifications, weaker parties can publicly shame the powerful and 
thereby exercise some control over them. But if weaker agents frame their claims in 
terms of considerations that powerful agents are unresponsive to, or simply ignore 
powerful agents, public deliberation cannot serve this purpose. Hence, it is not just the 
non-domination of unreasonable citizens that is problematic for the present proposal. 
It is also the non-domination of vulnerable groups.  
Some public reason theorists might reply that not addressing this second worry is 
not an oversight. Quite simply, they are interested in theorising public reason for ideal 
rather than non-ideal conditions. Quong, like Estlund and Rawls, explicitly suggests 
this. He remarks that  
 
the idea of public reason and the duty of civility belong to an ideal of how 
things ought to be in a democratic society, assuming citizens as just and 
society as well-ordered […] Pointing out that adhering to the duty of civility 
may be counterproductive under current conditions is thus no objection to 
the ideal, since current democratic societies are far from ideal, or well-
ordered.55  
 
There are two things to say here. Firstly, although this is a possible response, some 
political theorists who idealise the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency clearly are 
interested in non-ideal theory. For example, Gutmann and Thompson as well as Krause 
                                                 
55 Quong (2013, 270; 2017, Section 8.1). See also Estlund (2008, 19) and Rawls (1997, 766n3). As Enoch 
(2015, 125n37) observes, however, Quong (2011, 158-159) occasionally speaks as if public reason norms 
applied in non-ideal conditions.  
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intend their discussion of public discourse to be relevant to actual conditions. 
Accordingly, they frequently cite actual cases—for instance, pronouncements by the 
Civil Rights Movement—to illustrate why they defend certain discursive norms.56   
Secondly, while this response might shield Rawlsian public theorists and other ideal 
theorists from my criticism, it does so only by making their topic of inquiry distinct 
from my own. Hence, it does not undermine my point that, in non-ideal theory, 
restricting the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency generates significant problems. 
Even if those authors were not concerned with non-ideal theory, it remained an open 
question (which Quong acknowledges to be “hugely important” and underexplored57) 
whether their recommendation could also be prescriptive there. I have reached the 
conclusion that in important respects, it is not. 
In summary, the proposal that we restrict the Shared Reasons Constraint’s 
constituency to idealised or ‘reasonable’ participants faces two serious limitations 
(which echo the limitations of Chapter 1’s Moral Imposition Solution) when it is 
applied to public deliberation taking place in non-ideal conditions. Firstly, the proposal 
is insensitive to non-ideal contexts of power: when unreasonable parties are also 
powerful, the idealised Shared Reasons Constraint jeopardises the freedom as non-
domination of vulnerable groups. Where the unreasonable are not powerful, the 
proposal might seem more viable, as they can safely be ignored. However, even in such 
conditions restricting the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency seems problematic: 
it risks subjecting unreasonable citizens to domination. While this might sometimes be 
a necessary cost to protect misrecognised vulnerable groups from domination, we 
should only accept this solution as a last resort. This is because it does not weaken the 
trade-off between the non-domination of the unreasonable and of the reasonable. 
Rather, it simply suggests what the best decision is given that the trade-off exists. Prior 
to idealising the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency, then, we must investigate 





                                                 
56 E.g., Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 134), Krause (2008, chs. 4-5), Dreben (2003, 317, 328). 
57 Quong (2013, 270). 
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3.3. Adopting a Systemic View of Deliberative Sites  
 
According to the third popular solution, the overexclusiveness problem seems worrying 
largely because I fail to distinguish between different sites of the deliberative ‘system’. 
On the systemic understanding of deliberation, we should not imagine democratic 
deliberation as involving a single deliberative forum, which aspires to include all 
citizens. Instead, we should understand deliberative democracy as a whole system 
composed of smaller parts—i.e., composed of many arenas or sites for public 
discussion, which vary in size, function, and formality, and which are connected more 
or less directly to one another.58  
Systemic approaches typically distinguish two main kinds of deliberative sites. 
Formal public arenas, such as legislative bodies, involve deliberation which leads to 
coercively-enforced decisions. By contrast, in more informal arenas, often situated in 
civil society, deliberation largely helps participants form considered opinions on 
political issues.59  
There are strong reasons for endorsing the systemic view of deliberative democracy. 
Firstly, interpreting deliberation as a system composed of many interconnected sites 
helps us “think about deliberative democracy in large-scale societal terms”.60 
Accordingly, it contributes to addressing the criticism that deliberative democracy’s 
emphasis on inclusive deliberation is unrealistic when applied to large-scale mass 
democracies. Secondly, by describing democracy as comprising interconnected arenas 
which differ in size, formality, and function, it seems capable of accommodating 
naturally the intuition that institutions like consciousness-raising groups, partisan media 
outlets, and protests can enhance the quality of democracies, even though individually, 
such institutions are not fully welcoming to all citizens. Because of this twofold appeal, 
we should embrace the systemic approach to deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, I 
aim to challenge the more specific claim that the systemic approach helps solve the 
overexclusiveness problem.  
Why think that it helps? The systemic view of deliberation states that different 
deliberative sites vary in formality, so that some are regulated by more constraining 
                                                 
58 Mansbridge et al (2012).  
59 E.g., Habermas (1996, 307-308), Krause (2008, 121).  
60 Mansbridge et al (2012, 2).  
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discursive norms than others.61 In this light, a seemingly straightforward strategy for 
offsetting the Shared Reasons Constraint’s exclusiveness recommends confining it to 
formal deliberative sites. Rawls, for instance, affirms that “the idea of public reason 
does not apply to the background culture [i.e., civil society], with its many forms of 
non-public reason nor to media of any kind”. It only applies to what he calls the 
“public political forum”, which includes the discourse of judges, government officials, 
legislators, and candidates for public office.62 Krause is even clearer in suggesting that 
restricting the site of the Shared Reasons Constraint should mitigate the problem of 
overexclusiveness. While “laws and policies that are enforced on all of us need to be 
capable of being justified in terms of principles and concerns that are shared [,] [t]he 
mistake that is often made here is to treat all deliberation, including opinion-
formation”, in this way.63 It is entirely permissible, Krause suggests, for citizens to 
appeal to non-shared reasons in informal discourse aimed at opinion-formation. Thus, 
by distinguishing between formal and informal sites of decision-making, “a deliberative-
system approach […] will be less vulnerable to the charge, frequently levied against 
deliberative democrats as well as liberals that regulatory ideals of public deliberation 
systematically exclude the deeply held beliefs and values of many citizens”.64 
On this view, then, there is a division of labour within the deliberative system, 
which weakens the trade-off articulated at the end of Section 2. The freedom as non-
domination of vulnerable and misunderstood groups is preserved by waiving the 
Shared Reasons Constraint in informal opinion-formation settings, so that their 
perspectives are included there. Concurrently, the pro tanto freedom-related benefits of 
having the Shared Reasons Constraint are maintained by applying it to formal decision-
making arenas.  
The devil is in the details. How is this division of labour supposed to work? An 
initial proposal is that simply because the system has a part—informal public spheres—
that includes many viewpoints and reasons, including non-shared ones, we can consider 
the system as a whole to be sufficiently inclusive. This is unsatisfying because those 
who press the complaint of overexclusiveness do not merely want to express their 
important concerns in informal public fora. They want the expression of those 
                                                 
61 Dryzek (2010, 7). 
62 Rawls (1997, 768).  
63 Krause (2008, 156). 
64 Ibid., 121. 
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concerns to influence formal decision-making that produces coercive decisions. Only if 
this condition is satisfied will the inclusion of their concerns allow them to contest 
policies and to protect themselves from domination. 
So, a process must exist whereby the novel considerations and arguments 
developed in the informal sphere are transmitted to formal decision-making spheres. 
But since the formal decision-making sphere does have a Shared Reasons Constraint, 
this transmission would require translating those novel considerations in terms of 
reasons that are shared! The problem, then, is that the solution under consideration 
seems simply to reproduce the difficulties examined in 3.1. Confining the Shared 
Reasons Constraint to formal spheres is only attractive if the novel reasons raised in 
informal sites can make their way into formal deliberative sites. And this, in turn, 
requires deriving those reasons from already-shared reasons. Since we have been 
seeking ways to supplement or enhance the idea of deriving new reasons from old ones, 
this seems unhelpful. 
Here, Krause advances a more promising suggestion. She suggests a sense in which 
distinguishing between different sites in the deliberative system might facilitate the 
derivation process, rather than simply reproduce its difficulties: 
 
Through the layered process of public debate in the many different venues of 
the deliberative system, the arguments defending particular policies will either 
gain wider acceptance, or they will fade from the public agenda. By the time a 
policy is ready to be voted up or down we can expect—and require—that the 
arguments […] do appeal to sentiments and concerns that are generally 
shared65 
 
The idea, as I understand it, is that unconstrained public deliberation in the informal 
sphere can allow non-shared reasons to become shared prior to an issue being 
deliberated in the formal sphere. This seems to facilitate the process of deriving new 
reasons from already-shared ones: if prior informal discussion has helped popularise the 
concerns of marginalised groups, it will presumably be easier to derive their claims from 
already-shared reasons when trying to introduce them into formal decision-making 
arenas.  
                                                 
65 Ibid., 121-122.  
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Ultimately, however, even this more promising suggestion does not avoid the 
problem at hand. It explains why the division of labour between different deliberative 
sites facilitates the transmission of new reasons from the informal to the formal public 
sphere—namely, that deliberation in the informal sphere augments the stock of shared 
reasons which can then be used to derive new considerations in the formal sphere. But 
in doing so, it generates a new and isomorphic ‘derivation’ problem. We can now ask 
how discourse within the informal public sphere enables non-shared reasons to become 
shared by those who initially rejected them. If those wishing to popularise their 
concerns simply appeal to non-shared considerations (as the informal setting allows 
them to do), then it is unclear, absent further considerations, why those who do not 
already recognise these considerations would come to do so. Indeed, arguing for same-
sex marriage by appealing to the non-shared consideration that same-sex relationships 
are valuable loving relationships will presumably leave unmoved those who reject this 
consideration. If, however, they try to logically derive these non-shared reasons using 
already-shared reasons, then we are back where we started.  
As such, appealing to the division of labour between different deliberative forums is 
unsatisfactory in the present context. This is not to disavow the systemic conception of 
deliberative democracy itself. As I stressed earlier, we should embrace the systemic view 
of deliberation, along with its intuitive proposal that the Shared Reasons Constraint 
should only apply to more formal deliberative arenas. This view will prove important in 
subsequent chapters. My point here is more limited: it is unclear, absent further 
considerations, how adopting this understanding of deliberation helps address the 
overexclusiveness problem.   
I have considered the three most influential strategies for offsetting the 
overexclusiveness of the Shared Reasons Constraint, and have suggested that they 
encounter significant limitations, both individually and considered together. While 
logically deriving non-shared reasons from already-shared reasons identifies a plausible 
way of introducing novel reasons into public deliberation, its prospects seem limited if 
we start from non-ideal contexts where—as social epistemologists have suggested—
some groups lack the experiences and conceptual resources needed to appreciate 
others’ valid concerns (3.1). To bolster this strategy, one might restrict the Shared 
Reasons Constraint’s constituency to idealised participants. Indeed, doing so expands 
the pool of initial shared reasons from which the derivation of new reasons then 
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proceeds. This proposal, however, is poorly equipped to handle non-ideal 
circumstances where those who are insensitive to legitimate concerns are also 
empowered (3.2). Finally, confining the Shared Reasons Constraint to formal sites in 
the deliberative system only postpones the problems that the ‘derivation’ strategy faces 
(3.3).  
 
4. Expanding the Form of Democratic Public Deliberation 
 
To alleviate these difficulties, I will now propose a further strategy for offsetting the 
Shared Reasons Constraint’s overexclusiveness. I want to suggest that this 
overexclusiveness concerning what contents are admissible in public discourse is partly 
sustained by an overly restrictive conception of what forms of communication—i.e., 
what vehicles for communicating propositional contents—are appropriate. To remedy 
this, non-argumentative and emotionally-charged forms of speech should occupy a 
more central role in our normative account of formal and informal democratic public 
deliberation. Note that my primary aim here is to sketch how such a discursive norm, 
which expands the forms of speech that can be used publicly to express propositional 
contents, might complement the strategies canvassed in Section 3 and weaken the 
Shared Reasons Constraint’s overexclusiveness. However, I will not develop this 
solution at great length here. Instead, I will develop it in Chapter 4, where I specifically 
discuss the epistemic merits of angry public narratives. 
 
4.1. Beyond Argument 
 
The three strategies considered in Section 3 suggest a picture of democratic public 
discourse characterised by broadly inferential forms of discourse, like argument, where 
deliberators derive conclusions from premises via logical steps. This is explicit in the 
idea of deriving new considerations from already-shared ones (3.1). Furthermore, the 
strategy of restricting the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency (3.2) also works 
within this picture: it is a way of expanding the set of contents from which the 
derivation of new shared reasons begins. So, it does not challenge the notion that 
speakers must logically connect novel considerations to already-shared considerations. 
As for confining the Shared Reasons Constraint to formal deliberative sites, we have 
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seen that this strategy ultimately reintroduces the need to derive new reasons from 
already-shared reasons (3.3).  
This picture of democratic discourse is incomplete. In addition to argument, 
democratic public deliberation should welcome forms of discourse, such as narrative, 
that are non-argumentative and typically charged with emotion. Narrative is discourse 
that aims to transmit one’s experience or perspective on the world. This can consist of 
personal testimony—i.e., telling others about one’s experiences of an unusual event or 
practice. But it also includes more general perspective-sharing—i.e., telling a story to 
get people to see a common event or practice as one does.66 As I define it, emotionally-
charged narrative can involve not just positive emotions such as joy, but also more 
contentious emotions, such as anger and despair.  
Importantly, these forms of discourse are not inferential: they do not involve logically 
connecting what is said to premises that are currently shared. This is promising in light 
of the difficulties encountered earlier. What conclusion one can reach via logical 
inference depends fundamentally on what premises one starts from. This is particularly 
clear in the case of deductive argument, which is non-ampliative: there can be nothing 
in the conclusion that is not in some sense already in the premises. That is why, as we 
saw in 3.1, the strategy of deriving new reasons from already-shared reasons seems 
unpromising when it starts from an extremely restricted set of shared considerations. In 
contrast, since emotionally-charged narrative is not inferential, it is not hostage to the 
lack of shared premises. It aims directly to introduce or make visible certain experiences 
or perspectives, and thereby to enrich the pool of publicly-recognised considerations. 
The next section will further outline how the epistemic value of emotionally-
charged narratives helps address the overexclusiveness problem. Before proceeding, we 
should consider how the present recommendation fits into broader debates in 
democratic theory. The idea that we should give a greater role to emotionally-charged 
and non-argumentative forms of speech, such as narrative, is by no means new. It has 
long been championed by democratic theorists concerned with non-ideal theory, most 
notably Iris Marion Young. But these theorists, as mentioned in the introduction, are 
often sceptical of discursive constraints like the Shared Reasons Constraint.67 By 
                                                 
66 Sanders (1997, 369-373); Young (2000, 70-77). 
67 Young (1996, 131-132). See also Sanders (1997, 372), Mouffe (1999, 755), and Dryzek (2000, 73-74). 
Dryzek (2010) is more open to discursive constraints than some of these other theorists. But he nonetheless 
claims that “anything goes […] provided that it is (a) capable of inducing reflection, (b) noncoercive, and (c) 
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contrast, I am arguing that expansive norms relating to the form of democratic speech 
are needed to complement the Shared Reasons Constraint, by offsetting its 
overexclusiveness.  
On the other hand, deliberative theorists who do support the Shared Reasons 
Constraint have traditionally been less accommodating towards emotionally-charged 
and non-argumentative forms of speech. In fact, Young’s defence of such discursive 
forms is a critical response to classical theories of deliberative democracy. Traditional 
deliberative democrats, Young suggests, aim to stave off the Platonic objection that 
democracy hands power over to the mob’s unruly passions. To do so, they adopt 
‘rationalist’ norms of deliberation: they affirm that proper public communication 
consists not of emotional outbursts or intoxicating rhetoric, but of calm, logical 
arguments from common premises.68 Unlike the Shared Reasons Constraint, which 
governs the content of public reason-giving, Young emphasises that these exclusionary 
norms govern its form. They exclude people’s contributions “from serious consideration 
not because of what is said, but how it is said”.69  
There is certainly some evidence supporting Young’s charge among the most 
influential defenders of the Shared Reasons Constraint, most prominently (though not 
exclusively70) Rawls and Habermas. When discussing the idea of public reason, for 
instance, Rawls distinguishes between “reasoning”—which is governed by “principles 
of inference”—and “rhetoric or means of persuasion”—which are not. Having done 
so, he immediately stresses that he is concerned with former.71 A similar observation is 
regularly made concerning Habermas. Habermas famously defends deliberative 
democracy as a way of subjecting power to the “unforced force of better argument”.72 
And he interprets emotions as essentially non-cognitive states, whose political 
expression seems relatively lacking in epistemic value.73 On the basis of such 
                                                                                                                                               
capable of connecting the particular experience of an individual, group, or category to some more general 
principle” (34). This is weaker than the requirement that deliberators appeal to shared considerations, as some 
general principles may not be shared (ibid.).  
68 Young (2000, chs. 1-2). For further critical discussion of these rationalist norms, see Sanders (1997) and 
Garsten (2011, 162-167).  
69 Young (2000, 56). 
70 For other classical deliberative democrats who endorse rationalist norms, see Cohen (2009, 248-251), Elster 
(1998, 109), and Spragens (1990, 128). Benhabib (1996, 82-83) recognises that affective storytelling has a 
place in the deliberative ideal, but restricts it to informal arenas.  
71 Rawls (1993, 220). 
72 Habermas (1996, 306). 
73 Ibid., 294.  
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comments, some theorists conclude that Rawls and Habermas openly exclude 
emotionally-charged and non-argumentative discourse from their deliberative ideals.74 
Still, one might harbour reservations. Although these comments about emotions 
and rhetoric are suggestive, they tend to be made in passing and are not developed at 
length. So, one might worry that it is uncharitable to suggest that Rawls and Habermas, 
and the deliberative theorists following in their wake, explicitly exclude emotionally-
charged narrative from their normative ideals.  
Instead, as Dryzek suggests, a fairer charge is one of silence: even if they do not 
explicitly exclude emotionally-charged and non-argumentative discourse, Rawls and 
Habermas have little to say about these forms of discourse in their normative accounts 
of deliberation.75 Importantly, this second charge also applies to more recent defenders 
of the Shared Reasons Constraint, particularly Rawlsian public reason theorists. Quong, 
for example, almost never mentions emotional or narrative forms of discourse. The 
main exception to this is even more telling. While listing objections to the idea of public 
reason, he cites Young’s concern that public reason “marginalizes [...] emotive, 
passionate, or rhetorical forms of discourse”. But he promptly brackets this objection, 
and never returns to it.76 
On this evidence, the deliberative theorists who have most closely theorised the 
Shared Reasons Constraint commonly do not explicitly assign a central role to non-
argumentative and emotionally-charged speech within their normative models of public 
deliberation. By contrast, my suggestion is that a commitment to the Shared Reasons 
Constraint should motivate such an expanded conception of deliberative forms. As the 
next section will discuss, emotionally-charged narrative performs a crucial epistemic 
function which helps offset the Shared Reasons Constraint’s exclusiveness.   
However, it is important to emphasise that there are significant exceptions to this 
tendency among defenders of the Shared Reasons Constraint. Some defenders of the 
Shared Reasons Constraint do recognise the importance of emotionally-charged 
narrative. Most notably, Krause explicitly combines the Shared Reasons Constraint with 
a firm endorsement of emotionally-charged narrative in formal and informal 
deliberation. And, unlike some other deliberative democrats who combine these two 
                                                 
74 E.g., O’Neill (2002), Abizadeh (2007).  
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features,77 she does this partly out of recognition of its epistemic value.78 Hence, to 
clarify my argument, I will later return to the residual differences between her account 
and my own.  
 
4.2. Emotionally-Charged Narrative and the Overexclusiveness Objection  
 
How does emotionally-laden narrative help offset the Shared Reasons Constraint’s 
overexclusiveness? By contrast with, say, deductive inferences from shared resources, 
narrative is an ampliative form of communication. By telling a story that gets people to 
experience the world in a certain way, it strives directly or non-inferentially to introduce 
new experiences and concepts into the public sphere.79 For instance, in his Invisible Man, 
Ralph Ellison vividly depicts the perspective of a black American man who is 
persistently overlooked, misunderstood, slighted. Thus, he effectively reproduces those 
experiences, such that readers from other social groups may imaginatively perceive how 
daily slights cumulatively produce far more than a trivial offense. In this way, readers 
may come to see the irreducible feature of the world that the concept ‘micro-
aggression’ aims to capture. So, emotionally-laden narrative helps show something when, 
because of a lack of shared experiences or concerns, it cannot yet convincingly be 
logically argued for.  
What role does emotion play in this? Narrative could conceivably be expressed 
dispassionately. So why am I defending emotionally-charged narrative? Narrative seeks 
to increase the pool of shared experiences. But short of making people experience the 
                                                 
77 E.g., Gutmann and Thompson (2004), Mansbridge (1999), Chambers (2004). Gutmann and Thompson 
(2004, 50-51) combine the Shared Reasons Constraint with acknowledgement of emotional speech’s 
importance, but—as Young (2000, 67n11) and Krause (2008, 152-153) observe—they stress emotional 
speech’s motivational rather than epistemic value, and classify it as a nondeliberative supplement to 
deliberation. Mansbridge (1999) also affirms that emotions play a positive role in deliberation (213) and 
expresses openness to Gutmann and Thompson’s “reciprocity” requirement which requires appealing to 
mutually acceptable considerations (222). But the function of emotions she most emphasises again seems to 
be motivational: emotions matter because “reason can proceed only rarely without emotional commitment, if 
only an emotional commitment to the process of reasoning” (225, emphasis added). Similarly, although Chambers 
(2004) is sympathetic to the requirement that deliberators appeal to shared reasons (390-382), and although 
she asserts that emotions have an important role to play in public discourse (402-403), she predominantly 
describes emotional language  as a “mobilizing tool” (402).  
78 See Krause (2008, 113-122, 162-165) on the epistemic value of emotionally-charged narrative. Note that 
another reason Krause deems emotion central to deliberation is less epistemic and more normative—on her 
view, reasons for doing things are constituted by affective concerns (2008, 150-151). Given this metaethical 
position, the process of deliberating about reasons for and against policies necessarily involves appealing to 
what we care about, affectively. For a similar point, see Hall (2007, 90-92). 
79 For evidence corroborating narrative’s ability to publicise new experiences, see Polletta and Lee (2006, 718-
719), Wesolowska (2007, 674, 676), Huijer (2009, 237). 
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actual relevant events themselves, this can only be done by getting them to imagine 
those experiences. However, even if someone describes an event accurately, 
imaginatively reconstructing it may be difficult. This is where emotion becomes 
epistemically significant. There is a widespread and involuntary tendency among human 
beings to resonate with or ‘catch’ the emotions of others. As Hume famously puts it: 
“as in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest, so 
all the affections readily pass from one person to another”.80  
For this reason, weaving emotion into an enumeration of facts plays an important 
epistemic role, as it facilitates the communication of experiences. By transferring 
emotion to one’s hearers, it helps them imagine those facts more vividly, in a way 
coloured by emotion. Chapter 4 will elaborate at length on the precise way in which the 
‘colouring’ offered by emotions is epistemically valuable. For now, I leave things at the 
intuitive idea that emotions have a distinctive felt experience which highlights or 
renders more salient significant properties of our perceptions and imaginings. Thus, 
emotionally-laden narrative seems an effective means of getting the public to share 
one’s experience of an event or practice and of thereby enriching the conceptual 
categories people have for interpreting events and practices.81  
Consider two examples relating to same-sex marriage, both drawn from French 
public debates in 2013. The first illustrates how emotionally-laden narrative in informal 
settings can communicate experiences and thereby enrich publicly-shared conceptual 
resources. Recall the deliberative impasse discussed in 3.1. In this example, defenders of 
same-sex marriage want to introduce the consideration that same-sex relationships are 
valuable by connecting such relationships to the idea of a loving relationship, but the 
concept of a loving relationship is itself disputed. Consider now La Vie d’Adèle, a film 
which gained wide attention against the background of public debates concerning 
same-sex marriage. The film portrays the relationship of two women, Adèle and Emma. 
Given our interest in how practices and claims are understood in public, observing the 
language critics used to characterise the film is instructive. La Vie d’Adèle was notably 
described by critics as “evok[ing] love in its purest and most passionate form”,82 as 
“brilliantly demonstrating how love feels”,83 and finally as a “devastating portrayal of 
                                                 
80 Hume (2009[1738], 3.3.1.7). See also Coplan (2011) and Chapter 4, Section 4.1. 
81 Chapter 4 will show how this picture of emotions coheres with contemporary philosophy of emotion.  
82 Bradshaw (2013). 
83 Quirke (2014) 
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the lifespan of a relationship, one that [is] […] convincing and intimate”.84 La Vie 
d’Adèle, then, was widely received as a strikingly accurate and moving representation of 
love. By representing the two protagonists’ relationship in such an intensely emotional 
way, it seems to show what could not be logically argued for given the previously-
mentioned deliberative impasse: that if anything constitutes a loving relationship, Adèle 
and Emma’s relationship surely does. Thus, it helps its audience see same-sex 
relationships as loving relationships, and thereby contributes to generating new shared 
understandings—here, a more inclusive concept of ‘loving relationship’.85  
A second example indicates how emotionally-laden narrative can publicise new 
perspectives and conceptual resources during formal public debates. In January 2013, 
Christiane Taubira, then French Minister for Justice, prefaced parliamentary debates on 
same-sex marriage with a speech describing marriage’s historical evolution. As she 
reports with a mixture of indignation, resolution, and pride, though marriage in France 
was initially reserved for Catholics, it then became available to Jews and Muslims. Later, 
the secularisation of marriage made it available to couples of all faiths, of no faith, and 
to some hitherto-excluded professions. In parallel, the relationship marriage defines 
gradually became more egalitarian. Divorce became legal, wives no longer needed their 
husband’s legal authorisation to open a bank account, and, eventually, marital rape was 
recognised.  
By telling this story with passionate rhetoric, Taubira communicated a distinctive 
perspective on marriage, and this perspective encouraged her audience to 
reconceptualise marriage as follows. First, according to the perspective she offers, 
marriage has no fixed meaning. Second, its meaning has always shifted towards greater 
inclusiveness and equality, and these shifts were widely regarded as moral progress. 
Finally, with this new conception of marriage in place, extending the right to marry to 
same-sex couples could appear as the natural next step in marriage’s laudable march 
towards greater inclusiveness. By publicising this conception of marriage, Taubira’s 
emotionally-charged narrative arguably made it easier subsequently to argue for same-
sex marriage by appeal to shared premises. 
                                                 
84 Clift (2014). 
85 La Vie d’Adèle’s accuracy as a representation of lesbian relationships is not undisputed. E.g., Maroh (2013). 
Accordingly, I present this as an example of epistemically-effective narrative only in a qualified sense: against a 
political background where many citizens denied the standing of same-sex relationships as loving relationships, 
the film supplied 1) a less inaccurate representation of a same-sex relationship, which 2) vividly showed how 
unsustainable these prejudices were, and 3) did so in a way that widely impacted public perceptions. This is 
compatible with retaining doubts regarding its overall accuracy. 
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In sum, emotionally-charged narrative performs an epistemic function that is 
distinctively suited to offsetting the overexclusiveness of the Shared Reasons 
Constraint. The Shared Reasons Constraint’s overexclusiveness, recall, results partly 
from the deep epistemic obstacles diagnosed by social epistemologists. Where different 
social groups have radically different experiences of the world, and where the 
conceptual resources needed to make sense of those experiences are often lacking, 
some considerations that are crucial to publicly contesting injustice will be unacceptable 
and eventually unintelligible to others. The resulting paucity of shared considerations 
makes even weaker interpretations of the Shared Reasons Constraint overly exclusive, 
and limits the extent to which we can introduce new considerations by deriving them 
from already-shared ones. Emotionally-charged narrative tackles the problem at its 
source: it facilitates the communication of non-shared experiences and enriches the 
conceptual resources needed to interpret these. Crucially, moreover, since it is not 
inferential in form, its ability to publicise new experiences does not—contrary to the 
‘derivation’ strategy—depend on what considerations are already shared. In light of 
these promising qualities, we should adopt more permissive discursive norms regarding 
what forms of public discourse are desirable in order to redress the overexclusiveness 
of public discourse’s content. Deliberative ideals that exclude or ignore emotionally-
charged narratives deprive themselves of a key epistemic instrument for publicising new 
considerations, and thereby help to sustain the Shared Reasons Constraint’s 
exclusiveness.   
Notice a further advantage of the present proposal. Expanding the forms of 
deliberation helps to weaken the trade-off between the freedom as non-domination of 
the unreasonable and that of vulnerable participants. On the one hand, it maintains the 
Shared Reasons Constraint without necessarily excluding the unreasonable, and so 
preserves its generic freedom-related benefits. On the other, by making the 
introduction of new shared reasons less dependent on what reasons are already shared, 
it facilitates the introduction by vulnerable groups of previously-overlooked concerns. 
Hence, it promotes the non-domination of vulnerable parties, and thereby blunts the 
force of the overexclusiveness objection. This stands in contrast to the strategy of 
idealising the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency. As 3.2 explained, this strategy 
proposes to reduce the Shared Reasons Constraint’s exclusiveness and thus to protect 
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vulnerable groups from domination, but only by exposing unreasonable citizens to 
greater risks of domination.  
While defenders of the Shared Reasons Constraint often do not give a central role 
to emotionally-charged and non-argumentative forms of speech in their deliberative 
ideals, I noted earlier that this is not always true. The rich account of public deliberation 
Krause offers in Civil Passions also combines the Shared Reasons Constraint with an 
endorsement of emotionally-charged speech in deliberative politics. By way of 
clarification, then, it is worth noting two residual differences between her argument and 
my own. First, as we saw in 3.2, Krause readily recommends that we idealise or restrict 
the perspectives that are relevant to determining which concerns are publicly 
admissible. I have argued that doing so is problematic: not only does it expose 
unreasonable citizens to domination, but it may be counterproductive in non-ideal 
contexts of power. As far as possible, then, we should be cautious about idealising the 
Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency. 
Second, when responding to the overexclusiveness concern, Krause sometimes—
though not always86—emphasises different elements of her account of deliberation 
than I do. As 3.3 discussed, she occasionally suggests that what prevents the Shared 
Reasons Constraint from being too exclusive is the fact that it only governs formal 
deliberative sites. While I agree that the Shared Reasons Constraint should only regulate 
formal spheres, I have argued that this is not what helps address the problem of 
overexclusiveness: distinguishing between different sites in the deliberative system 
ultimately reproduces the difficulties involved in deriving new considerations from 
already-shared ones. On my argument, it is rather the inclusion of emotionally-charged 
narrative which, by publicising the experiences and concerns of divided groups in both 
formal and informal deliberation, plays a fundamental role in making a relatively non-
idealised Shared Reasons Constraint more palatable. Again: by helping to enlarge the 





                                                 
86 As mentioned in 4.1, Krause (2008, 162-165) also sometimes emphasises, as I do, the epistemic value of 
emotionally-charged narrative. See note 78, this chapter.  
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4.3. Preliminary Objections 
 
Chapter 4 will further elaborate on the function of emotionally-charged narrative in 
public deliberation, particularly by expanding significantly on the sense in which 
communicating emotions is epistemically valuable. In the meantime, let us forestall 
some preliminary worries. To begin, one might object, as Benhabib does, that inviting 
emotionally-charged narrative into formal and informal deliberation undermines the 
impartiality of political processes. Emotionally-laden narrative involves conveying one’s 
partial perspective on the world, trying to make one’s particular concerns publicly 
recognised. Hence, doesn’t admitting such discourse replace impartial rule with the 
pursuit of particular interests?87 
Some philosophers might respond by challenging the value of impartiality.88 But the 
introduction of partial emotionally-charged perspectives is not genuinely opposed to 
impartiality. Firstly, the discursive norm I am advancing invites partial narratives into 
public discourse not directly as justificatory grounds for coercively-backed policies, but 
rather as an epistemic instrument for determining what should be admissible as a ground 
for policy-making. When someone delivers an emotionally-charged narrative, she is not 
directly making a political demand on the basis of a non-shared worldview. Instead, she 
is trying to make others see a consideration as a reason for political action. Only if this 
attempt at making the consideration shared succeeds may that reason be used to make a 
political demand. While Taubira may deliver an impassioned and partial narrative in 
legislative debates to get her interlocutors to see marriage in a certain light, she must 
resort to shared reasons when those debates reach their final stages. So allowing partial 
modes of expression in this epistemic role is compatible with requiring all coercively-
backed policies to be justified impartially, by appeal to shared reasons.  
In fact, and secondly, allowing partial narratives is not simply consistent with 
impartiality: it is also instrumentally necessary for truly impartial public deliberation, 
which gives fair consideration to the interests of all. Because we occupy particular social 
positions, no single person reflecting on justice can fairly consider the concerns of all.89 
Indeed, I unavoidably focus on some considerations to the exclusion of others simply 
because they are more salient to me, from my particular standpoint. To correct these 
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88 Young (1996, ch. 4).  
89 Krause (2008, 114-115); Young (2000, 108-120). 
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socially-caused biases, we must engage with occupants of different social positions. In 
this light, inviting partial narratives helps, rather than hinders, impartiality: by pooling 
different social perspectives, it helps us register and appreciate the concerns of different 
social groups. 
A more daunting concern is that complementing the Shared Reasons Constraint 
with a discursive norm assigning a central role to emotionally-charged narrative might 
seem to overachieve—it is overinclusive. Alongside admirable emotional narratives like 
those mentioned in the last section, this norm might—absent further qualification—
open the door for extreme or deeply misguided emotional narratives. For some public 
speakers, revealing their personal worldview might mean expressing deep-seated rage at 
racial minorities and immigrants. This is of course not just a hypothetical concern. In 
conditions of widespread ignorance, demagogues routinely use impassioned appeals to 
arouse misguided sentiments and thereby steer their listeners to unjust ends. 
Accordingly, Plato was extremely concerned that intoxicating rhetoric might induce the 
demos to embrace tyrants and tyrannical policies.90 But we hardly need to go all the way 
back to Plato: this concern is highly salient in contemporary divided democracies, 
where demagogues such as Marine Le Pen or Donald Trump express narratives of fear 
and anger which they unfittingly direct at vulnerable minorities.  
The first thing to note in response to this concern is that it is not specific to 
emotionally-laden narrative. Dispassionate argument too can be abused. Indeed, one of 
the most effective forms of sophistry consists in endowing fallacious inferences with 
the trappings of rational argument or scientific authority.91 We are all too familiar with 
how, as the DSM’s classification of homosexuality manifested, purported experts 
sometimes weigh in misleadingly to public debates by showering audiences with 
esoteric formulas, technical jargon, or deceptive statistics. So appeals to rational 
argument and expert knowledge too can be misused. And yet, this is not usually 
considered a sufficient reason to purge the deliberative ideal of argument or expert 
testimony. 
But given how deeply problematic this ‘overinclusiveness’ concern is, and how 
pressing it is in actual divided democracies, we should not leave things at this first 
observation. Instead, we must investigate more closely what the appropriate normative 
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91 Chambers (2009, 337).  
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response to extreme public narratives is. How should we qualify or complement the 
norm, advanced in this chapter, that democratic public discourse should invite 
emotionally-charged personal narratives? What, in other words, should we do about 
public narratives expressing, say, a racist’s rage? 
There are actually two overinclusiveness concerns here. The worry might be about 
the content expressed by the narrative, the deeply disrespectful racist views that are 
publicly communicated. Alternatively, it might concern the emotion that is being 
expressed, independently of what that emotion is about. For example, one might think 
that publicly expressing rage is morally undesirable, irrespective of what that rage is 
about. More generally, this second worry targets negative emotions like anger or 
resentment. The next two chapters will be devoted to exploring these two concerns. 
Chapter 3 will investigate the problem posed by deeply disrespectful or vilifying speech 
for democratic discourse that aims to promote justice. As for the worry about negative 
emotions, I explore it at length in Chapter 4, by defending the place of anger in 




The Shared Reasons Constraint has strong prima facie appeal: by facilitating processes 
of political contestation, it advances the freedom, understood as non-domination, of 
citizens. As social epistemologists have argued, however, contemporary democracies 
are characterised by deep experiential divides and hermeneutical injustice, as a result of 
which some citizens fail to accept and even understand crucial concerns of other 
citizens. In such settings, even the weakest variant of the Shared Reasons Constraint 
defines the content of public discourse too restrictively. In doing so, it politically 
disempowers those whose concerns are misrecognised, and threatens their freedom. So, 
we have a trade-off relating to non-domination: pro tanto reasons grounded in non-
domination pull both for and against the Shared Reasons Constraint.    
The three most influential strategies advanced by defenders of the Shared Reasons 
Constraint for addressing this problem encounter significant limitations in non-ideal 
contexts. Deriving novel considerations from already-shared ones is highly difficult if 
we start from settings where some groups lack the experiences and conceptual 
resources needed to appreciate others’ concerns. To bolster this strategy, one might 
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restrict the Shared Reasons Constraint’s constituency to idealised participants. Doing so 
expands the pool of initial shared reasons from which the derivation of new reasons 
then proceeds. However, this proposal is ill-advised in contexts where unreasonable 
citizens are empowered. And even outside of such contexts, it exposes unreasonable 
citizens to domination. This strategy therefore does not attempt to weaken the above 
trade-off, but simply settles it in favour of reasonable citizens. Hence, it should only be 
considered as a last resort. Finally, confining the Shared Reasons Constraint to formal 
sites in the deliberative system, though appealing on other grounds, only postpones the 
derivation strategy’s problems. 
To complement these strategies for mitigating the Shared Reasons Constraint’s 
overexclusiveness, we should adopt more expansive norms concerning the form of 
deliberation. In addition to arguments from shared premises, formal and informal 
public deliberation should welcome emotionally-charged narratives. In virtue of their 
non-inferential character and of their emotional tenor, such narratives constitute an 
effective epistemic tool for publicising new considerations. Therefore, by giving such 
discursive forms a greater place in democratic public deliberation, we can maintain the 
Shared Reasons Constraint while attenuating its negative impact on vulnerable groups’ 
political freedom.  
Nevertheless, absent qualification, this proposal may seem overinclusive. Firstly, it 
might open the door for narratives whose content is deeply disrespectful. Secondly, it 
might invite narratives charged with highly negative emotions, such as anger and rage. 
Even if one thinks that some emotions have an important part to play in political 
discourse, one may have reservations about profoundly negative emotions. The next 













COUNTERING PUBLIC HATE SPEECH 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Overinclusiveness Problem 
 
I have been concerned with the following question: what norms should regulate 
democratic public deliberation in non-ideal conditions marked by pervasive inequalities 
and profound ethical divisions, for inclusive deliberation to constitute an effective tool 
for advancing justice? 
Chapter 2 introduced the Shared Reasons Constraint, according to which 
participants must appeal to considerations that are shared by others. This norm is prima 
facie appealing, as it facilitates processes of contestation whereby participants hold 
powerful parties accountable. However, one of the principal objections to this 
constraint is that it tends to be overly exclusive in non-ideal contexts: it excludes some 
important considerations, without which some participants cannot effectively pursue 
justice.  
To remedy this deficiency while maintaining as far as possible the Shared Reasons 
Constraint’s advantages, I recommended that we expand our conception of what forms 
of discourse are publicly admissible. In particular, normative models of democratic 
public deliberation should welcome emotionally-charged narratives as epistemically 
useful. By communicating particular experiences and broader worldviews, such 
narratives contribute to making previously excluded considerations shared. If this 
perspective-sharing process is successful, the Shared Reasons Constraint then allows the 
newly-shared considerations to be used when justifying one’s political demands. 
While making space for personal narratives in this way helps tackle the problem of 
overexclusiveness, we saw at the end of the last chapter that it generates the opposite 
problem—a problem of overinclusiveness—which constitutes the present chapter’s 
focus. In strongly divided democracies, some citizens have highly prejudiced beliefs 
about others. For such citizens, telling others how they see the world may involve 
publicly expressing deeply disrespectful views—i.e., views that deny others’ standing as 
free and equal persons. Racists or homophobes, for example, might publicly deliver 
narratives that communicate their hateful viewpoints. So, disrespectful views could 
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enter public discourse at the deliberative stage where citizens express narratives aiming 
to make their distinctive perspectives shared.1 Unless they are further qualified or 
supplemented, then, the norms advanced in the last chapter may open the door for 
public communications whose content is abhorrent.  
That deeply disrespectful views may make their way into public discourse is of 
course not just a theoretical problem. Whether it is Danish cartoonists publishing 
representations of the prophet Muhammad as a bomb-throwing terrorist,2 British 
journalists assimilating migrants to “cockroaches” and to a “plague of feral humans”,3 
or then-presidential candidate Donald Trump referring to Mexican immigrants as 
“rapists” and “criminals”,4 one thing leaves no doubt: disrespectful and degrading 
speech is rampant in actual democratic political discourse.  
What should we do, then, about public speech that expresses deeply unjust and 
disrespectful viewpoints? There is no real controversy that such utterances are morally 
undesirable. Deliberative theorists of democracy widely agree that, ideally, participants 
in deliberation should respect one another. Gutmann and Thompson, for example, 
maintain that “mutual respect” should govern deliberative interactions.5 Likewise, in 
Young’s communicative ideal, interlocutors should frame their exchanges “in terms of 
basic respect”.6  
Thus, by contrast with the discursive norms mentioned in Chapter 2,7 the salient 
question here is not whether deliberators have moral reasons to refrain from engaging 
in deeply disrespectful speech. That much is uncontroversial. Rather, the salient 
question is: given that so many actual speakers violate this moral norm, what kind of 
normative response is warranted by these moral reasons? Do the moral reasons that 
oppose disrespectful public speech recommend implementing formal legal norms that 
coercively expel such speech from democratic public deliberation? Or should we 
                                                 
1 This is true even if the narrative ultimately fails to make the abhorrent considerations shared. While such a 
failure would mean that the Shared Reasons Constraint will not allow the consideration to be used to justify 
political demands during the final stages of formal deliberation, the abhorrent narrative would still be 
expressed at the prior deliberative stage where deliberators aim to publicise their distinctive experiences.  
2 Asser (2010). 
3 Usborne (2015). 
4 Reilly (2016). 
5 Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 79-81). 
6 Young (2000, 48). See also Krause (2008, 166) and Mansbridge et al (2010).  
7 As we saw in Chapter 2 (esp. Section 2.1), debates about the Shared Reasons Constraint are largely about 
whether there is a moral duty to appeal to shared considerations, where this moral duty might be unenforced 
or only enforced informally (e.g., through verbal disapproval). 
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instead respond to disrespectful speech internally to democratic discursive processes, by 
countering it with more speech?  
My discussion will focus on an especially abhorrent type of disrespectful speech: 
hate speech. There are two reasons for this focus. First, hate speech picks out an 
intensely disrespectful kind of speech, as opposed to a mildly disrespectful one. 
Consequently, the public presence of hate speech is particularly threatening for the view 
that inclusive public deliberation can promote justice in non-ideal conditions. Second, 
philosophers of language, feminist and critical race theorists, and legal philosophers 
have closely examined hate speech and have developed rich conceptual resources for 
understanding the injustices it may enact. Democratic theorists concerned with making 
the deliberative ideal relevant to divided settings have much to gain from incorporating 
these important theoretical insights.  
 
1.2. Defining Hate Speech 
 
The definition of ‘hate speech’ is highly contested. By ‘hate speech’, I will refer, 
roughly, to communications that emphatically deny the basic status of other members 
of society as free and equal citizens. More specifically, I follow influential discussions in 
taking hate speech to deny the basic standing of individuals who belong to vulnerable 
social groups, in virtue of their belonging to these groups.8 Two things are worth 
stressing here. First, hate speech includes not just verbal speech, but also all platforms 
(including printed images) that might be used to communicate propositional contents. 
Second, what makes a communication hate speech is not the speaker’s emotion, but 
rather the content of the communication. Chapter 4, however, will examine the place of 
a controversial emotion, anger, in public deliberation.  
This abstract characterisation is intended as an approximate guide, rather than as a 
precise analysis. So, to make matters clearer, consider a few illustrations of the kinds of 
speech I am concerned with. Hate speech might include newspaper articles falsely 
attributing essential dangerousness to a minority group (‘Muslims are terrorists’) or 
leaflets portraying some groups as subhuman (for instance, depictions of blacks as ape-
like). Sometimes, hate speech explicitly expresses the exclusion of a minority group 
                                                 
8 This definition is inspired by Waldron (2012, 27-28, 34-41) and Brettschneider (2012, 1). In legal 
scholarship, it echoes the UN’s (1965) condemnation of speech “based on ideas or theories of superiority of 
one race or group of persons of one colour”. 
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from the political community, as in Pegida’s infamous posters asserting ‘Rapefugees 
Not Welcome’. 
My discussion will focus on hate speech occurring in public discourse within stable 
democracies. The second restriction brackets contexts of political instability where hate 
speech is likely to induce a breakdown of minimal peace. While this would constitute an 
extremely powerful reason for legally banning it,9 I will rather be concerned with cases, 
like France or the US, where hate speech is diffuse without threatening to produce such 
an imminent political breakdown.  
As for the first restriction, I understand ‘public’ quite broadly.10 It encompasses 
communications occurring in formal political debates, but also those published in 
newspapers, posted on the internet, or plastered in common spaces. Very often, 
Waldron notes, such communications become “a permanent or semipermanent part of 
the visible environment”.11 Moreover, this is commonly speech that is not simply 
directed at the targets of the hate speech’s content, but addresses a broad audience, 
which includes third parties. Hence, although the distinction between public and non-
public hate speech remains vague, this restriction tends to exclude live, face-to-face 
encounters where, for example, the speaker directs a slur at a particular person with the 
deliberate intention to wound, or cases where someone threatens a particular individual 
by, say, spray-painting a swastika on their door.12   
I focus on public hate speech, thus defined, for two reasons. The first is dialectical. I 
will chiefly be engaging with Jeremy Waldron, and he takes his argument for banning 
hate speech to be most powerful with respect to such public hate speech. The second is 
political. The political contrast that is often drawn is between the US, which tends to 
oppose hate speech bans, and the rest of the world, which tends to embrace them. But 
even in the US, live, face-to-face “fighting words”, as well as targeted threats and 
harassment, are generally legally prohibited.13 So the main debate concerns not whether, 
but which kinds of hate speech should be prohibited. And hate speech bans in public 
discourse are politically far more divisive.  
                                                 
9 Tirrell (2012).  
10 See also Chapter 1, note 40. 
11 Waldron (2012, 37).  
12 Heinze (2013, 590-591), Langton (2012, 76-77), Brettschneider (2012, 1), and Waldron (2012, 37) also 
bracket such face-to-face assaultive forms of hate speech. Brison (1998, 313-315) treats them separately. 
13 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942); Virginia v. Black (2003). 
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This characterisation might still seem too broad. Many actual hate speech 
regulations require not just that the expressed content of the regulated speech 
profoundly contradict the basic standing of vulnerable groups, but also that it be 
uttered in circumstances such that it is likely to produce certain effects, like violence or 
antipathy.14 Now, there is enormous variation in characterisations of hate speech. In 
part, this is due to the fact that how we define hate speech depends on what kinds of 
speech-related harms we are concerned with. Accordingly, I adopt this relatively broad 
account because 1) it is adapted to the particular speech-related harm I will be focusing 
on (see Section 2), and 2) it is informative given my more general project: since I am 
fundamentally interested in democratic deliberation, I am especially concerned with 
speech that is abhorrent because it expresses views that contradict the moral 
underpinnings of democracy (i.e., participants’ status as equal and free citizens). 
 
1.3. Outline  
 
What should be done about hate speech occurring in public discourse within stable 
democracies? Should we supplement the norms defended in Chapter 2 with a further 
constraint, by coercively banning hateful considerations—that is, should legal norms 
threaten to impose penalties on those who publicly engage in hate speech? Or should 
we tolerate such speech, and try to address the injustice it enacts internally to 
democratic discursive processes?  
The relevant literature is vast, and spans across philosophical and non-philosophical 
domains. Consequently, in addressing these questions, I will predominantly engage with 
Waldron’s treatment of hate speech. Waldron offers a philosophical analysis of what 
makes public hate speech harmful, which he believes should incline us to legally 
suppress such speech. Taking Waldron’s framework as our starting point is fruitful for 
three reasons. First, Waldron’s argument is clear and powerful: not only is it rooted in 
an appealing picture of justice and of what it means to respect human dignity, but—in 
line with my aim of theorising democratic public deliberation for non-ideal 
conditions—it is acutely sensitive to how deeply harmful hate speech can be. Second, 
and as a result, Waldron’s framework has been highly influential in contemporary 
                                                 
14 The UK’s Public Order Act of 1986, for instance, prohibits insulting or abusive speech when it is likely to 
stir up hatred. See also Mill’s (2006[1859], 64-65) justification for restricting speech. 
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theorising about hate speech. Finally, it draws on a wide range of sources, and therefore 
helpfully integrates the insights which law, political philosophy, feminist thought, and 
critical race theory have contributed to the issue.  
The principal strength of Waldron’s analysis lies in its articulation of how public 
hate speech harms the dignity of its targets.15 There is no denying, therefore, that if 
unchallenged, public hate speech is deeply harmful and unjust. But what is less 
persuasive, I will suggest, is the claim that coercive legal bans constitute the best way of 
responding to this harm. Waldron, like many other proponents of bans, relies on an 
overly optimistic picture of his preferred solution (bans), and an overly unsophisticated 
picture of the main alternative (countering hate speech with more speech). By offering a 
more refined understanding of ‘counterspeech’, and a more nuanced vision of bans, I 
will argue that critiques of counterspeech either fail or apply even more forcefully to 
bans. In this light, we should be significantly less inclined to implement legal norms 
banning public hate speech. Instead, we should embrace robust norms of democratic 
counterspeech. 
Note, however, two limitations of my argument in this chapter. First, my defence of 
counterspeech remains pessimistic. In other words, it will proceed less by suggesting 
that democratic counterspeech fully overcomes the objections levelled at it, and more 
by showing that these objections are at least as problematic for bans.  
Second, although I focus primarily on Waldron’s influential account of what makes 
public hate speech harmful, there are other ways in which such speech can harm. For 
this reason, my argument in this chapter is limited in scope. That being said, it does not 
follow that my inquiry is irrelevant to these other harms: as a further line of 
investigation, we should explore to what extent the strategy I deploy for defending 
counterspeech can successfully be extended to other speech-based harms. Because 
many of the other harms associated with hate speech involve claims about the causal 
effects of hate speech, I expect that this further line of investigation will be in 
substantial part empirical. 
My argument will be structured as follows. I begin by outlining Waldron’s 
framework for understanding the unjust harm enacted by hate speech, and why he 
takes it to support legal bans (Section 2). In turn, I critique this defence of bans by 
articulating a more sophisticated understanding of democratic counterspeech, and why 
                                                 
15 For criticism, however, see Simpson (2013). 
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it seems a better way of blocking the harm in hate speech (Section 3). Now, the policy 
of relying on such counterspeech does face genuine difficulties. Nevertheless, I then 
demonstrate that the two weightiest objections to counterspeech can be turned, with 
greater force, against bans (Section 4-5). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Dignitarian Case for Bans 
 
For some, the harm involved in hate speech warrants forcibly excluding or banning it 
from the public deliberation of democratic societies.16 According to their opponents, 
countervailing considerations, such as freedom, democracy, or truth, demand that we 
tolerate it.17 Waldron articulates a framework for understanding the harm in hate 
speech which, he claims, supports the former option.   
Waldron starts from an appealing picture of justice (a picture consonant with the 
one that informs my broader inquiry18) whereby justice requires treating human beings 
with dignity. In the first place, this means that citizens’ status as equal and free 
members of society in good standing—their dignity—should be recognised and upheld 
by other citizens.19 However, drawing on Rawls’s idea of a well-ordered society, 
Waldron argues that justice requires something more. Citizens must also know that their 
peers uphold their good standing. Absent the assurance that their dignity is safe, 
citizens cannot fully enjoy their good standing. Indeed, this assurance is necessary for 
citizens to pursue their aims and participate in civil and political life without fear or 
shame.20  
Because the public assurance of dignity is an essential component of justice, 
Waldron suggests, we should pay greater attention to “political aesthetics”: we should 
care, in other words, about what our society literally looks and sounds like.21 Imagine, 
Waldron continues, what a hate speech-allowing society would look like to targets of 
hate speech. Think of the “marching feet and chants of neo-Nazis in Skokie, a Grand 
                                                 
16 E.g., Waldron (2012), Delgado (1993), Matsuda (1993), Brison (1998), and Quong (2011, 305-312).  
17 On freedom or autonomy, see Baker (1996), Scanlon (1972), and Dworkin (1981a). On democracy, see 
Heinze (2016), Dworkin (2009), and Post (1990). On truth, see Mill (2006[1859]).   
18 As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 2, the idea of justice that informs my project involves upholding social 
relations of equality. This is consonant with Waldron’s dignitarian picture of justice, since Waldron defines 
‘dignity’ as the social status of being an equal member of society.  
19 Waldron (2012, 59-60).  
20 Ibid., 65-69, 81-89.  
21 Ibid., 71-77. 
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Wizard’s speech at a Ku Klux Klan rally”.22 Think of a Muslim citizen confronted with 
newspapers depicting Muslims as terrorists. This is clearly not what a well-ordered and 
just society looks and sounds like. When a society looks like this, it is not public 
knowledge that all citizens uphold the dignity of others.  
Hence, we can appreciate a powerful harm generated by public hate speech. In 
publicly denying the status of its targets as social equals, hate speech affects the way the 
society looks in such a way as to undermine the public assurance that their status is 
secure. Moreover, public hate speech reaches out to other hateful persons, to assure 
them that they are not alone. In doing so, it replaces the assurance of dignity with the 
assurance of hatred. 23   
How exactly does hate speech relate to this harm? Dignitarian accounts of the harm 
in hate speech commonly argue that hate speech causes dignity-related harms. On this 
understanding, hate speech causally influences how other members of society view and 
act towards the target group, so that they stop upholding their status as equals.24 While 
Waldron’s account is consistent with the causal claim, he largely focuses on how hate 
speech constitutes an assault on dignity.25 In publicly saying ‘You are not one of us, and 
we want you out’, hate speech undermines the public assurance that the target group 
are respected by their peers. Communicating this is part and parcel of the act of 
refuting the public assurance of dignity, and of assuring other citizens with hateful 
views that they are not alone.26   
For Waldron, the fact that hate speech constitutes an assault on its targets’ effective 
enjoyment of dignity reveals how fragile this good is. “The flare-up of a few particular 
incidents can have a disproportionate effect” on the public assurance of dignity.27 
Hearing racist vituperations of far-right groups on the radio may well produce fear and 
a sense of alienation in its targets, even if the views uttered are marginal. This, Waldron 
concludes, is why coercive hate speech bans are required. By forcefully excluding hate 
speech from the public sphere, bans prevent such speech from creating an environment 
of fear and alienation.28  
                                                 
22 Ibid., 71.  
23 Ibid., 94. 
24 E.g., Delgado and Stefancic (2004).   
25 Waldron (2012, 166-167). 
26 For other constitutive accounts, see, e.g., Langton (2012) and Maitra (2012).  
27 Waldron (2012, 94).  
28 Ibid., 93-95. 
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This constitutes the basic structure of Waldron’s argument for banning public hate 
speech. As I critically evaluate it, I will progressively introduce further complexities and 
nuances. In the meantime, notice three features of this argument that are particularly 
appealing. Firstly, it rests on intuitively appealing moral foundations—the idea that 
justice requires not just respecting the dignity of human beings by upholding their 
status as equal members of society, but also publicly assuring them that their equal 
status is secure.  
Secondly, the framework is methodologically appealing. Waldron embraces non-
ideal theory by demanding that we imagine what hate speech looks like in the “real 
world”, particularly to those on the receiving end. This commitment to taking the 
experiences of targets seriously is a welcome corrective to scholarship which, he 
suggests, frequently adopts an abstract and idealised conception of hate speech.29  
Finally, because it focuses on the harms constituted (as opposed to caused) by hate 
speech, Waldron’s framework is dialectically powerful. It sidesteps the fiercely 
contested empirical question of whether the causal relations between hate speech and 
its purported harms really obtain.30 
Consequently, Waldron’s philosophical framework constitutes a promising starting 
point for thinking about what we should do about public hate speech. But it remains 
problematic. While the account of hate speech’s harm is convincing, his inference to 
the endorsement of hate speech bans is too direct, and ultimately unpersuasive.   
 
3. A Fairer Comparison 
 
Public hate speech assaults the dignity of its targets. How can we uphold justice and (as 
a component thereof) the assurance of dignity in the face of this assault? While 
Waldron advocates banning public hate speech, an alternative would be to allow such 
speech, and to counter it with more democratic public speech. Implicit in Waldron’s 
above endorsement of hate speech bans, then, is the belief that such democratic 
counterspeech is insufficient. Unless democratic public discourse is already purged of 
hate speech, it constitutes an inadequate instrument for promoting justice and the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 33. 
30 Ibid., 166. 
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assurance of dignity. So, if we care about using inclusive public deliberation to promote 
justice in real-world conditions, hate speech bans are needed.  
The central problem with this inference to hate speech bans is that it relies on an 
unfair comparison between the society that allows hate speech and the society that bans 
it: as we will see, Waldron is overly idealistic about the latter and overly uncharitable 
about the former. The present section aims to rectify this unfairness. Take the hate-
banning society first.  
 
The Hate-Banning Society: The society in which bans suppress public 
occurrences of hate speech by imposing coercive sanctions on such speech. 
 
The most commonly invoked worry with this society is that having one’s speech 
suppressed significantly undercuts one’s freedom or autonomy. Although this point can 
be made with different conceptions of autonomy or freedom, I will emphasise, in line 
with previous chapters, how it applies with freedom as non-domination. Domination, 
recall, is subjection to alien or unchecked power. Accordingly, non-domination is 
secured insofar as individuals are capable of contesting the power to which they are 
subjected, so that it is forced to track their interests and concerns.31 In Chapter 2, I 
argued that the ability of participants to contest and thereby check political power is 
enhanced when they can publicly appeal to the considerations they deem most 
significant.32 This remains true, the present worry continues, even when those 
considerations are hateful ones. Hence, banning public hateful considerations 
diminishes the freedom as non-domination of citizens with hateful political views.33  
Importantly, Waldron himself recognises these freedom- or autonomy-based costs. 
Bans, he claims, 
 
have a direct bearing on freedom to publish, sometimes on freedom of the 
press, very likely on freedom of the Internet […] And this matters to 
                                                 
31 Lovett and Pettit (2009, 14).  
32 Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
33 For other freedom- or autonomy-related objections, see Brettschneider (2012, 76-80), Scanlon (1972), 
Dworkin (1981a), and Baker (1996, 992). Note that this objection cannot justify protecting all kinds of hate 
speech. Shouting a slur at someone in the street, for instance, is not an attempt at contesting political power. 
But, as stated in the introduction, I am bracketing such assaultive, face-to-face forms of hate speech. By 
contrast, the examples of public hate speech mentioned in the introduction (e.g., ‘Muslims are terrorists’) 
sometimes are raised to support political demands.  
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individuals. Often the messages that racists or Islamophobes are stopped 
from expressing are the very messages […] that matter most to them. For 
them, other aspects of political expression pale into insignificance [by 
comparison]34 
 
But he responds that these considerations are outweighed by considerations having to 
do with the dignity of targets of hate speech. All things considered, then, bans remain 
morally justified.  
We could go even further on Waldron’s behalf. As Susan Brison has argued, lacking 
assurances that one is a citizen in good standing risks depriving one of the 
psychological conditions needed to participate politically without fear or shame.35 By 
undermining the public assurance of dignity, hate speech may therefore undercut its 
targets’ ability to contest exercises of political power. Therefore, even within the value of 
freedom (understood as non-domination), one might think that the balance of reasons 
favours bans. I want to grant these responses to the freedom-based argument, not just 
for the sake of argument, but also because—unlike some critics36—I find such claims 
about the harmfulness of hate speech persuasive.    
Even so, we should still be worried about bans. Although the freedom-based 
reasons against bans may be outweighed, they remind us that upholding the dignity and 
freedom of targets of hate speech comes at a significant price. Part of what is non-ideal 
in actual circumstances is that many citizens uphold hateful viewpoints. Witness the rise 
of European far-right parties like the French Front National, whose rhetoric is often 
saturated with xenophobia. In some cases, moreover, supporters of such hateful 
political ideologies are socioeconomically disaffected citizens who feel, sometimes 
justifiably, that their voices have been ignored by mainstream parties.37 Thus, coercively 
suppressing hate speech seems to come at a substantial moral cost: it further diminishes 
the freedom of many relatively disadvantaged citizens, and thereby fuels the 
exclusionary processes that, often, contributed to producing their hateful disaffection.38  
                                                 
34 Waldron (2012, 148-149).  
35 Brison (1998).  
36 E.g., Dworkin (2009, vi).  
37 E.g., Willsher (2015).  
38 Why does it matter that those affected by bans are often relatively badly off? On a consequentialist 
interpretation, ignoring those who have already been ignored is problematic because it risks alienating them 
further, and breeding more hatred. But the explanation needn’t be consequentialist. Instead, one might think 
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What this means is that even if Waldron is right that the claims of targets of hate 
speech outweigh those of citizens who possess and wish to express abhorrent views 
(‘hateful citizens’, for short), the trade-off between the two is significantly worse than 
he acknowledges. This realisation should strongly motivate us to seek a solution that 
weakens the trade-off—that is, that blocks the harmful features of hate speech while 
limiting the costs to hateful citizens. Bans should be a last resort. 
Now, in observing that many of those whose freedom would be restricted by bans 
are relatively disadvantaged and numerous, my intention is to bring out how important 
it is to find an alternative response to hate speech. But my more fundamental point 
does not hinge on this sociological observation. Even if hateful citizens tended to be 
well off (as they of course often are), there would still be a freedom-based cost to 
restricting their political speech. Accordingly, it would remain true that if we can find an 
alternative solution that blocks the harm in hate speech without imposing this cost on 
hateful citizens, we should prefer that solution to legal bans.   
To this end, let us now consider the society that allows hate speech, legally 
speaking. Waldron’s most sustained depiction of this society is uncharitable. Opponents 
of hate speech bans “love the richness and untidiness of the marketplace of ideas: let a 
thousand flowers bloom, they say, even the poisonous ones”.39 On this crude 
understanding, the hate-allowing society responds to the interests of hateful citizens by 
allowing them to publicly disclose their abhorrent worldviews. As for the interests of 
targets of hate speech, the idea is that since all citizens can voice their opinions, hateful 
views can be countered by more public speech, which challenges hateful utterances. 
Critics have forcefully argued that this counterspeech-based solution to the problem 
of hate speech is profoundly inadequate, for two reasons. First, it seems unfair, insofar 
as it typically places the burden of challenging hate speech on its targets.40 Second, it 
seems ineffective at protecting targets of degrading speech. To begin, empirical 
evidence indicates that targets of hate speech rarely actually speak back in public. This 
suggests that the harmfulness of hate speech makes speaking back very difficult.41 
Moreover, even if targets of hate speech did speak back, it is unclear how effective this 
                                                                                                                                               
this matters because one shares the basic prioritarian intuition that losses of welfare or freedom are more 
morally problematic when they afflict those with overall lower levels of well-being.  
39 Waldron (2012, 67). Nielsen (2012, 154), Brown (2015, 246), Matsuda (1993, 36-37), Delgado (1993, 95), 
and MacKinnon (1993, 72-73) also criticise this unrefined understanding of counterspeech. 
40 Maitra and McGowan (2012, 9).    
41 Nielsen (2012).  
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would be at preserving the public assurance of dignity. The difficulty, as philosophers 
of language often put it, is that targets of hate speech frequently lack the authority 
needed to block the harm in hate speech.42 If what is harmful in public hate speech is 
that it asserts that a given group are unwanted by the society at large, then being able to 
refute this assertion requires being able to speak on behalf of the society at large. Since 
targets of hate speech are typically members of minority groups, they are often not in a 
position to do this. 
However, this picture of the hate-allowing society and of the democratic 
counterspeech it involves is largely43 a straw man. Setting up a choice between either 
having the state ban hate speech or having the state step back and let private citizens 
respond is misleading. Instead, as Corey Brettschneider has argued, the state can be 
active as a speaker endowed with expressive powers. So a more refined alternative to 
bans is the following: 
 
The Hate-Allowing Society: The society where hate speech is not coercively 
suppressed, but where the state actively speaks out against public occurrences 
of hate speech.44   
 
States possess numerous tools for speaking back. To begin, the state should speak back 
by having public officials affirm the ideal of human dignity, not just through public 
pronouncements in formal deliberative forums, but also by naming public spaces, 
dedicating monuments, and enacting public holidays. Moreover, state officials should 
speak back by denouncing particular instances of public hate speech.  
How does this state-based counterspeech address the above objections? First, while 
this solution is consistent with the victims of hate speech also speaking back, it is not 
primarily victims who are required to respond. Rather, it is public officials or, as I 
explain below, third parties. Thus, this solution seems less unfair.  
Second, state officials, unlike many private citizens, have an authoritative status, in 
virtue of which they can successfully challenge hate speech’s attempted assault on the 
public assurance of dignity. In decrying detestable speech, the state is reassuring its 
                                                 
42 Maitra and McGowan (2012, 9-10). 
43 Some advocates of counterspeech do endorse the unsophisticated version. E.g., Rauch (1993, 159), 
Richards (1999, 135-136), Schulzke (2016, 237-239). 
44 Brettschneider (2012).  
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targets. It is saying: ‘We are sorry that you had to hear that. It’s true, some individuals 
unfortunately still believe this. But on behalf of the people generally, rest assured that we 
stand by you, that they, not you, are the outliers, and that we will ensure that what they 
say remains an empty threat.’  
To make this more vivid, consider how Christiane Taubira—then the French 
Minister for Justice—intervened in response to David Rachline—a Front National 
Senator—in the French Senate in 2015. After Rachline criticised Taubira’s advocacy of 
humane treatment for criminals, whom he referred to as “thugs” and “executioners”, 
Taubira replied to his various claims, and concluded as follows: “You belong to a 
political family […] that systematically seeks scapegoats […] and that looks for invaders 
everywhere […] [O]ne shudders at the thought of what would happen if it took 
power—but we will fight to make that absolutely impossible”.45 The overwhelming 
majority of the Senate rose to their feet to applaud this response. In her response, 
Taubira does several things: she takes the time to answer; she denounces far-right 
ideologies and their scapegoating practices; she promises to keep those exclusionary 
ideas away from power; and she does this in broad daylight, to wide acclaim. If we want 
hate speakers isolated, so that they cannot undermine the assurance of dignity, public 
counterspeech like Taubira’s seems an exemplary realisation of those aims. Her 
response not only contributes to making Rachline’s ideology isolated (as a ban might 
achieve), but also publicly shows it to be isolated.  
Of course, public officials can only do so much. But the state can also speak back in 
more indirect ways. First, as Brettschneider notes, it can fund private associations, like 
civil rights groups, whose functions include publicly denouncing occurrences of hate 
speech. This provides support to targets of hate speech by empowering third parties to 
block its attempted harms.46 Second, the state can speak against hateful views through 
public education, which teaches children about historical events like the Holocaust, and 
which exposes them to democratic values.47 
Now, the latter recommendation involves state coercion as well as state speech. 
Parents are required to send their children to school. Consequently, they will almost 
unavoidably have to come into contact with worldviews they disavow. Nevertheless, it 
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does not prevent hateful parents from publicly expressing their viewpoints.48 And it is 
coercively suppressing such expressions that is especially problematic for individual 
freedom. Recall: doing so is problematic, in part, because it reduces one’s ability to 
contest exercises of political power. By contrast, having to send one’s children to 
school, or hear other viewpoints, does not.  
Admittedly, however, countering hate speech through public education does entail 
that teachers, in their capacity as teachers, are required to refrain from expressing 
hateful viewpoints. As Brettschneider notes, “there is no general right to be employed 
by a public school”. Teachers (like other government employees) are hired on the 
condition that they perform certain functions—including repudiating hateful views in the 
classroom. Therefore, the state would be “justif[ied] [in] firing teachers who spread 
such views”.49  
Let us take stock. On this refined picture of democratic counterspeech and of the 
hate-allowing society, the state intervenes to block the dignitarian harms of hate speech. 
But it does so without coercively suppressing hateful citizens’ public utterances. Hence, 
it weakens the aforementioned trade-off between the freedom of hateful citizens and 
the freedom of their targets. In light of this fairer comparison between the hate-
allowing society and the hate-banning society, the former seems prima facie more 
desirable. It is, in other words, a better way of upholding justice and the public 
assurance of dignity in the face of public hate speech. In what follows, I consider two 
objections which suggest that my argument thus far idealises state-sponsored 
counterspeech. In both cases, I will show that counterspeech and bans are companions-
in-guilt: these objections can be turned—with greater force—against bans.  
 
4. Objection 1. Does Counterspeech Block All Hate Speech? 
4.1. The Limited Effectiveness of Counterspeech 
 
One might think that it is unrealistic to hold that state-based counterspeech can truly 
block the dignitarian harm in hate speech. In his very brief consideration of state-based 
counterspeech, Waldron objects that this solution would provide the wrong kind of 
public assurance of dignity. In particular, raising “billboards proclaiming the principles 
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of justice” would have a “creepy totalitarian flavour”.50 To avoid this, the assurance of 
dignity should be provided in a way that is more implicit.  
This response seems misguided in several respects. To begin, it is unclear in what 
sense laws banning hate speech constitute implicit assurances. After all, such laws must 
be publicly known and typically lead to widely-publicised lawsuits. But even granting 
this, we can query the claim that explicit assurances are undesirable. First, Waldron 
makes a straw man of speaking back. As the Taubira example illustrated, counterspeech 
often involves public responses to particular instances of hate speech that are not flat-
footed in the way Waldron’s envisaged billboards are. Moreover, even if state 
counterspeech does involve explicit pronouncements of values, is that really a bad 
thing? Does Waldron really think that billboards—like those displayed in football 
matches—stating ‘SAY NO TO RACISM’ are “creepy”? And is explicitly erecting 
monuments honouring the Civil Rights Movement “totalitarian”? 
Waldron suggests that such explicit assurances are bad because they are “evidence 
of a problem”.51 But bigotry is a problem. Given that this is the case, it seems at least an 
open question (as we have seen in Section 3) whether it is preferable to recognise the 
problem and publicly denounce it, or maintain a blissful ignorance of its existence by 
suppressing the public speech of hateful citizens.  
A better version of the objection under consideration comes from philosophers of 
language who argue that degrading speech often takes a form that is very difficult to 
identify and speak out against. Rae Langton, in particular, has emphasised how 
degrading representations are often presupposed rather than straightforwardly asserted in 
hate speech.52 Instead of saying ‘Blacks are lazy’, someone might say ‘Even blacks 
would do that job’, thereby implying that blacks are lazy.  
Why does this matter? Conversations tend to follow rules of accommodation. Very 
roughly, this means that the content of presuppositions tends to be added by default to 
the common background assumptions that the relevant conversation relies on, unless 
those presuppositions are explicitly challenged. Suppose you say ‘I need to walk my 
dog’. The idea is that it automatically becomes an accepted assumption in our 
conversation that you have a dog, unless I say ‘Wait a minute, you don’t have dog!’53 The 
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accommodation of presuppositions means that some contents can be smuggled in 
more easily to the conversational common ground than if they were straightforwardly 
asserted. 
On its own, this is not immediately problematic for state-based counterspeech. If 
the problem is that degrading representations presupposed in hate speech automatically 
become common ground unless they are blocked, then it seems this rather calls for 
counterspeech. While one way of stopping the degrading representation of black 
citizens from becoming common ground is to prohibit utterances of ‘Even blacks 
would do that job’, the other is to block it through counterspeech: ‘What do you mean, 
even blacks?! We don’t condone those views around here!’ 
It is in light of a further observation, concerning coded speech, that the point about 
presupposition becomes particularly challenging. Jason Stanley has argued that the 
conventional meanings of words can shift, so that hateful representations become 
encoded in ordinary words. The idea is that repeated associations in the media of 
ordinary terms, like the association of ‘inner cities’ with black citizens, eventually make 
this term refer to black citizens. Similarly, repeated associations of ‘welfare’ or ‘food 
stamps’ with laziness make ‘welfare’ or ‘food stamps’ encode laziness.54   
When combined with the existence of coded speech, Langton’s observation 
regarding presuppositions becomes highly problematic. For presuppositions not to be 
added to the conversational common ground, they must be identified and challenged. 
But doing so is far more difficult if they are concealed through coded speech. More 
precisely, when degrading contents are encoded in public speech, the message is 
typically quite clear to its targets and to other hateful citizens, but less visible to third 
parties. This, in turn, is particularly worrying for state-based counterspeech since it 
emphasises the need for third parties, including public officials, to play a central role in 
responding to hate speech.   
To illustrate, consider Stanley’s example of an interview conducted in 2012 with 
Newt Gingrich, a leading US politician. Gingrich had previously claimed that “black 
Americans should demand jobs, not food stamps”. In response, the interviewer 
observed that this was offensive to blacks, as Gingrich was clearly invoking negative 
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racial stereotypes—namely, that blacks are lazy. Gingrich answered “No, I don’t see 
that”, and was loudly applauded, while the interviewer was booed.55    
This case, Stanley suggests, exemplifies the use of coded presuppositions expressing 
degrading contents in public speech. Gingrich’s claim presupposes that black Americans 
ask for food stamps rather than jobs. And if ‘food stamps’ encodes laziness, the 
presupposition means that black Americans are lazy. This is problematic, firstly, because it 
makes identifying the degrading stereotype being expressed more difficult. But the 
example also reveals a second problem. Even when one has identified the 
presupposition, speaking back against it risks backfiring. Because the degrading content 
is encoded, the person who wishes to block it (here, the interviewer) must be the first 
to explicitly invoke it. This makes it possible for the person who challenges the hateful 
content to be blamed for its expression, so that the intervention achieves the opposite 
of its intended effect. Instead of assuring black citizens of their standing, the would-be 
challenger is made to seem as though he holds degrading views. 
What is worse, the above example is hardly the most coded imaginable. Substituting 
‘inner cities’ for ‘black Americans’, Gingrich could have presupposed the same 
demeaning content by saying ‘Inner cities’ reliance on food stamps is draining public 
resources’. Stanley goes even further, and suggests that the very words ‘welfare’ or 
‘food stamps’ can sometimes immediately encode that blacks are lazy, even in utterances 
that do not appear to be about black citizens (e.g., ‘Food stamps are expensive’). In 
these cases, what the terms presuppose is their own conventional meaning, which has 
been altered to encode the degrading stereotype.56 Hence, the difficulties illustrated in 
this example might easily be amplified. In sum, coded speech, which Stanley argues is 
widespread, seems to generate profound difficulties for state-sponsored counterspeech.   
 
4.2. Two Replies: A Defence and an Attack 
 
A first reply is that we should nonetheless not conclude too much from these 
difficulties. Stanley sometimes draws deeply sceptical conclusions regarding 
counterspeech from the foregoing analysis.  He suggests, for instance, that the contents 
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encoded in speech are “not negotiable”.57 So, the existence of coded presuppositions 
renders effectively speaking back through democratic deliberation “impossible”.58 On 
this pessimistic view, counterspeech, including state-based counterspeech, is wholly 
incapable of challenging the coded expression of vilifying contents.  
But this conclusion is too strong. Having authoritative political figures speak back is 
sometimes a powerful way of blocking hateful coded presuppositions. Some of 
Stanley’s own examples suggest as much. For example, following Representative Paul 
Ryan’s comments asserting that “inner cities” lacked a “culture of work”, 
Representative Barbara Lee replied: “Let’s be clear, when Mr. Ryan says ‘inner city’ […] 
these are simply code words for what he really means: ‘black’”.59 While Ryan denied 
having said anything about race, the response prompted widespread criticisms in the 
media.60  
This last case suggests a more nuanced conclusion. Counterspeech can indeed block 
the dignitarian harms of coded degrading speech. However, the success of such 
counterspeech depends on having various skills and abilities, including: the ability to 
identify vilifying presuppositions; the clarity to challenge them in a way that makes it 
difficult for others to twist one’s words; and sufficient authority to be taken seriously 
when one publicly battles over words. Indeed, being an elected representative with a 
record of fighting for civil rights was likely part of what enabled Lee to be more 
successful than Gingrich’s interviewer.61 
Nevertheless, because these conditions for success are highly demanding—even for 
public officials and their empowered agents—the objection from coded speech remains 
problematic, and constitutes an apt qualification of Brettschneider’s optimism regarding 
state counterspeech. Often, state-based counterspeech may fail to block hate speech’s 
dignitarian harms. Accordingly, my second and more fundamental reply does not deny 
this worry, but argues that it can be turned, with greater force, against the hate-banning 
society. Indeed, Waldron’s conception of hate speech bans is overly idealised if these 
are taken to infallibly block the dignitarian harms enacted by public hate speech. 
The idealisation at hand is partly empirical. As Section 2 noted, Waldron’s argument 
sidesteps debates about the causal effects of hate speech. However, it does make 
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empirical assumptions concerning the causal effects of bans: namely, that they are 
effective at eliminating hate speech, or at least at removing it from public arenas where 
it can undermine the assurance of dignity.62 Some commentators maintain that these 
assumptions are at best contentious, and at worst unfounded.63  
Even so, because the empirical evidence regarding the overall merits of bans 
remains mixed,64 we should try to avoid relying on it. For our purposes, then, the main 
problem is the following. Advocates of bans must show that coercive legal bans are 
better at handling the cases that proved problematic for state counterspeech. But even 
in theory, bans seem singularly unpromising with respect to coded hate speech. Recall 
the coded sentence discussed above: ‘Inner cities’ reliance on food stamps is draining 
public resources’. In context, this presupposed that blacks are lazy. However, banning 
such speech seems extremely difficult. To begin, and most obviously, the epistemic 
problems which afflicted counterspeech apply here too: simply identifying instances of 
coded speech for the purposes of legislating or implementing bans can be difficult.  
Moreover, two further problems arise specifically for bans. First, legal bans are 
blunt tools, whereas the very existence of coded hate speech shows that hate speech 
can easily shift in form. Hence, even if we identified and banned coded hate speech, 
hate speakers might easily adopt new codes to avoid the ban. The problem is not so 
acute with counterspeech. It is easier to speak out against a new instance of coded 
speech than it is to pass yet another law or even to implement a generally-worded law in 
a significantly new way. Notice that the problem here is moral, not empirical: what 
makes bans relatively inflexible is that, because they employ coercive force (whereas 
counterspeech does not), implementing them requires meeting a higher burden of 
moral justification. This (as Section 5 will discuss) is because coercive measures involve 
a pro tanto restriction of the coercee’s freedom. The point, then, is not just that the 
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institutional processes for implementing bans are in fact more inflexible than 
counterspeech—instead, it is that they are morally required to be.  
Second, trying to ban coded hate speech exacerbates a common charge against hate 
speech bans, namely that they risk obstructing or ‘chilling’ democratic debates that are 
instrumental to promoting justice. Coded speech is widespread and works through 
otherwise innocent and useful terms, such as ‘welfare’, ‘food stamps’, ‘inner city’. 
Appealing to such terms is a normal and necessary part of fruitful democratic public 
deliberation. Consequently, even if we could identify and ban all instances of coded hate 
speech, this seems undesirable given how much banning this would involve, and how 
ordinary and useful the banned words or phrases would be.  
Coded hate speech, then, also poses a problem, and arguably a greater one, for 
bans. Proponents of bans might perhaps respond that coded speech is less likely to 
arise in the hate-banning society. But this is implausible. First, it seems empirically 
dubious. In many European states that do have bans, extreme-right parties like the 
French Front National or the German NPD have gained mainstream prominence. And 
they have done so in part by smuggling hateful propositions into public deliberation 
under coded guises. In France, one of Marine Le Pen’s central strategies for 
mainstreaming the Front National has been to co-opt the language of republican values. 
It has been argued, for instance, that the French far-right has increasingly used words 
like laïcité (roughly: secularism) or ‘republicanism’ to refer specifically to opposition to 
Islam.65 Equally, the NPD has avoided bans by substituting ‘Glory and Honour’ for the 
banned ‘Blood and Honour’, replacing the swastika with a Nazi-era triangular figure, 
and using a salute with three-outstretched fingers rather than an outstretched hand.66 
(Notice how this last example illustrates how easily citizens can evade bans by adjusting 
their communications.) At first blush, then, coded hate speech seems just as widespread 
in hate-banning societies. 
This should hardly be surprising: there are theoretical reasons to expect coded 
speech to be more prevalent in societies that ban hate speech than in those that do not. 
First, the imposition of legal penalties incentivises the development of coded hate 
speech by citizens wishing to express abhorrent views. This is not to deny that some 
such incentives, like social opprobrium, exist in hate-allowing societies. But, in virtue of 
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operating through the use of coercive sanctions, legal bans produce further incentives. 
Because they do so, Eric Heinze argues, “bans […] are teaching [hate groups] how to 
mock and scorn vulnerable targets from within the bounds of the law.”67  
Furthermore, the principle of operation underpinning bans not only incentivises, 
but also facilitates the development of coded hate speech. Underlying the view that we 
should ban hateful discourse, Waldron suggests, is the compelling thought that some 
propositions are simply not up for debate.68 On this view, we need not discuss why, say, 
‘Immigrants are vermin!’ is false. We need not explain that all human beings have equal 
dignity, that this dignity mandates treating people with respect, and so on. We simply 
ban the hateful utterance. And if some cannot understand why, so much the worse for 
them.  
According to Robert Talisse, however, when politics is organised around such a 
principle of non-engagement, “the very content of the concepts that shape and direct 
our political institutions is left underdetermined; they are up for grabs […] [and] 
available for easy co-optation”.69 Here, Talisse is echoing John Stuart Mill’s warning 
that, in the absence of a vigorous defence of important truths, “the shell and husk only 
of [their] meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost”.70 The implication, in our 
context, is that refusing to publicly repudiate hateful utterances ironically contributes to 
making the relevant values (‘dignity’, ‘respect’, ‘equality’, etc.) up for grabs. Other things 
being equal, it is easier for hate groups to present their views as egalitarian or concerned 
with dignity in contexts where no concrete articulation or reiteration of these values has 
recently been offered. For example, it might be easier for racial segregation to be 
publicly defended as egalitarian in circumstances where, because we prefer bans to 
counterspeech, there has been little public discussion of what equality truly means. 
In contrast, democratic counterspeech actively employs powerful tools for 
authoritatively endowing democratic values with concrete content. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, it not only gives arguments for why hateful views are wrong, but employs 
emotionally-charged narratives to show precisely what is meant by democratic ideals. 
Think, for instance, of Martin Luther King’s ‘I Have a Dream’ speech, where he offers 
an impassioned vision of a society of equals, which explicitly aims to recapture “the true 
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meaning of equality”. Such a narrative contributes to authoritatively clarifying the 
meaning of equality in a way that makes co-opting this ideal more difficult. 
Given these deficiencies with respect to coded speech, advocates of bans might be 
tempted to offer a different kind of response: that this section’s principal line of 
argument attacks a straw man, as they are actually not interested in banning coded hate 
speech.71 This response is inadequate for two reasons. Firstly, given the logic of 
Waldron’s argument, it is unclear that this response is genuinely available to him. After 
all, the rationale for banning public hate speech is that it undermines the public 
assurance of dignity and assures other hateful citizens that they are not alone. But this 
rationale does not seem inherently sensitive to whether speech takes a coded form or 
not. Indeed, as the NPD’s adjusted Nazi salutes illustrate, coded hate speech can be 
such that, while it is encoded enough to escape existing regulations, it clearly expresses 
and diffuses a dignity-denying message. Therefore, this response seems ad hoc.  
Secondly, and more fundamentally, this reply is unsatisfactory given the dialectical 
situation. The discussion of coded speech was initially raised on behalf of critics of state 
counterspeech to suggest that such counterspeech is less effective than bans. My 
argument has been that coded speech is at least as problematic for bans as it is for 
counterspeech. In this context, then, advocates of bans cannot respond that they are 
not interested in regulating coded speech without also defusing the original objection to 
counterspeech. 
There is another sense in which my argument might be accused of attacking a straw 
man. The defender of bans might say that they are not recommending legal bans instead 
of state-sponsored counterspeech. Rather, they want bans in addition to state-sponsored 
counterspeech. So, they can avail themselves of all of the comparative benefits of 
counterspeech.  
This response, though natural, faces two difficulties. Firstly, it assumes that we can 
simply add the good effects of bans to those of state-based counterspeech by 
combining the two. But this assumption is contentious. We have encountered reasons 
for thinking that bans, because of their distinctive mode of operation, encourage and 
facilitate the development of coded hate speech. And the harms enacted by coded hate 
speech are especially difficult to block, for both counterspeech and bans. (This, note, is 
consistent with my argument that coded hate speech is even more problematic for bans 
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than for counterspeech). State-sponsored counterspeech may therefore be less effective 
alongside bans than on its own. 
To appreciate the second difficulty, consider once more the dialectical situation. In 
Section 3, I argued that bans involve a pro tanto moral cost, stemming from 
considerations of freedom (understood as non-domination), which state counterspeech 
avoids. To justify this moral cost, the advocate of bans needed to show that bans are, at 
least in some cases, more effective at blocking hate speech’s harm than state-driven 
counterspeech. This section has suggested that this is not the case. But if bans offer 
nothing more than state-sponsored counterspeech by way of blocking the harm in hate 
speech, we still have a reason to prefer simple counterspeech to the combination of 
bans and counterspeech: the latter is no more effective than the former, yet involves a 
freedom-related cost that the former avoids. 
I began by considering the objection that counterspeech is often ineffective at 
blocking hate speech’s dignitarian harm, particularly when hate speech takes a coded 
form. While this objection is powerful, it does not establish that state counterspeech is 
entirely ineffective in these contexts. More importantly, this objection can be turned 
against bans. Not only do bans seem even more ineffective in response to coded 
speech, but it is inherent to their principle of operation that they encourage and 
facilitate the development of such speech. 
 
5. Objection 2. Does Counterspeech Block Only Hate Speech? 
5.1. The Risk of Misdirected Counterspeech 
 
According to the previous objection, state-based counterspeech cannot block enough 
instances of hate speech. By contrast, the present objection claims that state-based 
counterspeech risks challenging too many instances of speech. That is, it risks 
undermining contributions to democratic public deliberation that are not hateful (for 
short, ‘non-hateful speech’) and that are even sometimes instrumental to advancing 
justice. 
Robin West directs a variant of this objection at Brettschneider, by raising the 
possibility of the “Hypocritical State”. So far, we have been assuming that the state will 
only use its powers of counterspeech against hateful speech. But part of what is non-
ideal in the real world is that states and influential political figures sometimes use their 
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expressive powers wrongly. Put differently, they misdirect their speech. One 
explanation for why they do so, West observes, is that states are sometimes 
hypocritical. They appeal to values like dignity or equality to advance unjust ends that 
are contrary to those values, and to denounce speech that genuinely aims to promote 
those values.72 Therefore, recommending a policy of state counterspeech in non-ideal 
conditions risks undermining speech that is not hateful and that may instead be geared 
towards advancing justice. 
The public reception of Black Lives Matter brings this concern to life. In 2016, the 
social movement campaigned regularly against structural racism directed at black 
Americans, and notably protested the violent treatment of blacks by law enforcement 
officers. In response, soon-to-be-president Donald Trump and Rudy Giuliani 
condemned the slogan ‘Black Lives Matter’ as racist on the fallacious grounds that it 
implied that non-black lives did not matter.73 Here, West might want to say, we have a 
case of misdirected speech: authoritative public figures used the language of racial 
equality to denounce a public slogan that was neither hateful nor inegalitarian, and that 
instead promoted racial equality. 
This is a serious objection. Again, however, it can be turned against the policy of 
banning hate speech. If, as West claims, the state is badly motivated, or hypocritical, 
then it might misdirect bans too. It might, say, appeal to the ideal of human dignity to 
ban speech that is not genuinely hateful, and that rather aims to advance human dignity. 
There is some empirical evidence of bans being misused thus. Indeed, opponents of 
bans often complain that bans are routinely used to silence groups contesting genuine 
injustices.74 That being said, I am not committed to the claim that bans are actually 
often misdirected. Rather, my principal claim is a conditional one: if there is reason to 
think that the state’s expressive powers will be misdirected, then, prima facie, there is 
reason to think that the state’s coercive powers too will be misdirected.75 After all, if the 
state is ill-motivated, as West suggests, why think that this will not affect its usage of 
bans as well as its counterspeech? So, insofar as this objection is effective against the 
policy of state counterspeech, it should be effective against the policy of banning hate 
speech.  
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Once again, then, the hate-banning and hate-allowing societies appear to be 
companions-in-guilt. Further, the hate-banning society is once more the guiltier party. 
Misdirected banning—misusing bans to penalise non-hateful speech—is more morally 
problematic than misdirected counterspeech—speaking back against non-hateful 
speech. First, banning involves coercive power, rather than merely persuasive or 
expressive power.76 Since coercive power involves employing force to make someone 
do or not do something, it diminishes individual freedom or autonomy in a way that 
merely expressive or persuasive power does not.77 
Second, the coercive power involved in misdirected banning also reduces individual 
freedom because of what it keeps individuals from doing, namely publicly voicing 
considerations that matter to them. As Section 3 discussed, being free to publicly raise 
such considerations is valuable partly because it enables speakers to contest exercises of 
political power and thereby hold them accountable. Consequently, by punishing non-
hateful public speech, misdirected banning risks significantly undercutting the freedom 
(understood as non-domination) of its targets.  
Now, we should not overstate the moral asymmetry between misdirected banning 
and misdirected counterspeech. Although misdirected counterspeech does not employ 
coercive force, it too can impede its targets’ freedom. To see this, recall that 
authoritative counterspeech can disable certain speech-acts. In Section 3, the basis for 
recommending state counterspeech was that it can disable the speech-act of refuting 
the public assurance of dignity. In the case of misdirected counterspeech, state 
counterspeech diminishes the target’s perceived authority, and thereby reduces her 
capacity to convince her audience through non-hateful speech. Thus, insofar as being able 
to publicly raise concerns and convince one’s listeners protects one against political 
domination, misdirected counterspeech also impedes freedom as non-domination. 
Nevertheless, the crucial point remains that misdirected counterspeech does not 
disable all speech-acts associated with the targeted utterance. In voicing her non-hateful 
concerns, the speaker can still successfully disclose her worldview, share her experiences, 
and expose others to new arguments. Further, the speaker can contest the ill-motivated 
state’s claim that her views are unjust by offering a rival understanding of the relevant 
values. For example, when leading politicians fallaciously condemn the slogan ‘Black 
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Lives Matter’ as inherently racist, members of Black Lives Matter still can (and do) 
contest that claim: they can argue, say, that when one racial group faces special 
injustices, achieving racial equality requires paying special attention to that group’s 
interests. Such speech-acts at least help third parties better understand the speaker’s 
non-hateful concerns, so that some of her discursive power to advance her goals is 
preserved.78 Hence, a morally-important asymmetry persists:79 while misdirected 
counterspeech salvages some valuable speech-acts associated with the targeted 
utterance, misdirected banning suppresses them all.  
 
5.2. Can Bans Avoid the Objection? 
 
Section 5.1 argued that the problem of misdirected state action is more problematic for 
bans than it is for counterspeech. Consequently, proponents of bans might be tempted 
to deny its basic premise: namely, that the state is likely to be ill-motivated. Waldron 
voices such a reply. Put differently, he suggests that the objection under 
consideration—that if we allow some hate speech bans, the state will ban some things 
that it should not—is overblown. Like many slippery-slope arguments, it relies on 
unsubstantiated empirical claims, which are overly pessimistic about states’ 
motivations.80 
One line of response asserts that these claims are substantiated, and that states do 
tend to use bans improperly.81 To avoid relying on such empirical claims about states’ 
motivations, I will offer a different response, which focuses on the epistemic difficulties 
involved in applying hate speech regulations. Specifically, I will argue that there are 
conceptual reasons, grounded in the vagueness of the harm in hate speech, that explain 
why states are liable to misidentify instances of hate speech, and hence—if 
implementing bans—to ban non-hateful speech.  
To see this, let us re-examine the harm in hate speech. Waldron is at pains, firstly, to 
distinguish the harm that warrants legal regulation from the notion of offense. This is 
because offense is too widespread. “Especially in a multifaith society, religion is an area 
                                                 
78 Notice a difference with speaking back against hateful speech. State counterspeech reduces the 
persuasiveness of hate speech because it has authority, and because it has the force of better argument on its 
side. But with misdirected counterspeech the speaker against whom the state speaks may well offer more 
compelling reasons. So she retains some persuasive force in a way the hate speaker does not. 
79 Rowbottom (2017, 33-34). 
80 Waldron (2012, 202).  
81 Mchangama (2012, 97-99). 
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where offense is always in the air. Each group’s creed seems like an outrage to every 
other group”.82 Consequently, religious freedom cannot be preserved without freedom 
to offend.83 A second desideratum for a speech-induced harm which we can safely 
recommend banning, Waldron suggests, is that it must not be vague.84 If it is vague—if 
it is often indeterminate whether the harm obtains or not—then there is a conceptual 
reason to expect that whoever is implementing the ban will make mistakes and ban 
non-hateful speech. The harm’s vagueness would constitute an underlying cause for 
why legislators and judges will make mistakes.  
Putting these two desiderata together, a minimal condition for the harm in hate 
speech to be one that we can safely recommend banning is that it be clearly, rather than 
vaguely, distinct from offense. For Waldron, the harm of assault on dignity, where 
dignity is the status of being an equal citizen in good standing, satisfies this condition. 
Being offended is a subjective or psychological harm, which manifests itself in felt 
experiences like shock or distress. By contrast, assault on dignity is an objective harm, 
which concerns “how things are with respect to [one] in society”.85 Whether one’s 
dignity is assaulted depends fundamentally on whether speakers are actually rejecting 
one’s good standing. Conceivably, there might be cases where one feels as though this 
is the case though it is not. Conversely, while shock and distress often accompany 
assaults on dignity, they are neither constitutive nor necessary consequences of such 
assaults. Thick-skinned targets of dignity-denying speech, for instance, may not feel 
distressed. Because of this qualitative difference, Waldron is confident that the 
distinction between offense (which should not be banned) and assaults on dignity 
(which should be) is clear, not vague. 
Ultimately, however, this move fails to dissipate the vagueness of the harm in hate 
speech. Even if assaults on dignity are objective harms, and therefore of a different 
ontological kind from offense, the distinction remains epistemically vague. Put differently, 
even if they are two different kinds of things, the way in which we find out whether they 
are occurring often does not allow us to distinguish the two.86 This is because, 
                                                 
82 Waldron (2012, 127). 
83 Ibid., 130. 
84 Ibid., 136-143. This may seem inconsistent with Waldron’s insistence elsewhere that vague laws can be 
adequately action-guiding. But there is no inconsistency. When Waldron (2010, 75-77) considers the objection 
that vague laws might suppress too much behaviour, he replies that this may be a valid consideration with 
free speech, but not in the cases he discusses there (driving and torture). 
85 Waldron (2012, 106). 
86 On epistemic vagueness in ethics, see Dougherty (2014). 
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intuitively, the most natural way to find out whether an utterance assaults the assurance 
of other citizens’ good standing is to consider how its targets experienced it. Did they 
feel a combination of, say, shock and outrage, shame and humiliation, which combined 
to produce an overall feeling of not belonging, of being excluded? And using these 
subjective epistemic indicators simply is looking at whether someone has been 
offended.87 
One might think that the subjective hurt resulting from dignitarian assaults is 
phenomenologically distinct from mere offense. But it is unclear why this would be. It 
seems perfectly conceivable that someone whose dignity has not really been assaulted 
could have a qualitatively similar psychological response as a target of dignity-denying 
speech. For instance, as Waldron himself notes, a believer confronted with a merely 
offensive image of Christ may well experience shock and outrage, shame and 
humiliation, and feel that being humiliated thus denigrates her social standing.88 
To avoid this problem, Waldron suggests using an alternative epistemic indicator. 
Instead of trying to distinguish assaults on dignity from offense based on the 
experiences they induce, the idea is that we should look more directly for objective 
markers of assaults on dignity.89 These markers would help distinguish reasonable 
feelings of having one’s standing attacked from unreasonable ones. What could these 
markers be? Waldron suggests that merely offensive speech denigrates a person’s 
beliefs, whereas assaults on dignity denigrate the person herself.90   
This distinction, however, is difficult to sustain. Most problematically, it struggles to 
handle the case of religious offense, which Waldron was concerned with distinguishing 
from assaults on dignity. This is because religious believers might respond that their 
religious beliefs are constitutive of their identity, so that deriding those beliefs is also an 
attack on their persons. Consider again the 2005 Danish Cartoons, which represented 
the prophet Muhammad as a bomb-throwing terrorist, or Charlie Hebdo’s representation 
of Muhammad as a child-molester. By attacking central figures of Islam, the response 
would go, these attack the dignity of profound adherents to Islam. So, this objective 
criterion fails to clearly rule out religious offense.  
                                                 
87 For instance, Gelber and McNamara (2015a, 336-337) use self-reports of subjective experiences to 
determine whether individuals’ dignity has been assaulted. 
88 Waldron (2012, 114-115). 
89 Ibid., 115. 
90 Ibid., 120.  
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Waldron considers a similar response but dismisses it as “largely an irresponsible 
attempt” by its advocates “to claim more […] than they are entitled to” by “recklessly 
presen[ting] claims about offense as though they were non-negotiable”.91 And when 
confronted with the Danish cartoons, he grudgingly concludes that they merely 
constitute a bad offense: attacking Muhammad’s dignity is not attacking Muslims’ 
dignity.92  
This reply seems uncharitable. We can easily imagine a reasoned case for thinking 
that attacks on Muhammad also constitute attacks on Muslims. ‘Since part of what it is 
to be a Muslim is to hold Muhammad’s life up as an exemplar’, someone might say, 
‘such representations entail that we Muslims aspire to be terrorists!’ Arguments like this 
suggest that, even if Waldron were right that many religious beliefs are not constitutive 
of believers’ identity, there is nothing clearly absurd or “irresponsible” in thinking so. In 
religious contexts, then, the distinction between attacks on persons and attacks on 
beliefs (and accordingly between reasonable and unreasonable claims to having one’s 
dignity assaulted) often remains epistemically vague. 
Moreover, Waldron’s reply jars with one of the more appealing features of his 
framework: his methodological commitment to asking what it is like for those on the 
receiving end of potentially harmful speech to be in this position. By introducing 
criteria of reasonableness to weed out unreasonable feelings of exclusion, and 
dismissing interpretations of these criteria voiced by self-described targets of religious 
hate speech, Waldron seemingly departs from this commitment. The point is not just to 
indicate an internal inconsistency. As I argued earlier, this methodological commitment 
is attractive. It is sensitive to the fact that targets of disrespectful speech may have a 
privileged perspective on what may be harmful about it. Furthermore, even when 
targets are mistaken regarding its harmfulness, it helps us better understand how they 
experience the world and thus facilitates engaging with them. 
This section has examined the objection that state counterspeech may be 
misdirected in non-ideal contexts. This objection, I have shown, applies even more 
forcefully against bans. This is so even if, like Waldron, one rejects the claim that states 
are badly motivated. Even if those in charge of banning hate speech are not badly 
motivated, the basis for banning hate speech remains epistemically vague. Hence, the 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 131. 
92 Ibid., 126. 
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present objection stands, and continues to stand more strongly against bans. To make 
this more vivid, let us end with an example. When it is vague whether citizens’ dignity 
has been assaulted—as for example with the Danish cartoons or Charlie Hebdo 
cartoons—the hate-allowing state may make mistakes regarding whether to speak back 
or not. Suppose it does not speak against Charlie Hebdo. Instead, it denounces those 
who publicly excoriated the cartoonists. And suppose this is a mistake. Even then, 
those against whom the state speaks will not, by contrast with the banning case, be 
entirely silenced. Accordingly, we can at least hope to achieve a better understanding of 
why some citizens experienced the cartoons as an assault on their dignity. And if some 





How should we respond to public narratives expressing deeply disrespectful or hateful 
views? Public hate speech assaults the basic political status of its targets. This harm, it 
has been argued, warrants implementing legal norms that suppress such speech: unless 
we ban hate speech, democratic public deliberation risks promoting injustice rather 
than justice. While this diagnosis of the harm in hate speech is compelling, the 
inference to hate speech bans is too direct. It relies on an idealised picture of bans and 
an unsophisticated understanding of democratic counterspeech. This chapter has aimed 
to remedy this shortcoming and thereby offer a qualified defence of the view that 
public hate speech should be countered via democratic public discourse, rather than 
bans.  
On a refined understanding of the counterspeech approach, the state authoritatively 
speaks back against hate speech despite not banning it. Given the freedom-related costs 
involved in banning hate speech, especially in conditions of widespread political 
alienation, such democratic counterspeech seems a preferable way of promoting dignity 
and advancing towards greater justice. Nonetheless, advocating state counterspeech 
might seem naïve: in non-ideal conditions, it is likely to achieve both too little and too 
much. My strategy in responding to these objections has primarily been to argue that 
counterspeech and bans are companions-in-guilt. Bans too struggle to block the 
dignitarian assaults produced by coded hate speech. And bans seem just as liable to be 
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misdirected as state counterspeech. In fact, in both cases, these objections seem more 
problematic for bans than for counterspeech. Bans are the guiltier party. 
However, this defence of robust norms of state-sponsored counterspeech over legal 
bans must be qualified. First, my defence of counterspeech remains pessimistic. The 
companions-in-guilt structure of my argument shows that democratic counterspeech is 
far from a perfect response to abhorrent public narratives. One of the unhappy 
conclusions of this chapter is that, in non-ideal conditions, both attempted solutions 
face serious limitations. 
Second, as I noted earlier, I do not purport to have definitively shown that bans on 
public hate speech are never warranted. My argument against bans and for democratic 
counterspeech is defeasible for two reasons. To begin, there is enormous variation in 
the forms that abhorrent speech takes and in the contexts where it occurs. Inevitably, I 
have focused on a restricted set of cases—in particular, cases of public discourse 
occurring in relatively stable democracies. In other types of political contexts, the 
companions-in-guilt arguments I have supplied may be less applicable.  
Moreover, I have been focusing on one important speech-based harm: how hate 
speech constitutes an unjust assault on the public assurance of dignity. But there are 
other speech-based harms. For some of the causal harms of hate speech, analogous 
companions-in-guilt arguments, which would rely on substantial empirical investigation, 
may perhaps be less successful. Further empirical research is therefore needed to 
ascertain how far the argumentative strategy I have deployed for defending 
counterspeech extends to other speech-based harms. 
Still, an important upshot remains: insofar as we are concerned with upholding the 
assurance of citizens’ equal standing in stable democracies in the face of public 
narratives expressing abhorrent views, there are good reasons for thinking that 















1.1.  Anger and Visibility  
 
In the classic novel Invisible Man (1952), Ralph Ellison depicts the perspective of an 
unnamed black American whose skin colour renders him “invisible”: he is persistently 
ignored, misunderstood, or mistaken for another. In a final moment of introspection, 
the invisible narrator turns to the reader: 
 
So why do I write, torturing myself to put it down? Because in spite of myself 
I’ve learned some things […] Why should I be the one to dream this 
nightmare? Why should I be dedicated and set aside—yes, if not to at least tell 
a few people about it? There seems to be no escape. Here I’ve set out to 
throw my anger in the world’s face […] ‘Ah,’ I can hear you say, ‘He only 
wanted us to listen to him rave!’ But only partially true: Being invisible and 
without substance, as it were, what else could I do? What else but try to tell 
you what was really happening when your eyes were looking through? And it 
is this which really frightens me: 
Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you? 
 
The passage is fascinating, not least for what it suggests about the communication of 
anger. First, the narrator emphasises the importance of “throwing [his] anger” at his 
audience. Further, he seems to do so for epistemic reasons, to make visible what had 
previously been invisible, by foregrounding his nightmarish experiences. Relatedly, 
perhaps, he claims that in expressing his anger, he speaks for the audience.  
Interestingly, the invisible narrator is not alone in voicing such thoughts. His 
suggestions resonate strongly with the poet Audre Lorde’s assertion that “my anger and 
your attendant fears, perhaps, are spotlights that can be used for your growth, […] for 
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corrective surgery”.1 Or consider, similarly, the novelist and civil rights advocate James 
Baldwin, who once declared that “to be a Negro in [America] and to be relatively 
conscious, is to be in a rage almost all of the time”, before recommending “control[ling] 
the rage so that it won’t destroy you”, thereby turning it into a productive force. For 
him, as a novelist, doing so manifests itself in the process of “creat[ing] a person and 
mak[ing] other persons feel what this person feels”.2 A pattern emerges. 
In this chapter, I examine the place of anger in democratic public deliberation. In 
doing so, I will try to make sense of the recurrent themes above. How is publicly 
expressing anger “corrective surgery” for one’s audience? What is it capable of teaching 
us, or making us feel? And why does it matter that, as the invisible narrator suggests, 
the angry speaker be “dedicated and set aside” for this purpose? These recurrent 
observations, I will argue, point to important insights regarding anger’s function and 
place in democratic public discourse—insights, moreover, which extant philosophical 




Consider how this fits within my broader inquiry. In Chapter 2, to counter the 
objection that the Shared Reasons Constraint excludes too many things from public 
debate, I recommended giving a greater role to emotionally-charged narrative in 
democratic discourse. But a powerful objection to this recommendation is that it risks 
being too inclusive. Absent further qualifications, it is liable to allow, for instance, a 
racist’s enraged narrative. There are two worries here: one concerns the content of the 
racist views being expressed; the other bears on the rage, or intense anger, the speaker 
expresses, independently of what that rage is about. Chapter 3 considered the first 
worry, by investigating how we should counter public expressions of deeply 
disrespectful views. The present chapter turns to the second worry.  
To keep the two worries apart, I will focus on cases where the contents of the 
angrily communicated speech are not immoral or disrespectful. Imagine, for example, 
an American civil rights activist in the 1960s, who affirms the principle of racial equality 
and denounces as unjust the fact that blacks are denied equal rights. And suppose she 
                                                 
1 Lorde (1997, 278). 
2 Baldwin et al (1961, 205). 
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expresses these views in a way that is charged with deep anger. In this context, we can 
ask: is it desirable, from the standpoint of justice, that she publicly expresses this anger 
in conditions marked by deep divisions and pervasive injustices?3 Or ought she, 
morally, to refrain from expressing her views in a way that is suffused with anger? 
Democratic theorists who explicitly invite emotions into their normative 
conceptions of public deliberation often intimate that this includes negative emotions 
such as anger. Krause, for instance, cites with approval the anger that members of the 
ACT UP publicly directed at Americans’ failure to take the AIDS crisis seriously.4 
Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson praise the intense outrage that Carol Moseley 
Braun voiced in the US Senate, concerning the proposed renewal of a patent on the 
Confederate flag insignia.5 According to these theorists, then, deliberators concerned 
with advancing justice needn’t necessarily refrain from publicly expressing their anger.  
But anger has come under attack. Spurred in part by the rage and resentment that 
pervade contemporary politics,6 some philosophers—including, most influentially, 
Martha Nussbaum—have revitalised a historical tradition of scepticism towards anger. 
By contrast with the case of disrespectful or vilifying hate speech, critics of political 
anger are typically not suggesting that legal norms should coercively suppress angry 
public speech. But they nevertheless hold that publicly expressing anger is morally 
undesirable. One of the most influential arguments for this view, an argument which is 
commonly echoed in broader public discourse, asserts that expressing anger is 
counterproductive from the standpoint of justice. Although it is an aversive reaction to 
injustice, it is likely to exacerbate existing injustices. Thus, even if some emotions have 
an important role to play in public deliberation, deliberators should refrain from voicing 
deep anger. Justice would be better served, critics conclude, by expressions of 
forgiveness, love, or even meekness.7  
Against this popular challenge, I will argue that anger does have a key role to play in 
democratic public deliberation, partly by articulating an underexplored epistemic value 
of publicly-expressed anger, and partly by challenging the broader framing of the 
                                                 
3 I will only consider cases where speakers have some control over their expression of anger. After all, if they 
cannot refrain from expressing anger, recommending that they do so asks for something impossible. 
4 Krause (2008, 119). See also Young (1996, 124), Mansbridge (1999, 223), and Chakravarti (2014).  
5 Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 135-138). However, they suggest that the angry oration may have been a 
non-deliberative means to deliberation, rather than an instance of deliberation.  
6 Nussbaum (2016b). 




debate. My argument proceeds as follows. After offering a working definition of ‘anger’ 
(Section 2), I provide an overview of the counterproductivity objection, and of the 
main strategies for addressing it. I suggest that even if we grant the non-
consequentialist value of anger, we cannot circumvent the issue of whether anger is 
productive in terms of its consequences. Accordingly, I distinguish two complementary 
philosophical strategies for defending anger’s productivity, both of which I will pursue 
(Section 3).  
The first part of my defence theorises an important positive consequence of 
political anger. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I argue that public 
expressions of anger possess a distinctive epistemic value. In virtue of anger’s 
characteristic phenomenology, communicating anger to one’s listeners can play an 
indispensable role in helping them register and understand existing injustices. This 
epistemic role is crucial in divided societies, where the injustices suffered by some 
groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, others (Section 4).  
On its own, however, this initial argument is insufficient to stave off the 
counterproductivity objection. To complement it, the second part of my defence 
recommends rethinking what constitutes the correct context for evaluating anger’s 
productivity. By appealing to democratic theory’s ‘systemic turn’, I contend that anger’s 
consequences should be evaluated not in isolation—as advocates and opponents of 
anger have often done—but rather from a systemic perspective. This reframing reveals 
that the worries concerning anger’s alleged counterproductivity are substantially more 
tractable than they initially appear (Section 5). Having defended the place of anger in 
the deliberative system, I conclude by revisiting Ellison’s invisible narrator (Section 6). 
 
2. Defining Anger 
 
To define our subject more precisely, let us outline some key properties of the emotion 
I am calling ‘anger’. Like all emotions, and unlike moods, anger is an intentional 
attitude, in the philosophical sense of the term—an attitude that is directed at a 
particular object, its content.8 Anger, put differently, is about something: A is angry that 
B betrayed him; C is angry that she was not promoted.  
                                                 
8 On emotions’ intentionality, see Deonna and Teroni (2012, 3-6), Brun et al (2009, 11-12), and Nussbaum 
(2015, 42-43).  
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Secondly, anger is a cognitive attitude: an important part of what anger does is aim 
accurately to represent certain features of the world. More specifically, philosophers 
commonly suggest that anger presents the content it is directed at as involving a moral 
violation or injustice. Because anger has this cognitive dimension, we can assess it as 
being more or less correctly directed, or fitting. Anger is fitting, firstly, only if its content 
actually involves an injustice; and, secondly, only if its intensity is proportionate to the 
severity of the injustice it is purporting to represent. Rage is not a fitting response to a 
minor moral violation, such as your borrowing my favourite pen without permission.9 
Thirdly, anger is phenomenologically distinctive: there is a distinctive qualitative 
experience that is involved in being angry at something. This experience is partly 
characterised by certain bodily feelings, such as an increased heart rate, feeling hot, or 
trembling. However, anger’s distinctive phenomenology also concerns the content it is 
directed at. A common observation among philosophers of emotion is that although 
emotions are directed at objects that are already given to us through perception, 
imagination, memory, or belief, emotions do not leave the representation of these 
objects unchanged. Instead, they are “distinctive ways of seeing a situation”.10 In 
Section 4, I will say more about how anger characteristically affects the way we 
experience its content, and why this matters politically. 
Finally, besides having a cognitive dimension, anger has a conative aspect. Not only 
is anger an attitude which aims to represent something about the world, but it also 
disposes us to action. For example, A’s rage at the unfair treatment of blacks in the 
criminal justice system may motivate A to retaliate against law enforcement agencies, or 
to protest for their reform.  
With this picture of anger in place,11 we can define this chapter’s focus more 
precisely. As we will see shortly, Nussbaum has mounted an influential challenge to 
anger, which centres on its conative dimension: anger is problematic, she claims, 
because it disposes us to retributive or vengeful actions, actions aimed at inflicting 
                                                 
9 On the fittingness conditions of anger, see Cogley (2014, 201-203), Chakravarti (2014, 3-6), Srinivasan 
(2017, 6-7), and Nussbaum (2015, 42-43).   
10 Jones (1996, 11).  
11 This picture of anger is compatible with many theories of the emotions, including the perceptual theory 
(e.g., Döring (2007), Tappolet (2011)), and the attitudinal theory (e.g., Deonna and Teroni (2012, ch. 7)). And 
although, as I discuss later, it is unclear whether the evaluative judgment theory (e.g., Nussbaum 2015) can 
successfully explain anger’s distinctive phenomenology, advocates of this theory typically acknowledge that 
emotions are phenomenologically distinctive. For discussion, see note 64, this chapter.   
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payback on the perpetrators of injustice.12 But even Nussbaum allows for some forms of 
anger, which she labels “transitional anger”, and of which Martin Luther King is the 
paradigmatic illustration. 
While transitional anger’s most distinctive attribute is that it is not retributive,13 
Nussbaum’s discussion of King makes it clear that it has further distinguishing 
properties. A second characteristic is that although, like anger generally, transitional 
anger is directed at a morally deficient object, it swiftly transforms into a forward-
looking attitude, which is oriented towards advancing justice. Thus, someone 
experiencing and expressing transitional anger does not dwell on past injustices.14 
Thirdly, although transitional anger sometimes moves individuals to non-retributive 
violence (for instance, in self-defence), it habitually motivates non-violent actions.15 
Finally, transitional anger has a distinctive tone. Its typical expression is not fiery or 
harsh, but calm and self-controlled.16  
In this light, to avoid arguing against a straw man when defending anger’s place in 
public discourse, I will focus on non-transitional forms of anger. To this end, this 
chapter focuses predominantly on the public speech of Frederick Douglass (1818-
1895), an abolitionist leader who escaped from slavery, and Malcolm X (1925-1965), 
who famously militated against the oppression of black Americans. Both were heavily 
involved in the struggle for racial justice, and both were reputed for their intensely 
angry rhetoric.  
Crucially, the anger they expressed was seldom transitional anger. First, its conative 
dimension, or aim, could be retributive. Douglass, for instance, once asserted that 
slaveholders “deserve to have [their throats] cut”.17  And even when its aim was not 
retributive, their anger nonetheless typically differed from transitional anger. It was 
often agitated and harsh, sometimes shading into rage, it did not shy away from 
encouraging violence, and it often dwelled on past and current injustices. Consider, for 
example, Malcolm X’s insistent depictions of the “nightmare” constituted by black 
                                                 
12 Nussbaum (2015, 45-48).  
13 Ibid., 44. See also Nussbaum (2016a, 212) 
14 Nussbaum (2015, 52-54).  
15 Ibid. See also Nussbaum (2016a, 212, 221).  
16 Nussbaum (2015, 52-54; 2016a, 222, 228-230). 
17 Cited in Oakes (2007, 100).  
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Americans’ daily lives—a rhetoric which contrasted so starkly with King’s own 
forward-looking rhetoric of “dreams” that King repeatedly distanced himself from it.18 
Besides these dialectical reasons, there is also a political reason for examining the 
value of non-transitional anger—namely, that such anger is widespread in non-ideal 
public discourse. Douglass and Malcolm X, with their deeply angry rhetoric, played 
highly influential roles in their respective struggles. What is more, the intensity of their 
anger echoes that of the three figures we started with. Baldwin, in particular, makes it 
clear that it is rage he needs to control and channel. So, while political philosophers have 
given due attention to the rhetoric of more moderate speakers, like Martin Luther 
King,19 a normative assessment of democratic deliberation in non-ideal conditions 
should pay greater attention to the more controversial, but nonetheless politically 
salient, case of non-transitional anger. 
 
3. The Counterproductivity Objection: An Overview 
3.1. The Counterproductivity Objection 
 
One of the most common charges against publicly expressing non-transitional anger is 
that doing so is counterproductive: it is likely to amplify rather than alleviate existing 
injustices. This accusation pervades actual political discourse. Social movements that 
angrily denounce, say, police brutality against blacks, discrimination against women, or 
abuse directed at the LGBT community are frequently told that their advocacy would 
be more effective if it were less shrill.20 But this concern also has a distinguished 
philosophical history. Perhaps most famously, Seneca asserts that anger is inconsistent 
with humankind’s ethical ends: “mankind is born for mutual assistance; anger for 
mutual ruin”.21 Thus, “anger has nothing useful in itself”.22 The view that anger and its 
expression are counterproductive has also been revitalised by contemporary 
philosophers. Glen Pettigrove, for instance, suggests that because anger may interfere 
with interpersonal communication, blind angry individuals, and motivate oppressive 
                                                 
18 Baldwin (1986).  
19 E.g., Dryzek (2010), Rawls (1997).  
20 For examples, see Srinivasan (2017, 1-5).  
21 Seneca (1928[c. 45], I.5).  
22 Ibid., I.9. See also Adam Smith (1982[1759], I.ii.ch. 4).  
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actions, “the person who does not grow angry […] will be better positioned to focus on 
promoting common goods”.23  
Among contemporary theorists, however, the counterproductivity objection owes 
its most prominent restatement to Martha Nussbaum. In Anger and Forgiveness, 
Nussbaum contends that, because of its tendency to motivate payback, “anger is always 
normatively problematic, whether in the personal or in the public realm”.24 As we will 
see in the following section, Nussbaum is partly concerned with anger’s intrinsic moral 
standing. But when explaining what makes anger problematic in the public realm, she 
frequently emphasises its bad consequences for justice.25  
Firstly, Nussbaum claims, anger tends to be an irrational waste of energy, which 
distracts from the pursuit of justice. Anger typically motivates individuals to seek 
payback or vengeance. But seeking payback, Nussbaum claims, will rarely undo the 
wrong which prompted the anger. Hence, “if we ponder the futility of the payback wish 
[…] we quickly discover that non-anger and a generous disposition are far more 
useful”.26 
Secondly, Nussbaum continues, anger is likely to positively obstruct the pursuit of 
justice. By “breeding mistrust” and “increas[ing] the anxiety and self-defensiveness” of 
its targets, expressing anger undermines interpersonal cooperation.27 And interpersonal 
cooperation seems necessary for the wide-scale promotion of justice. In the worst 
cases, by inciting payback and eroding trust, anger risks triggering a “cycle of blood 
vengeance”.28 This is no doubt what King also feared when condemning Malcolm X’s 
violently angry rhetoric, which he claimed could “reap nothing but grief”.29 Thus, 
expressing anger seems deeply misguided if we truly care about advancing justice. In the 
pursuit of justice, “anger is politically futile”.30 
Anger’s alleged counterproductivity has normative upshots for both formal and 
informal politics. For Nussbaum, formal political institutions ought to be governed by a 
spirit of non-anger.31 To this end, citizens who populate and uphold these institutions 
                                                 
23 Pettigrove (2012, 347, 369-370). See also Silvermint (2017, 10-15).  
24 Nussbaum (2016a, 5).  
25 Ibid., 220. 
26 Ibid., 228.  
27 Ibid., 230. 
28 Ibid., 1, 230-233.  
29 Cited in Baldwin (1986, 403).  
30 Nussbaum (2016a, 236). 
31 Ibid., 172. 
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should exercise emotional self-restraint and resist “the siren song of anger”.32 What 
does this mean for specific political institutions? In the judicial realm, Nussbaum 
suggests, court proceedings should not institutionalise victim impact statements, where 
wronged parties voice their grievances.33 In the realm of transitional justice, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) ought to avoid providing an outlet for non-
transitional anger. Instead, they should give expression to “generous forward-looking 
thoughts”.34 Accordingly, Nussbaum commends Desmond Tutu insofar as he 
discouraged narratives of anger during the South African TRC.35 And although 
Nussbaum never discusses formal legislative politics, her condemnation of public anger 
presumably applies there too: if publicly-expressed anger truly impedes justice, this 
seems just as problematic when making laws as when interpreting them.  
Nussbaum likewise recommends that informal political contestation be governed by 
norms of non-anger. Indeed, she categorically praises Martin Luther King, Mohandas 
Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela, who “all repudiated anger as a matter of both theory and 
practice”.36 According to Nussbaum, their concerted efforts to refrain from expressing 
deep anger and to discipline away the anger that they sometimes felt were crucial to the 
success of their social movements.37 Because of this, Nussbaum asserts that we ought, 
morally, to emulate them: “the revolutionary non-anger of Mohandas Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King, Jr., is proposed not as a distant hope but as an immediate task, to 
be embraced here and now in the confrontation with justice”.38 Thus, participants in 
informal political contestation who wish to advance justice should refrain from 





                                                 
32 Ibid., 197. 
33 Ibid., 194-195. Nussbaum (2016a, 196-197) does cautiously consider allowing such statements post-sentencing, 
but precisely because this would diminish their political impact.    
34 Nussbaum (2016a, 240). 
35 Ibid. However, Nussbaum goes further than Tutu: because she worries that even forgiveness might be a 
covert form of anger, she recommends that TRCs advance a narrative of unconditional generosity. For 
discussion of how the South African TRC discouraged expressions of anger, see Chakravarti (2014, ch. 2).  
36 Nussbaum (2016a, 212).  
37 Ibid., 227, 231-233, 236. Nussbaum (2016a, 236) acknowledges that King and Mandela occasionally 
experienced and even expressed anger. But she insists that, crucially, this anger was fleeting: it was (and 
needed to be) swiftly followed by a transition to forward-looking love and compassion.  
38 Nussbaum (2016a , 218).   
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3.2.  Consequentialist and Non-consequentialist Strategies 
 
A direct strategy for responding to this objection consists in arguing that public anger 
actually needn’t be counterproductive: often, it may have more good effects than bad 
effects. However, to sidestep the thorny issue of whether or not anger is 
counterproductive, Amia Srinivasan suggests an alternative strategy. According to 
Srinivasan, the question of whether or not political anger is desirable is not fully 
answered by an assessment of anger’s consequences. Even if we ascertain that overall, 
we have instrumental reasons not to get angry, there may still be intrinsic reasons to do 
so, reasons unrelated to anger’s consequences. “For any instance of counterproductive 
anger we might still ask: is it the fitting response to the way the world is? Is the anger, 
however unproductive, nonetheless apt?”39 
What makes anger apt? Recall that anger has a cognitive dimension: it is directed at 
an object, which it represents as involving a moral violation or injustice. Anger is 
cognitively fitting only if its object actually involves an injustice and only if its intensity 
is proportionate to the severity of that injustice. For Srinivasan, aptness is the intrinsic 
moral value that accrues to anger in virtue of being a fitting cognitive response to 
injustice. The idea is that, just as there is intrinsic aesthetic value in appreciating beauty, 
so too there is intrinsic moral value in anger that correctly registers injustice.40 
Because anger is apt in virtue of fittingly or correctly registering its object’s moral 
properties, its aptness does not depend on producing good consequences. Therefore, 
even if anger is instrumentally problematic, its intrinsic value suggests that we might yet 
be able to resist the conclusion that it is all-things-considered morally undesirable.  
One worry with this response is that, for Nussbaum, anger’s tendency to motivate 
retributive action, or payback, is not merely instrumentally problematic. It also makes 
anger questionable from a non-consequentialist perspective. On Nussbaum’s view, 
either retribution is driven by the thought that inflicting suffering will somehow undo 
the injury which prompted one’s anger, or retribution inflicts suffering in order to 
degrade or “down-rank” the offender’s status.41 In the latter case, retribution seems 
immoral, displaying an obsession with rank.42 In the former case, retribution is 
                                                 
39 Srinivasan (2017, 4).  
40 Ibid., 5-9. 
41 Nussbaum (2015, 41-51). 
42 Ibid., 51. 
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irrational, since only “magical thinking” could make one believe that inflicting suffering 
will undo the injury one has sustained.43 Therefore, either the desire for payback 
involves an immoral obsession with the relative status of others, or it displays an 
irrational disposition to produce futile suffering. Since both traits are vicious, the fact 
that anger’s conative dimension inherently disposes us to retributive action means, 
Nussbaum concludes, that anger is intrinsically immoral. 
Srinivasan, however, gives us reasons to doubt this. She denies that such a tight 
connection obtains between anger and retribution. “Anger without the desire for 
revenge is something many of us know well”. When a friend betrays me, Srinivasan 
suggests, it is perfectly conceivable that my ensuing anger might motivate me simply to 
seek his recognition that he has wronged me. This desire for recognition, it seems, has 
no essential connection to the desire for revenge.44 If this is right, the upshot is that 
anger is not inherently associated with payback. Though anger may sometimes cause 
revenge, it is not itself essentially vindictive. So, even accepting for the sake of 
argument that retribution is inherently immoral, it would not follow that anger is 
intrinsically immoral.  
But even if Srinivasan’s response is right (as I believe it is), her non-consequentialist 
strategy nevertheless does not allow us to circumvent the counterproductivity objection 
altogether. As Srinivasan herself recognises, the non-consequentialist reasons for 
expressing anger do not have absolute force. In other words, the aptness of anger gives 
us a pro tanto moral reason in favour of publicly expressing apt anger, but this moral 
reason could in principle be overridden by countervailing moral reasons.  
The counterproductivity objection purports to give such countervailing moral 
reasons: if publicly expressing anger is indeed counterproductive, this gives us pro tanto 
moral reasons not to do so. And if expressing anger is highly counterproductive—if it is 
bound, as Nussbaum suggests, to impede crucial justice-promoting reforms—then 
these consequentialist reasons against expressing anger may well outweigh the non-
consequentialist reasons Srinivasan invokes. To illustrate: if expressing rage really would 
have caused Abraham Lincoln to fail in his attempt to abolish slavery, and Martin 
Luther King to fail in his leadership of the Civil Rights Movement, then one might 
plausibly think that, overall, caring about justice required that they refrain from 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Srinivasan (2017, 7-8). In fact, some of the evidence Nussbaum cites suggests that anger commonly seeks 
control or justice, which are conceptually distinct from vengeance. E.g., Tavris (1982, 153-153).  
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expressing anger. Correspondingly, if expressing anger really is extremely 
counterproductive, it might seem that enraged orators like Douglass and Malcolm X 
were overall wrong, from the perspective of justice, to express themselves as they did. 
Hence, although I agree with Srinivasan’s claim that anger has non-consequentialist 
value, we should not stop there. To strengthen the case for publicly-expressed anger, 
the rest of this chapter aims to tackle the counterproductivity objection more directly. 
 
3.3.  Two Types of Consequentialist Strategies 
 
One might worry that directly resisting the counterproductivity objection’s 
consequentialist claim is essentially an empirical task, which should devolve to social 
scientists. But philosophers can also play a part. Firstly, consider that when social 
scientists investigate the empirical consequences of public anger, they do not look 
randomly, but instead proceed with some theoretical hypotheses regarding what types 
of effects might reliably be related to anger. The task of developing such hypotheses is 
one that philosophers can fruitfully contribute to. By elucidating emotions’ 
phenomenology, intentionality, and relation to epistemic values, philosophical accounts 
of emotions help illuminate what kinds of consequences we can expect emotions to 
produce. Accordingly, one philosophical strategy for tackling the counterproductivity 
objection consists in identifying and conceptualising possible positive consequences of 
anger.  
A second way in which philosophers can contribute is by examining what the 
correct context for evaluating the consequences of angry speech is. The context of 
evaluation is an account of what alternative things are being compared along a given 
standard of evaluation. Suppose that our aim or standard is to motivate others to 
oppose injustice, and that we have shown that publicly-expressed anger sometimes 
motivates listeners to oppose injustice. A critic of anger might acknowledge this, but 
reply that the relevant question is not: does angry speech motivate individuals to 
oppose injustice better than no speech at all? Rather, it should be: does angry speech 
motivate individuals to oppose injustice better than the best form of non-angry speech? 
Importantly, the criticism is not that angry speech produces a certain kind of (bad) 
consequence. Instead, it is that advocates of anger are taking the wrong objects as their 
comparanda. In this way, examining the context of evaluation constitutes a distinct 
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strategy through which philosophers can challenge claims about the productivity or 
counterproductivity of public anger.  
I will pursue both strategies in tandem. Section 4 articulates a vital and neglected 
epistemic consequence associated with publicly-expressed anger. In turn, Section 5 
contends that both advocates and opponents of the counterproductivity objection 
typically adopt the wrong context for evaluating public anger’s consequences. Now, in 
doing so, my aim is of course not to show that publicly expressing anger will always be 
productive, all things considered. But it is to indicate that the counterproductivity 
challenge rests on at least two illicit moves: first, it overlooks a distinctive and 
important epistemic value of communicating anger; second, by adopting the wrong 
context of evaluation, it forces us to choose between these epistemic benefits and other 
values when doing so may be unnecessary. Establishing these conclusions will put us in 
a far better position to resist Nussbaum’s charge that “anger is always normatively 
problematic,”45 along with her recommendation that formal and informal political 
institutions be governed by norms of non-anger. 
 
4. The Epistemic Value of Publicly-Expressed Anger 
 
Opponents of the counterproductivity objection have enumerated various goods that 
anger can produce. Anger, it is said, motivates others to oppose injustice,46 helps one 
retain one’s self-respect,47 and enhances one’s perceived status.48 Without rejecting 
these suggestions, I will specifically investigate the epistemic value of communicating 
one’s anger. In part, this is because this dimension is particularly relevant to my broader 
inquiry: at various junctures, I have emphasised how democratic public deliberation 
matters, inter alia, because it contributes to pooling information that is relevant to just 
policy-making.49  
The view that anger and its public expression are epistemically valuable is not 
uncommon. Recall, for example, the invisible narrator’s assertion that his anger aims to 
make visible what had been overlooked, and Lorde’s reference to her anger as a 
                                                 
45 Nussbaum (2016a, 5).  
46 Lorde (1997, 280).  
47 Bell (2009, 168); Borgwald (2012). 
48 Tiedens (2001).  
49 Chapter 1, Section 3; Chapter 2, Section 4.  
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“spotlight”. Furthermore, this view has been taken up by philosophers, particularly 
feminist philosophers, as part of a broader trend towards rehabilitating emotions within 
epistemology.50  
Nevertheless, the epistemic value of publicly-expressed anger has yet to be 
articulated adequately. To begin, some philosophers who discuss anger’s epistemic 
worth are not primarily concerned with the value of publicly communicating anger.51 And 
most of the defences that are concerned with publicly communicating anger are largely 
programmatic, rather than precisely developed.52 An exception here is Sonali 
Chakravarti, who has extensively explored the value of anger in victim testimony. But 
Chakravarti does not avail herself of recent developments in the philosophy of 
emotion, which—I will argue—are needed to understand what is distinctive about 
publicly-expressed anger’s epistemic contribution.53 These limitations have enabled 
critics of publicly-expressed anger to acknowledge that it has some epistemic value, 
while downplaying the relative importance of that value. To pre-empt such replies, I 
will explore the epistemic value of publicly-expressed anger in a way that makes it 
clearer why this epistemic role matters, and why it cannot easily be performed without 
anger. 
 
4.1. The Theoretical Case 
 
Some epistemic benefits of publicly expressing anger are relatively uncontroversial. 
When public speakers express their demands with sincere anger—either by displaying 
the conventional physiological and vocal signs of anger, or by explicitly affirming that 
they are angry—we learn that they are angry. Given an understanding of what anger is, 
this reveals many things about their psychology. We learn that they are experiencing 
certain bodily feelings, like tenseness, that they have the sense that something is 
seriously unjust, and that they might be driven to action. 
Although providing this information is an important epistemic function, two 
worries arise. Firstly, one might reply that this function could largely be performed 
without expressing full-blown anger. Nussbaum, for instance, might again point to 
                                                 
50 E.g., Frye (1983), Jaggar (1989), Bell (2009), Chakravarti (2014, ch. 5). On this epistemological trend, see 
Brun et al (2008). 
51 E.g., Jaggar (1989), Bell (2009). 
52 E.g., Lorde (1997), Frye (1983).  
53 Chakravarti (2014, 2).  
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transitional anger. The entire cognitive content of transitional anger is “How 
outrageous. Something should be done about that.”54 So, expressing transitional anger, 
as King did, suffices to communicate the belief that a situation is unjust, and the 
disposition to act on this basis. Accordingly, although Nussbaum acknowledges that 
non-transitional anger has some epistemic value as a signal of outrage and injustice, she 
readily downplays this value as “limited”.55 Similarly, Pettigrove remarks that refraining 
from anger did not prevent Lincoln from expressing his moral opposition to slavery.56 
For example, in a letter to a political opponent, Abraham Lincoln declares: “You think 
slavery is right and ought to be extended; we think it is wrong and ought to be 
restricted. For this, neither has any just occasion to be angry with the other”.57  
Secondly, remember that we set out trying to illuminate the intriguing observations 
Ellison’s invisible narrator made about anger, observations which Lorde and Baldwin 
echoed. But the above account of publicly-expressed anger’s epistemic value does not 
fully capture what they meant. The invisible narrator declares that his anger teaches us 
something about the world, shining a light on nightmarish features we had overlooked. 
So far, however, the epistemic function of anger is merely that it teaches us something 
about the speaker’s psychology, not about the world she is looking at. Nor, moreover, 
does the present account elucidate Baldwin’s suggestion that useful rage works by 
making listeners feel what the speaker feels. 
To isolate an epistemic function of publicly-expressed anger that can overcome 
these concerns, let us take a step back. Chapter 2 discussed how, in non-ideal 
conditions marked by deep divisions, logical arguments from shared premises 
sometimes break down. Often, the reason they do so is that some social groups lack 
certain concepts, or have erroneous views about the application conditions of certain 
concepts. This, in turn, typically results from the fact that they lack relevant experiences 
of the world. In this context, I argued, emotionally-charged narratives can remedy such 
communicative breakdowns, by facilitating the communication of one’s experiences 
and perspective to others. Applied to anger, the idea is that anger-infused discourse is 
epistemically important not just because it tells the audience that the speaker is angry, but 
also because it can help them imaginatively experience what it is like to be in the speaker’s 
                                                 
54 Nussbaum (2016a, 6).  
55 Ibid., 211-212. 
56 Pettigrove (2012, 355).  
57 Lincoln (1860, 152).  
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shoes, how the world feels or appears from where they stand. Put differently, anger-infused 
narratives can enable the audience to empathise more fully with the speaker.58  
How does this work? The first thing to notice is that publicly expressing anger can 
be a means of transmitting anger to one’s audience. Suppose A is describing an unjust 
state of affairs—say, slavery—to denounce it. But instead of simply enumerating facts 
about slavery, A expresses his intense anger, with the aim of arousing similar emotions 
in the audience. In doing so, A is making use of the propensity for human beings to 
resonate with, or ‘catch’ the emotions of others. As Chapter 2 mentioned, Hume 
famously observes this general tendency: in human beings, he suggests, “all the 
affections readily pass from one person to another”.59  
This phenomenon is well documented in contemporary psychology, under the 
heading of ‘emotional contagion’. Human beings tend to mimic the expressions, 
vocalisations, and postures of others, in a way that leads them to experience the 
emotions of others. This process is typically automatic, involuntary, and largely 
unconscious.60 Importantly, this effect also holds with angry speech, specifically. One 
study, for instance, finds that when speakers raise their voices and accelerate their 
speech, “this is likely to raise the listener’s blood pressure and feelings of anger”.61 In 
short—and here we have an echo of Baldwin’s thoughts about rage—given the 
tendency for emotional contagion, infusing one’s narrative with anger can cause one’s 
audience to feel that anger.  
To illustrate, consider Douglass’s indictment of slavery. Douglass, one historian 
records, was known for his fiery passion: “when he spoke, he roared, his booming 
baritone complemented by waving arms”. And the fire was infectious: Douglass 
deliberately used this anger to “to make people feel—viscerally—the bloody horrors of 
slavery”, “to provoke his listeners […] to furious outrage”.62 Nowhere was this effect 
                                                 
58 For the identification of empathy and imaginative perspective-taking, see Matravers (2017, 1-2).  
59 Hume (2009[1738], 3.3.1.7).  
60 For discussion, see Barsade (2002) and Coplan (2011). Note that there can be other, more conscious, ways 
of coming to share others’ emotions. Sometimes, Goldman (2011) suggests, we first imagine someone’s 
perspective, then make an evaluative judgment on this basis, and this contributes to generating a relevant 
emotion. But I focus on emotional contagion for two reasons. First, as Coplan suggests (2011, 8), it is more 
reliable as a mode of emotional transmission. Second, the fact that the contagious transmission of emotion is 
largely unconscious is important for my defence of anger: it means that individuals can catch others’ anger 
prior to judging that an injustice is involved in the relevant situation. This matters because I will argue that 
transmitting anger can help one’s listeners register injustices that they had previously overlooked.  
61 Siegman et al (1990, 641). For tentative evidence of contagion from angry facial expressions, see Blairy et al 
(1999, 35), Hess and Blairy (2001, 138-139), Friedman and Riggio (1981, 102-103). 
62 Oakes (2007, 90-93).  
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more clearly reported than in William Lloyd Garrison’s account of Douglass’s first 
public speech: 
 
I shall never forget […] the extraordinary emotion it excited in my own mind—
the powerful impression it created upon a crowded auditory […] I think I never 
hated slavery so intensely as at that moment; certainly my perception of the enormous 
outrage which is inflicted by it […] was rendered far more clear than ever.63 
 
What the passage eloquently reveals is the contagious nature of Douglass’s anger, which 
spreads not just to Garrison, but to the audience generally. 
Publicly expressing anger about x, then, can help one’s audience experience anger 
about x. But why does this matter epistemically? As I noted earlier, philosophers of 
emotion commonly argue that emotional deliverances have a distinctive 
phenomenology, or felt quality. They are distinctive ways of seeing the object that they 
are directed at.64 Hence, conveying one’s anger to one’s listeners helps them 
imaginatively undergo a distinctive qualitative experience. More specifically, the 
audience’s perspective-taking, or empathy, is rendered more complete by emotional 
contagion. As the audience tries to adopt speaker A’s perspective, their imaginative 
reconstruction is altered by the anger they have infectiously gained from A. Not only is 
Douglass’s audience imagining the facts about slavery he is reporting, but the felt 
quality of their imaginings is coloured by the anger he has transmitted to them.  
For our purposes, the fact that the audience’s imaginative reconstruction of the 
speaker’s perspective is coloured by anger matters only if this ‘colouring’ is 
epistemically valuable—that is, only if the phenomenology of anger enriches our 
understanding of the anger’s object. To appreciate how it does so, let us consider two 
                                                 
63 Garrison (1845, iv), emphases added. 
64 Nussbaum and Pettigrove dismiss the distinctive epistemic value of anger partly because they overlook this 
phenomenology. It is widely held that the distinctive phenomenology of emotion is irreducible to the 
phenomenology of a judgment, or even of a judgment/desire pairing. E.g., Deonna and Teroni (2012, 66-71), 
Goldie (2002, 73-74). But both Nussbaum (2015, 42-45) and Pettigrove (2012, 357-358) broadly take anger 
about x to be reducible to a judgment/desire pairing, involving roughly a judgment that x involves some 
moral violation, and a desire to retaliate against its perpetrators. Now, Nussbaum does try, elsewhere (2001, 
65), to accommodate the rich phenomenology of emotions within her judgment theory of emotions. 
However, Ben Ze-Ev (2004, 454-457) and Deonna and Teroni (2012, ch. 5) forcefully rebut her attempt. 
Further, even if her account could accommodate emotional experience’s complexity, the problem remains 
that Nussbaum’s brief discussion of anger’s epistemic value does not integrate these insights. She simply 
stresses that anger signals the judgment that something is morally amiss and that something should be done 
about it (2015, 55-56).  
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aspects of what philosophers of emotion have argued characterises the phenomenology 
of emotional representation.  
The first relevant feature is that emotions are sources of salience: they draw our 
attention to certain aspects of a situation, and thereby place some properties of that 
situation into the foreground.65 In this, we have a way to understand Lorde’s reference 
to anger as a “spotlight”. Emotions help us navigate complex environments by 
selecting features of the environment and highlighting them. In doing so, they “rende[r] 
previously ignored features and previously unknown patterns salient”.66 
Which features do emotions call our attention to? Recall that the cognitive 
fittingness of an emotion depends on whether its object involves certain evaluative 
properties: loss for grief, danger for fear, injustice for anger, etc. Hence, one intuitive 
proposal is that a given emotion puts a spotlight on aspects of its object that are liable 
to ground those evaluative properties. Take the case of fear. If I am walking home at 
night and am afraid, my fear highlights features of the environment that may make it 
dangerous: the street’s emptiness, the absence of lighting, and the footsteps behind 
me.67 By extension, we should expect anger to highlight patterns of behaviour that are 
liable to ground injustices.  
Putting these observations together, we have a first sense in which anger’s 
phenomenology is epistemically valuable. Anger renders salient properties of our 
situation that are liable to ground injustices. Because the environments we navigate are 
extremely complex, we may otherwise fail to notice these properties. Thus, perceiving a 
situation with anger can make us notice an injustice that we would otherwise have 
overlooked. Furthermore, having our attention directed to the properties which ground 
a given injustice can help us see why something is unjust. Hence, the salience role of 
anger is epistemically valuable not only because it can yield knowledge that an injustice 
is occurring, but also because it can facilitate a greater understanding of the nature of 
that injustice. 
A second characteristic of emotions’ phenomenology suggests that emotions are 
epistemically valuable: in virtue of having a quasi-perceptual felt quality, it is commonly 
argued, emotional representations of objects allow us to register evaluative properties in 
                                                 
65 On the salience role, see Elgin (2008, 43-46), Deonna and Teroni (2012, 122), and Brady (2013, 16-25).  
66 Elgin (2008, 45).  
67 Ibid., 43-44.  
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a way that can be more fine-grained than our evaluative concepts would allow.68 
Deonna and Teroni clearly expound this second point. In the same way that 
 
we can visually discriminate thousands of shades of colour for which we 
simply lack the corresponding concepts […] we may surmise that the 
sensitivity to evaluative properties that [emotions] authorize is more fine-
grained than the discriminations that evaluative judgments provide for. The 
idea would be, for instance, that the intensity of one’s fear co-varies with the 
degree of danger one faces, something our comparatively coarse evaluative 
judgments may prove unable to capture.69 
 
To reformulate, the suggestion is that emotional experience is similar to perceptual 
experience in the following way: it can involve discriminations of evaluative properties 
that are more fine-grained than our existing evaluative concepts would allow, just as 
visual perception allows us to discriminate between more shades of blue than we 
currently have concepts for. 
This claim seems intuitively true, insofar as it accurately captures our experience of 
emotion. But there is a further reason to accept it. The fact that emotional experiences 
can involve such fine-grained evaluative discriminations helps explain why emotions 
play an essential role in the process of acquiring and mastering evaluative concepts.70 
Emotions could not play this widely-acknowledged developmental role unless the 
evaluative nuances offered by emotional experiences could be more subtle than those 
allowed by our existing concepts. Again, this seems analogous to the case of visual 
perception. The fact that we can visually discriminate between many shades of blue 
prior to having access to corresponding concepts is part of what explains how we first 
develop and master numerous colour concepts.71 
                                                 
68 This point is made most explicitly by theories that identify emotions with perceptions of evaluative 
properties. E.g., Döring (2007), Tappolet (2011). For other theories that acknowledge these 
phenomenological resemblances between emotion and perception, see Deonna and Teroni (2012, 66-67), 
Elgin (2008, 36-37), and Brun et al (2008, 15). In her general analysis of emotion, Nussbaum (2001, 65) uses 
language reflecting this analogy. 
69 Deonna and Teroni (2012, 66-67).  
70 On the role of emotions in conceptual development, see Deonna and Teroni (2012, 84), Brun et al (2008, 
20-21), Tappolet (2011, 126-127), and Jaggar (1989, 166-168).  
71 Peacocke (2001). 
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What does this mean for anger? The idea is that our experiences of anger can make 
us perceive or sense injustices that our pre-existing conceptual frameworks did not 
allow us to grasp. In turn, this emotional sensitivity facilitates the development of more 
nuanced moral concepts. As with the salience role of emotions, then, emotional 
sensitivity to fine-grained evaluative differences can not only help us first recognise that 
injustices are occurring, but can also advance our understanding of those injustices, by 
enriching our conceptual resources for thinking about them. 
To illustrate, consider the example, which Fricker discusses at length, of Carmita 
Wood. One of Wood’s male colleagues continuously subjected her to unwanted sexual 
advances. Though she felt unable to say why at the time, Wood’s deep indignation and 
bemusement made her sense that she was being treated wrongly. Reflecting on these 
responses in a consciousness-raising group then enabled her and others to develop the 
concept of sexual harassment.72 Thus, Wood’s emotional sensitivity allowed her to 
recognise that she was being treated wrongly before she could even name the wrong in 
question. And that in turn helped her acquire the conceptual resources needed to 
understand this wrong. Armed with the concept of sexual harassment, Wood was better 
equipped to explain how she had been wronged, and reliably to recognise other 
wrongdoings of the same type.   
In sum, recent developments in the philosophy of emotion yield a theoretical 
account of two ways in which publicly expressing anger, by inspiring anger in one’s 
interlocutors, helps them recognise and understand injustices when they would 
otherwise have struggled to do so: first, by rendering certain morally relevant properties 
salient which they had previously overlooked; second, by yielding perceptions of 
injustice that are more fine-grained than their existing moral concepts would allow. 
These two roles can come apart. Someone might already have extremely refined moral 
concepts, but might fail to apply them correctly because some non-moral properties of 
their environment are not salient to them. Conversely, someone might be aware of all 
the relevant non-moral properties but have very crude moral categories, which prevent 




                                                 
72 Fricker (2007, 149–151). 
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4.2.  Two Historical Illustrations 
 
The foregoing account of publicly-expressed anger’s epistemic value has been very 
abstract. To make it more concrete, let us consider two historical examples of political 
anger. The first focuses on Frederick Douglass’s denunciation of slavery. Before 
proceeding, note what this example is intended to illustrate. We have already seen, in 
the previous section, how Douglass used his gestures, tones, and rhetoric to express 
anger and thereby contagiously rouse his audience to anger. This, recall, was vividly 
reported in Garrison’s testimony, where he described the “extraordinary emotion” 
Douglass’s speech excited in him. 
What I want to illustrate now is how the anger Douglass transmitted to his audience 
altered their perception of slavery in the epistemically beneficial way outlined in the 
previous section. Ideally, to do so, we would consider Garrison’s own testimony 
regarding how the anger he had acquired from Douglass modified his moral perception 
of slavery. However, Garrison’s testimony is not very precise when it comes to 
describing exactly how the anger Douglass’s speech excited in him changed his felt 
experience of slavery. He merely indicates that this anger made his perception of 
slavery’s wrongness “far more clear”. By contrast, Douglass reports in extremely rich 
detail how experiencing anger transformed his own perception of slavery. So, to 
illustrate my theoretical account of anger’s epistemic value, I will focus on Douglass’s 
testimony regarding his own anger. By considering how Douglass’s anger affected his 
perception of slavery, we can learn about how being roused to anger by Douglass’s 
angry political speech may similarly have enhanced Garrison’s (and other audience 
members’) understanding of slavery’s injustice.   
With this clarification in mind, consider Douglass’s account of when, still a slave, he 
learned to read: 
 
The more I read, the more I was led to abhor and detest slavery, and my 
enslavers. […] I loathed them as the meanest and the most wicked of men […] 
Liberty! The inestimable birthright of every man had, for me, converted every 
object into an asserter of this great right. It was heard in every sound, and 
beheld in every object. It was ever present, to torment me with a sense of my 
wretched condition. […] My feelings were not the result of any marked cruelty 
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in the treatment I received; they sprung from the consideration of my being a 
slave at all. It was slavery—not its mere incidents—that I hated. […] The 
feeding and clothing me well, could not atone for taking my liberty from me. 
The smiles of my mistress could not remove the deep sorrow that dwelt in my 
young bosom.73 
 
Douglass clearly experiences intense anger: he “abhor[s]”, “detest[s]”, “loath[es]”, and 
“hate[s]” slavery and slaveholders. But he is not just telling us that he is angry. Instead, 
he is also reporting his felt experience of anger at slavery, how slavery appears from his 
angry perspective. Accordingly, he stresses how every object’s appearance was 
“converted” by his anger, and repeatedly employs perceptual language.  
What does Douglass’s anger teach him about slavery? First, Douglass’s anger draws 
his attention to how all things, including nonhuman animals, are free and independent 
in virtue of an “inestimable birthright”. By rendering salient the ubiquity of freedom, then, 
Douglass’s anger highlights his own degraded status.  
In turn, this helps him better understand the nature of slavery’s wrongness. The 
idea is that it is the status of slavery that is unjust, the very condition of depending on an 
arbitrary master, independently of that master’s oppressive actions. In Douglass’s 
words: it is “slavery—not merely its incidents”—that is wrong. Indeed, as he reports, 
by the standards he had previously been accustomed to, Douglass’s masters at this time 
were relatively kind. Thus, the angry perspective helps him perceive more precisely the 
ground of slavery’s wrongness, which concerns the relative standing or status of slaves. 
This is quite a fine-grained understanding of the injustice of slavery and of the value of 
freedom, which arguably anticipates contemporary conceptualizations of freedom as 
non-domination,74 and which Douglass (as well as his audience) may otherwise have 
been unable to grasp. 
Hence, Douglass’s testimony regarding his anger vividly illustrates how anger can 
both highlight morally relevant properties of one’s environment (e.g., the comparative 
independence of other living beings), and enable a more fine-grained understanding of 
injustice than may have been allowed by one’s prior moral categories (e.g., by making 
one sense the relational injustice of slavery, domination). We may surmise that being 
                                                 
73 Douglass (1855, 159-161).  
74 Pettit (1997). 
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roused to anger by Douglass’s angry political speech had a similarly beneficial 
phenomenological effect on Douglass’s audience. This helps us understand more 
precisely what Garrison may have been referring to when asserting that the anger 
gleaned from Douglass’s speech made his understanding of slavery’s injustice “far more 
clear”. 
Nussbaum might object that Douglass’s anger here is too close to her transitional 
anger to have much dialectical force against her. But Douglass’s anger in fact differs 
from the standard case of transitional anger. His reference to loathing, abhorrence, and 
hatred suggests a harsh and fiery form of anger, rather than a calm and restrained one. 
Moreover, he focuses on the injustice itself, rather than on the remedy. This difference 
is crucial: because transitional anger characteristically does not dwell on the injustice 
itself, it is ill-suited to helping us understand the nature and depth of that injustice. 
Admittedly, though, Douglass’s anger here does seem qualified in some respects. In 
particular, the conative dimension of his anger here does not seem to involve anything 
like retribution or violence.  
Hence, let us turn to Malcolm X for an even more intense expression of rage. In his 
speech ‘The Ballot or the Bullet’, Malcolm X denounces black Americans’ lack of 
economic and political opportunities: 
 
We’re trapped, trapped, double-trapped, triple-trapped. Any way we go, we 
find that we’re trapped […] So today our people are disillusioned. They’ve 
become disenchanted. And in 1964 you’ll see this young black man, this new 
generation, asking for the ballot or the bullet. That old Uncle Tom action is 
outdated. The young generation don’t want to hear anything about “the odds 
are against us”. What do we care about the odds? […] When we open our 
eyes today and look at America, we see America not through the eyes of 
someone who has enjoyed the fruits of Americanism. We see America 
through the eyes of someone who has been the victim of Americanism. We 
don’t see any American Dream. We’ve experienced only the American 
Nightmare. We haven’t benefited from America’s democracy. We’ve only 
suffered from America’s hypocrisy. And the generation that’s coming up now 
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can see. And are not afraid to say it. If you go to jail, so what? If you’re black, 
you were born in jail.75 
 
Like Douglass, Malcolm X’s speech expresses deep anger. And like Douglass, he is 
reporting what it is like to be enraged at America’s racially discriminatory practices, 
what one sees when one looks through the eyes of an outraged black American. Unlike 
Douglass, however, his anger does involve the conative dimension Nussbaum is wary 
of: it explicitly threatens violence (“the bullet”) which might well be retributive, born of 
a desire simply to retaliate (“what do we care about the odds?”). Let us examine what 
Malcolm X’s expression of deep non-transitional anger tells us about how anger 
affected his perception of racial injustices. As in the Douglass example, doing so will by 
extension help us learn something about how being contagiously roused to anger by 
Malcolm X’s fiery political speech may have been epistemically beneficial for his 
audience. 
Malcolm X’s rage reveals, in place of the American Dream, a vision of the 
“American Nightmare”. Indeed, just as Douglass’s anger draws his attention to the 
freedom of other beings, so Malcolm X’s anger renders salient the pattern of deceit that 
black Americans have experienced: an economic “Dream” that is not genuinely 
accessible to them, a political “democracy” that they are effectively excluded from, and 
a civic freedom that seems no different from “jail”.   
By putting a spotlight on this pattern of disappointments, Malcolm X’s rage 
foregrounds important properties of the injustice black Americans encounter, 
properties that otherwise may have been obscured by the ideology of the American 
Dream. Firstly, seeing the pattern suggests that these exclusions are not accidental or 
isolated but systemic, built into the principal political and economic institutions of 
American society. Moreover, experiencing racial exclusions as patterned and systemic 
also conveys a sense of their inescapability (“we’re trapped”), and, consequently, of 
hopelessness at the prospect of achieving reform from within the American political 
system. Thus, via its salience role, Malcolm X’s anger yields a fuller understanding of 
the injustice at hand. 
Rendering these properties salient, finally, arguably helps refine prior evaluative 
categories: it contributes to adjusting dominant conceptions of what kinds of political 
                                                 
75 Malcolm X (1964). 
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agency count as reasonable. By highlighting patterns of exclusion, Malcolm X’s anger 
helps make rational sense of the apparently unreasonable attitude which consists in 
embracing violent action, even when the odds of success are unfavourable. If reforming 
the American system from within is hopeless, and if one’s situation is no better than 
jail, then violence aimed at putting one’s opponents in their place may seem the best 
option.  
In sum, these examples illustrate my theoretical account of how experiencing anger 
can enhance one’s understanding of existing injustices and of the reactions they elicit. 
When we put this together with the fact that publicly expressing anger can transmit 
anger to one’s audience by contagion (as happened with Garrison), this indicates how 
publicly expressing anger can enhance the moral understanding of one’s audience.  
 
4.3. Objections to the Epistemic Productivity of Anger 
 
I have already considered some worries concerning anger’s epistemic productivity in 
Chapter 2, when recommending giving a greater public role to emotionally-charged 
forms of speech more generally. In particular, I raised the common worry that 
emotions can be manipulated by skilled orators, who use impassioned appeals to excite 
misguided emotions. In the case of anger, we are all too familiar with how demagogues 
sometimes express anger at immigrants or racial and religious minorities, in near-total 
disregard of facts, and thereby arouse misguided rage in their listeners. In her 
sociological study Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, for 
instance, Arlie Russell Hochschild argues that Donald Trump’s rise to power was 
facilitated by his ability to provide an outlet for the anger of white working-class 
Americans, and by his success at turning this anger against vulnerable scapegoats. His 
success at doing so, she suggests, was itself enabled by widespread factual 
misconceptions about these vulnerable groups.76 Thus, even if angry discourse can be 
epistemically beneficial when the expressed anger is fitting or well directed, making 
space for anger in the public sphere risks opening the door to dangerous expressions of 
unfitting or misdirected anger—especially against a background of political ignorance. 
And since unfitting anger represents just situations as unjust, or innocent people as 
                                                 
76 Hochschild (2016, ch. 15, Appendix C).  
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responsible for injustice, its public expression seems epistemically misleading, not 
epistemically useful.   
There are several things to note in response. In the first place, unfitting or 
misdirected anger may sometimes retain some epistemic value. Fittingness comes in 
degrees. While some instances of anger are wholly misdirected—e.g., a white 
supremacist’s rage at having black neighbours—unfitting anger is often only partly so. 
Some occurrences of anger, for example, might correctly represent a situation as 
involving injustice while representing the wrong group as blameworthy for this 
injustice. If the injustice in question is not known or understood by the society at large, 
expressing this partly-unfitting anger may contribute to advancing our understanding in 
the way I have theorised. In fact, Hochschild’s study itself brings out this point. While 
the anger her subjects express is arguably directed at the wrong agents (e.g., minority 
groups), Hochschild vividly depicts how listening to their anger rendered salient an 
underappreciated pattern of hardship (rising joblessness, pollution-related illnesses, 
environmental decay, cultural vilification, etc.). What is striking is how, notwithstanding 
their mixed fittingness, these angry narratives effectively bring into view an unjust 
pattern of broken socioeconomic promises—in a way that, in some respects, echoes 
Malcolm X’s disillusion with the American Dream. In this way, expressions of partly-
misdirected anger can lead us to register and examine previously-overlooked injustices, 
whose real source we may then identify at a later point. This is simply to say that we 
should not recoil too quickly at the idea of admitting public expressions of unfitting 
anger: anger that is partly misdirected may retain some of the epistemic value I have 
theorised. 
What about wholly unfitting anger—e.g., the white supremacist’s rage at having 
black neighbours—which is solely epistemically misleading? We have seen that there 
may be some strategies internal to democratic public deliberation for mitigating its 
epistemic harms. In Chapter 3, I examined narratives expressing severely misguided 
viewpoints, which vilify vulnerable groups, and argued that authoritative state-backed 
speech that denounces such narratives can go some way towards blocking the harms 
that they would otherwise enact. There, I focused on how state-sponsored 
counterspeech can prevent public hate speech from eroding the social standing of its 
targets. But a similar consideration arguably applies to the epistemic harms involved in 
deeply misguided expressions of anger: by exposing as ignorant and prejudiced the 
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factual presuppositions on which wholly unfitting anger is based, authoritative speakers 
can loosen its influence on the public.  
Now, this discursive strategy may sometimes be inapplicable. As Chapter 3 
acknowledged, state-sponsored speakers are sometimes the ones expressing the wholly 
misguided narratives.77 Even so, a final and more fundamental response is available. In 
Chapter 2, in response to the concern about misdirected emotions, we saw that non-
emotional forms of discourse are actually liable to a similar problem.78 In conditions 
where reliable information is scarce or complex, one of the most successful forms of 
sophistry consists in endowing fallacious arguments with the appearance of scientific 
rationality or expertise. And yet, we standardly do not think that because dispassionate 
argument can be misused in public discourse, we should forego it altogether.  
Admittedly, this last response is an unhappy one for democratic discourse more 
generally: it concedes that political manipulation, which subverts otherwise-
epistemically useful modes of discourse, may be widespread in conditions of public 
ignorance. In Chapter 6, therefore, I will consider head-on the democratic problem of 
public ignorance. However, the present response does suggest 1) that the problem at 
hand is not a special problem afflicting angry speech and 2) that just as we do not reject 
norms of argumentative reasoning simply because they can be abused in non-ideal 
conditions, so too we should not abandon the use of anger in political discourse.  
But publicly-expressed anger faces further objections. While the previous worry 
concerned the possibility that anger might be misdirected, another goes further and 
interrogates the claim that fittingly-directed or apt anger is epistemically desirable. 
Perhaps it is true that such anger can render certain facts more salient, namely those 
that are liable to ground injustices. But, according to Pettigrove, empirical research 
suggests that anger also obscures important facts. “When angry, people are more likely to 
see what they take to be hostile stimuli than they are to notice features of their 
environment they do not take to be hostile”.79 Relatedly, “people who have become 
angry are generally less responsive to counterevidence”.80 So, even when it is directed at 
real injustices, anger risks yielding a distorted perspective on the world.   
                                                 
77 Chapter 3, Section  5.1. 
78 Chapter 2, Section 4.3. 
79 Pettigrove (2012, 363). 
80 Ibid., 365.   
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However, I am not recommending that all public discourse be angry. Rather, I am 
defending the view that angry discourse should play an important role in democratic 
deliberation. The idea is not that angry discourse should supplant the countervailing 
perspectives that non-angry speech communicates, but that it should complement 
them. It enriches countervailing perspectives, bringing into view features of the social 
context that they typically overlook or struggle to accommodate, but does not replace 
them altogether. When the dominant ideology masks injustices—as when the ideology 
of the American Dream concealed structural barriers to black Americans’ social 
mobility—the angry perspective serves as a crucial epistemic corrective, which casts a 
spotlight on these injustices. But it is a corrective, not a substitute. Therefore, the fact 
that anger highlights neglected morally relevant facts while obscuring others is relatively 
unproblematic: non-angry speech can communicate those other facts.  
The reason Pettigrove overlooks the possibility that anger might play such a 
complementary epistemic role is partly that his focus differs from mine. He is primarily 
concerned with determining whether anger as a standing disposition of character is more 
virtuous than non-angry dispositions, like meekness. By contrast, I am suggesting that, 
among other forms of speech, public deliberation should involve expressions of anger 
that are liable to arouse episodes of anger in listeners. While having a standing disposition 
to anger is incompatible with having a standing disposition not to get angry, 
experiencing an episode of anger towards x seems compatible with experiencing non-
angry attitudes towards x at another time. Episodes of anger need not be, nor typically 
are, permanent. So, angry speech and non-angry speech might alternate, getting their 
listeners to see the world in different but complementary lights.  
Another objection questions the transmission of anger. My account of anger’s 
distinctive epistemic contribution depends on the claim that publicly expressing anger 
can help arouse anger in listeners. I have already cited evidence supporting the 
phenomenon of emotional contagion. However, one might worry that contagion and 
the perspective-taking it facilitates have limits, which are particularly salient in the non-
ideal conditions I am concerned with. After all, doesn’t resonating with the speaker’s 
anger require that the audience identify with, or at least trust, the speaker? If it does, my 




As it stands, this objection is overstated. Expressing anger is not wholly ineffective 
in divided circumstances. As we have seen, Douglass’s rage successfully induced 
profound anger in Garrison, a white abolitionist. Furthermore, the transmission of 
anger is sometimes possible even between individuals with significantly different 
perspectives. Famously, Republican vice-president Dan Quayle once declared that he 
had vicariously gained important insights into racial injustice from Malcolm X’s fiery 
autobiography: “I can see the hate that was there; I can see the bigotry; I can see it from 
his perspective”.81  
Nevertheless, once qualified, the objection is problematic. There is presumably some 
point at which social divisions and the attending mutual distrust become too great to 
allow anger to be contagiously transmitted. If group A deeply distrust group B, so that 
they doubt the sincerity or competence of members of B, it seems unlikely that they 
will resonate with their angry speech. For example, when prejudicial gender stereotypes 
represent women as epistemically untrustworthy, those who accept those stereotypes 
typically experience women’s anger not as a signal of some serious injustice to be 
investigated, but rather as a symptom of women’s supposedly hysterical natures. 
Instead of resonating with the anger, they experience it as alienating or absurd.82  
Now, Chapter 5 will examine more closely how far antecedent trust and goodwill 
really are required for fruitful interpersonal communication. But for now, I assume—
along with advocates of the counterproductivity objection such as Nussbaum—that 
some degree of pre-existing trust is needed for the effective transmission of anger, and 
that expressing anger will not increase the amount of trust there is.   
What can we say about cases where this required trust is lacking? Firstly, Marilyn 
Frye notes that historically, distrust has fruitfully been tackled by challenging the 
demeaning stereotypes that underpin it. In the case of gendered distrust, “the struggles 
and victories of abolitionists, suffragists, prohibitionists, and other reformers made it 
relatively safe for women to get angry, publicly, on behalf of great moral causes”.83 
Thus, taking measures to transform gender roles—e.g., by altering media 
representations of women—can continue to reduce the distrust which prevents many 
women’s anger from being heard.  
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Secondly, even when distrust persists, the possibility of ‘networked’ angry speech 
weakens its significance. Suppose that C deeply distrusts A, so that A cannot transmit 
her anger to C. But B trusts A, and C trusts B. In such conditions, A can communicate 
her angry perspective to B. And B, in turn, can relay that angry perspective by 
expressing it to C. In this way, networked angry speech helps to circumvent the 
communicative barriers raised by distrust. 
Nevertheless, these replies have limits. While they may salvage the epistemic utility 
of publicly-expressed anger in the long term, they do not fully ease our more immediate 
worries. Just as the affirmative policies Frye recommends may be slow in effecting 
change, so too relaying angry speech may be arduous. Contrary to the simple schema 
outlined above, the chain of networked angry speech can be very long in divided 
settings. Suppose Garrison tried to relay Douglass’s rage. Though Garrison was less 
distrusted by slaveholders than Douglass, it seems unlikely that they trusted him 
enough to resonate with his angry speech. And slightly more progressive politicians, 
who trusted Garrison, might have come to distrust him because of his association with 
Douglass’s message. Hence, Garrison might have to convey the angry perspective to 
listeners who are even closer ideologically. Progress could be excruciatingly slow.  
What is worse, a final concern is that even among those who trust the speaker 
enough to resonate with her anger, publicly-expressing anger may have countervailing 
bad effects. This was the point of Nussbaum’s counterproductivity objection: as we saw 
in 3.1, Nussbaum warns that expressing anger “increases the other party’s anxiety and 
self-defensiveness”.84 Thus, voicing anger risks impeding subsequent communication 
and coordination with one’s listeners. Consider two ways in which this could happen.  
In the first scenario, P is entirely swayed by the angry perspective. But because the 
anger was intense, and expressed blame and perhaps openness to violence against P’s 
social group, P feels too unwelcome or afraid to coordinate with the speaker. Perhaps P 
is a white man who resonates with Malcolm X’s rage towards racial injustices, but is 
made anxious by his references to white people as “hypocrites” and “devils”. Call P the 
‘anxious ally’.  
Alternatively, perhaps Q has imaginatively experienced Malcolm X’s rage, but feels 
that it does not offer an entirely balanced picture of the situation. However, for the 
reasons just mentioned, she worries that, were she to mention her lingering doubts 
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about the accuracy of this perspective, her interlocutors would shun her rather than 
deliberate with her. Call Q the ‘sceptical ally’.  
Despite its promise, then, the epistemic defence of anger’s productivity remains 
problematic, as shown in three types of cases. In some cases, the problem is that anger 
hardly seems to have good epistemic consequences. These are cases where the listener 
does not trust the speaker enough to resonate with her anger. In the other two types of 
cases—the anxious ally and the sceptical ally—the problem is that despite its good 
epistemic consequences, it is unclear whether these consequences outweigh anger’s 
countervailing bad trust-related consequences. These are cases where the listeners trust 
the speaker enough to vicariously experience her anger, but (because of that same 
anger) not enough subsequently to engage in practical coordination or deliberation. In 
what follows, I will show that we can mitigate these remaining problems by reframing 
our assessment of anger’s consequences. 
 
5. The Systemic Defence of Publicly-Expressed Anger 
 
Section 4 offered a defence of publicly-expressed anger that focused on the kinds of 
consequences it can produce. I will now complement this defence by examining which 
context of evaluation is appropriate for assessing anger’s consequences. The context of 
evaluation, recall, is an account of what alternative things we should be comparing 
along a given standard. Reconceiving the context of evaluation in light of the 
democratic ‘systemic turn’ renders more tractable the three worries outlined at the end 
of Section 4.  
 
5.1. The Systemic Turn Revisited 
 
The systemic turn, which Chapter 2 introduced, designates a popular trend among 
democratic theorists, which enjoins us to reconceptualise the site of democratic public 
deliberation. On this view, we should not conceive of democratic debate as occurring 
within a single unitary arena that strives to include all relevant perspectives. Rather, we 
should think of public deliberation as occurring within a system composed of many 
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discursive arenas which vary in size, function, and formality, and which are connected 
more or less directly.85 
Deliberative sites are extremely diverse. Some arenas, like legislative houses, engage 
in deliberation whose primary function is to produce coercive decisions, and which 
tends to be regulated by constraining formal norms (such as the requirement that 
participants appeal to shared reasons). By contrast, more informal arenas—such as 
rallies organised by social movements—are characteristically more concerned with 
helping citizens form considered opinions.86 
As Chapter 2 noted, the systemic view of democratic public deliberation is attractive 
on various grounds. First, by emphasising that democratic deliberation need not involve 
a single assembly which includes all citizens, it helps appreciate how inclusive 
deliberation might be realisable in mass democracies.87 Second, notice that the systemic 
view of deliberation was implicit in my earlier discussion of networked angry speech. 
Networked angry speech, remember, occurs when A transmits an angry perspective to 
B, who then relays it to C, and so on. This process presupposes the existence of a 
plurality of deliberative arenas (one including A and B, one with B and C, etc.) that are 
connected in virtue of the fact that their constituencies overlap. Thus, the systemic view 
has already played a role in my defence of publicly-expressed anger.88 
Crucially, the systemic view renders more tractable the worries outlined at the end 
of Section 4, by inviting us to adopt a more adequate context of evaluation. To see this, 
consider how debates concerned specifically with public anger are often framed. 
Opponents and advocates of anger often proceed by examining the properties of angry 
speech and the properties of non-angry speech, and asking: which of the two better 
instantiates our moral standards? Is King’s discourse better at realising justice than 
Malcolm X’s? Nussbaum clearly illustrates this tendency when she asks: “Imagining 
justice anthropomorphically, should justice get angry at offenders?” Whereas 
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Nussbaum answers negatively,89 advocates of anger such as Srinivasan respond 
positively.90 But what both sides accept, here, is a particular context of evaluation: they 
compare an instance of angry speech to an independent instance of non-angry speech, 
and ask which better realises our ideals of justice.91  
The systemic approach brings into view what is wrong with this framing. From a 
systemic perspective, what we ultimately care about are the properties of the 
deliberative system as a whole.92 We care, for instance, about whether the system is 
epistemically valuable—i.e., effective at gathering and processing information—and 
whether it is practically valuable—i.e., conducive to trust that enables coordination 
against injustice. Consequently, when evaluating parts of the deliberative system, what 
fundamentally matters is not whether they exhibit these desirable properties when taken 
independently, but rather whether they contribute to promoting these properties at the 
systemic level.  
Now, Jane Mansbridge observes that “a single part, which in itself may have low or 
even negative deliberative quality with respect to one of several deliberative ideals, may 
nevertheless make an important contribution to an overall deliberative system”.93 Take 
the partisan debates on display in party conventions. Party conventions are generally 
not open to all, and their debates exclude some experiences and values. However, when 
seen as part of a broader system that involves other party conventions, Mansbridge 
argues, such conventions can make the deliberative system more epistemically inclusive. 
Having a plurality of partisan conventions enables the articulation and development of 
significantly different perspectives, which can then confront each other in national 
contests.94 
Let us apply these lessons to the context of evaluation for angry speech. The first 
upshot is that we should be concerned, ultimately, with the justice-promoting 
properties of deliberative systems. Hence, what we should be comparing to our ideal of 
justice is not an instance of angry speech and an instance of non-angry speech. Rather, it is a system 
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in which a significant range of deliberative arenas welcome angry speech, and a system in which all 
deliberative arenas are governed by norms of non-anger. The correct question is not: should we 
have Martin Luther King or Malcolm X? It is: should the deliberative system contain 
some important arenas—rallies, debates, etc.—where speakers like Malcolm X are 
invited to publicly express their anger? Or should we instead prefer a system where, in 
all arenas, speakers strive to emulate King’s non-anger? 
Second, this systemic context of evaluation creates new possibilities for defending 
publicly-expressed anger. As we have just seen, although partisan rhetoric excludes 
certain perspectives when taken in isolation, conventions involving partisan rhetoric 
can contribute to greater epistemic inclusiveness when considered as part of a broader 
system. By analogy, even if, on its own, publicly-expressed anger erodes the trust that is 
necessary for subsequent coordination and deliberation, it does not immediately follow 
that a deliberative system where some (but not all) discursive spheres welcome angry 
speech lacks this trust.  
So far, I have only shown that once we adopt a systemic context of evaluation, the 
fact that angry speech taken in isolation can have negative effects does not necessarily 
entail that a system which gives angry speech a prominent place in some deliberative 
arenas will produce these negative effects more than one that does not. But this only 
establishes the abstract possibility that angry speech might not be counterproductive. In 
the following section, I will flesh out this possibility, by revisiting the three problem 
cases introduced at the end of Section 4.  
Before proceeding, we should pause to note what it might mean, concretely, to have 
a system where some deliberative arenas welcome anger and others do not. In the case 
of transitional justice proceedings, Chakravarti and Mihai both recommend a division 
of labour between criminal trials—where speakers are discouraged from expressing 
negative emotions like anger—and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions—where 
speakers are invited to voice their angry grievances.95 In the case of formal legislative 
debates, such a system might distinguish between earlier deliberative stages, where 
discourse charged with intense anger—such as Carol Moseley Braun’s enraged 
takedown of a patent on the Confederate flag insignia—is welcome, and later 
deliberative stages, where the presiding officer upholds more orderly discourse.  
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In the informal public sphere, the idea is that there should not simply be rallies, 
conventions, and debates where speakers (perhaps encouraged by a moderator) refrain 
from intense expressions of anger. The deliberative system should also include a wide 
range of rallies, conventions and debates where expressions of deep anger are welcome. 
Alongside the non-angry televised discussion between King and the segregationist 
James Kilpatrick, there should also be the Cleveland rally where Malcolm X was invited 
to deliver ‘The Ballot or the Bullet’, or the Harvard or Oxford Union debates which 
gave him a platform to voice his intense anger.  
It is clear that a critic such as Nussbaum would reject this. As discussed in 3.1, 
Nussbaum considers anger to be “always normatively problematic, whether in the 
personal or in the public realm”.96 Thus, as we saw, she recommends that TRCs give 
expression to generosity rather than anger; and, accordingly, she praises the way in 
which Tutu discouraged resentful narratives during the South African TRC. Similarly, 
recall that in her discussion of informal political contestation, Nussbaum upholds the 
non-anger of King and Gandhi as an ideal that agents concerned with promoting justice 
should strive for here and now. 
 
5.2.  The Systemic Evaluation of Anger 
 
According to Mansbridge, different “parts of a system may have relationships of 
complementarity […] Two venues, both with deliberative deficiencies, can each make 
up for the deficiencies of the other”.97 Let us consider how this complementary 
relationship functions in a deliberative system that contains sites where speakers 
express anger as well as sites where speakers refrain from expressing anger. More 
specifically, how does it help address the three problem cases outlined in Section 4?   
The benefits of the systemic perspective are more obvious in the two cases where, 
although angry speech successfully communicates certain experiences of injustice, it 
erodes trust in a way that makes subsequent coordination and subsequent deliberation 
more difficult. Take the anxious ally, who does not trust speakers in anger-welcoming 
arenas enough to coordinate with them in the struggle against injustice. Here, the 
existence of arenas governed by norms of non-anger offers a solution: such arenas give 
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him the opportunity to engage in practical coordination against injustice. Imagine once 
more the white man who resonates with the anger Malcolm X expresses at the 
Cleveland rally but feels unwelcome, because of that anger, to coordinate with 
participants in this rally. Equipped with the epistemic insights about injustice gleaned 
from the anger-infused rally, he could then coordinate to oppose those injustices within 
meetings governed, as King’s were, by norms of love and openness.  
A similar observation holds with the sceptical ally, who, having vicariously 
experienced the angry perspective, seeks to engage in further deliberation regarding its 
accuracy, but is reluctant to deliberate with angry speakers. What she seeks is a venue 
where she can expect her interlocutors to listen to her thoughts and doubts about racial 
injustice. Deliberative arenas governed by expectations of non-anger provide just such a 
venue. Indeed, the meetings, rallies, or church-gatherings organised by King’s followers 
adopted norms of love and non-anger partly to facilitate dialogue between estranged 
social groups.  
In these two cases, the relationship of complementarity takes an additive form. Each 
venue independently performs a necessary function: the anger-welcoming venues 
provide a distinctive epistemic good effect, by transmitting anger-infused experiences; 
and the anger-discouraging venues provide the trust and openness that facilitates 
further deliberation and coordination. Thus, when determining the overall properties of 
the system that contains sites that welcome anger as well as sites that discourage it, we 
can add their independent contributions, and thereby appreciate how it is preferable to 
the system that shuns anger.98 
Understood additively, however, the complementary relationship between anger-
welcoming and anger-discouraging venues is unhelpful with respect to the remaining 
problem case. This is the case where listeners do not trust the angry speaker enough to 
resonate emotionally with her angry speech. Here, the problem is that angry speech 
taken independently fails to produce its distinctive epistemic good effect. Consequently, 
simply adding the independently-achieved good effects of anger-welcoming and anger-
discouraging deliberative venues will not reveal what is advantageous about a system 
which contains angry speech. To address this last problem case, we must consider the 
interactive dimension of the complementary relationship. This dimension concerns how 
                                                 
98 Mansbridge et al (2012, 4) and Mihai (2016, 28-29) emphasise the additive complementary relationship. 
Dryzek (2010, 82-83) highlights the interactive form, discussed below.  
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different parts of a system interact to produce good effects that no part would produce 
independently.   
How might anger-welcoming and anger-discouraging discursive arenas interact 
fruitfully, and thereby help address the last problem case? One suggestion is that the 
presence of rallies and debates suffused with angry speech may help speakers in venues 
governed by norms of non-anger acquire the trust of wary listeners. As 4.3 discussed, 
part of the reason why expressions of anger can make one seem untrustworthy is the 
existence of prejudicial stereotypes that associate anger with unreason. In such 
circumstances, the contrast between anger-welcoming and anger-discouraging venues can 
make speakers in the latter appear more reasonable and trustworthy. And this, in turn, 
can enable them to convey a perspective that they otherwise could not have 
communicated. 
By way of example, consider the deliberative venues inhabited, respectively, by 
Lincoln and Douglass. These, James Oakes argues, had contrasting but interdependent 
roles in the abolitionist struggle: the function of the Congressional debates Lincoln 
participated in was to effect policy changes; the purpose of venues like The North Star—
the anti-slavery newspaper published by Douglass and Martin Delany—was to 
denounce slavery’s injustice without restraint or compromise. Importantly, part of what 
made Lincoln’s contributions seem reasonable to other members of Congress, Oakes 
suggests, was the contrast between the legalistic calmness which characterised 
Congressional debates and the fiery moral discourse promoted in venues like The North 
Star.99  
In a similar vein, Lewis Baldwin contends that, for many white Americans, part of 
what made it conceivable to engage with civil rights activists who embraced non-anger 
was the contrasting rage which animated Malcolm X’s rallies.100 Malcolm X explicitly 
acknowledged this: “if the white people realize what the alternative is, perhaps they will 
be more willing to listen to Dr. King”.101 Without the contrast with the deep rage 
expressed in black nationalist rallies, many white Americans may have deemed King’s 
vision of interracial love too extreme to be worth listening to.  
Oakes and Baldwin are highlighting a similar kind of interaction between parts of 
the deliberative system. By altering perceptions of reasonableness, they suggest, the 
                                                 
99 Oakes (2007, 90-95). 
100 Baldwin (1986, 408).  
101 Cited in Baldwin (1986, 398). 
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presence of anger-welcoming sites helped speakers in anger-free sites articulate their 
non-angry viewpoints and receive uptake in a way that would otherwise have been 
impossible.102   
Now, one concern is that, in this interactive relationship, the viewpoints whose 
successful communication is facilitated by the presence of anger-welcoming deliberative 
arenas are not the angry perspectives themselves. So it seems that the distinctive 
epistemic value of anger is lost. An initial reply to this concern is that the distinctive 
information conveyed by the angry perspective need not be entirely lost in the 
promoted non-angry perspectives. A message infused with grief might serve to 
highlight the loss that results from injustice. And a message of unconditional love, like 
King’s, might mention the existence of injustice, insofar as what makes it loving is its 
willingness to move beyond a history of oppression and to embrace its perpetrators.  
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that some of the distinctive information carried by the 
angry perspective is lost. Because they are different emotions, grief and love highlight 
different evaluative properties than anger. Grief may highlight the loss resulting from 
injustices, but it does not highlight the injustices themselves. And while a loving 
message may mention injustice, it does not put a spotlight on those injustices or on 
their perpetrators’ responsibility. For instance, the point of King’s passing reference to 
the “sweltering oppression of Mississippi”, in his Dream speech, is less to communicate 
a sense of what it is like to be oppressed, and more to introduce a vision of what it is like to 
move beyond the divisions which produce oppression.  
Hence, examining the interactive relationship between anger-welcoming and anger-
discouraging venues in the deliberative system only partly defuses the challenge posed 
by the last problem case. In this case, the listener will not resonate with the angry 
perspective and will not experience its distinctive phenomenology. However, this 
qualification should not obscure our main result: that even in this case, welcoming anger 
in some deliberative sites still has the potential to produce an epistemic benefit, albeit 
indirectly. To reiterate: the presence of anger-welcoming sites may facilitate the 
communication, in other sites, of valuable non-angry perspectives, such as King’s 
loving vision.  
                                                 
102 For discussion of how Malcolm X and King, as well as Douglass and Lincoln, facilitated this by 
strategically distancing themselves from each other, see Baldwin (1986, 402-403) and Oakes (2007, xvii-xviii). 
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By way of concluding this systemic evaluation of angry discourse, an important 
qualification is needed. When exactly the productive interdependencies I have outlined 
obtain is, at bottom, an empirical matter which cannot be settled definitively without 
input from social science. Accordingly, while the examples of the abolitionist struggle 
and of the Civil Rights Movement arguably illustrate such interdependencies, my point 
is not that they will definitely always obtain. Rather, as I explained in 3.3, I am making 
the weaker but nonetheless important point that switching to a systemic context of 
evaluation renders the productivity worries raised in 4.3 distinctly more tractable.  
Recall how it does so. By considering anger and non-anger in isolation from the 
deliberative system, Nussbaum forces a choice upon us: either we can have angry 
speech’s distinctive epistemic benefits; or we can have non-angry speech’s practical 
benefits for communication and coordination. But we cannot have both. The 
conceptual shift recommended by the systemic approach reveals that this is a false 
dilemma. Indeed, the systemic approach brings into view the possibility of 
complementary relationships, additive or interactive, between spheres that welcome 
anger and spheres that discourage it. In fact, we have seen that some of the benefits 
Nussbaum credits solely to non-angry discourse (e.g., communicating a loving 
perspective) may even depend on such complementary relations.  
Thus, invoking the systemic approach allows us to say this: even if Nussbaum were 
right that angry speech taken alone has a corrosive effect on trust which impedes 
important types of practical coordination and communication—an assumption I revisit 
in Chapter 5—it would not necessarily follow that giving anger a significant place in the 
deliberative system requires foregoing non-anger’s practical benefits. Indeed, the division 
of labour between different arenas means that not every deliberative arena has to fulfil 
every justice-promoting function. To justify shunning public expressions of anger as 
categorically as Nussbaum does, the counterproductivity critic would have to show that 
anger-welcoming and anger-free sites cannot complement one another in this way. This 
is something they have not shown, and which—on the evidence supplied by past 









I have offered a two-pronged defence of the claim that there is an important place for 
public expressions of anger inside the deliberative system. Those who deem expressions 
of anger counterproductive typically overlook anger’s distinctive epistemic contribution, 
and adopt the wrong context for assessing its consequences. 
Publicly expressing anger matters partly because, in virtue of anger’s particular 
phenomenology, it can produce a distinctive kind of epistemic good. As philosophical 
research on emotion indicates, experiencing anger helps render morally significant facts 
salient and contributes to enriching our moral concepts. Therefore, insofar as it induces 
listeners to imaginatively experience anger, expressing anger enables them to register 
overlooked injustices, and to develop a finer understanding of those injustices. In this, 
we have a systematisation of the compelling suggestion with which we started: that 
expressing anger is there to teach the audience something, by casting a spotlight on 
“what [is] really happening”. This function matters greatly in non-ideal settings, where 
members of social groups are often radically ignorant of the injustices endured by other 
groups.  
Taken alone, this first defence encounters several worries. But the force of these 
worries softens once we adopt a more adequate context for evaluating the 
consequences of public anger. In line with deliberative theory’s systemic turn, we 
should not ask whether isolated expressions of angry speech have better consequences 
than isolated expressions of non-angry speech. Instead, the relevant question is whether 
a deliberative system that gives a key role to angry speech (among other kinds of 
speech) is more productive than a system that does not. By bringing into view various 
complementary relationships which can obtain between anger-welcoming and anger-
free venues, the systemic perspective renders the above worries more tractable. This 
second part of my defence captures another intriguing claim with which we began. We 
now have an answer to why it matters that Ellison’s invisible narrator be “dedicated and 
set aside” for the purposes of expressing his anger: anger is supposed to play specific 
functions within a broader system, which complement and depend upon other forms of 
speech. 
This philosophical defence has implications for future empirical research on 
publicly-expressed anger’s (counter)productivity. First, given the foregoing account of 
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angry speech’s epistemic value, social scientists should further investigate under what 
precise conditions publicly expressing anger tends to rouse listeners to anger.103 Second, 
since the systemic perspective reminds us that we cannot conclude much from evidence 
regarding the effects angry speech has in isolation, they should study more fully the 
additive and interactive relations of complementarity that may obtain between angry 
and non-angry speech. In the meantime, I have offered some preliminary evidence for 
thinking that this avenue of research is promising. In particular, by analysing how it 
illuminates historical pairings such as Malcolm X and King, and Douglass and Lincoln, 
I hope to have given a sense of how, when skilfully channelled within the deliberative 
system, rage offers powerful tools for combatting injustice. 
 
                                                 




































DELIBERATION WITHOUT GOODWILL 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Attitudinal Presuppositions of Democratic Deliberation 
 
What should democratic public deliberation be like for it to constitute an effective 
means of realising justice in conditions marked by widespread social divisions and 
injustice? The past three chapters have defended a set of discursive norms that are 
geared towards advancing justice in such non-ideal conditions. To prevent political 
power from being exercised in an arbitrary or dominating way, participants in formal 
deliberative spheres should appeal to shared considerations.1 But to offset the 
exclusionary tendencies of this first norm, public deliberation should also leave 
significant room for non-argumentative and emotionally-charged forms of speech.2 
This last suggestion might seem overly inclusive, by opening the door for angry 
narratives and eventually hateful narratives. However, we should not wholly reject this 
implication. Angry public narratives perform a crucial epistemic function in divided 
democracies, by highlighting persistent injustices which may otherwise have been 
overlooked or misunderstood.3 As for public hate speech, there are strong (though 
defeasible) grounds for thinking that we should authoritatively denounce it, rather than 
legally suppress it.4 
The relevance and effectiveness of these discursive norms presupposes the 
existence of some non-ideal conditions, including: that many citizens experience 
systemic injustices; that citizens are often ignorant of each other’s experiences; and that 
some citizens embrace hateful views regarding others. In offering a defence of 
discursive norms whose desirability depends on such circumstances, my aim has been 
to supply a normative framework that is action-guiding in our world.  
But at this point, one might question just how close my normative framework is to 
actual, non-ideal conditions. What symbolic and material background conditions 
already need to obtain for the deliberative norms I have advanced to be realisable and 
                                                 
1 Chapter 2, Section 2.  
2 Chapter 2, Section 4. 
3 Chapter 4. 
4 Chapter 3. 
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conducive to advancing justice? In particular, how far does their adequacy presuppose 
attitudinal dispositions that are lacking in real-world conditions? In the final two 
chapters, I consider two attitudinal dispositions. The present chapter examines the 
disposition to demonstrate trust and goodwill towards one’s interlocutors. Chapter 6 




According to an influential objection, justice-promoting deliberation requires significant 
goodwill between deliberators. This goodwill, it seems, is lacking in contemporary 
democracies, marked as they are by deep distrust. Consequently, unless inclusive 
deliberation plays a role in generating the missing trust and goodwill—a suggestion that 
this critique typically also rejects—democratic deliberation seems largely unhelpful in 
actual conditions.5  
This objection is forceful, and certainly should inform deliberative theories like my 
own. Nevertheless, the present chapter will develop theoretical resources to help 
mitigate it as far as possible, and thereby stave off its pessimistic conclusion. After 
presenting the problem of goodwill (Section 2), I mount a two-faceted attack on its 
premises. First, I qualify the assumption that deliberation demands high levels of 
goodwill, by drawing together observations made in Chapters 2 and 4. Specifically, I 
argue that the division of labour between different arenas in the deliberative system 
alleviates the motivational demands made on the vast majority of citizens, and helps 
circumvent these demands when they remain too high (Section 3). 
Even with this qualification, however, the objection remains problematic. The 
second part of my argument therefore pushes back against another assumption: that 
trust and the attending goodwill cannot arise via non-ideal deliberation (Section 4). 
Specifically, I investigate how aspects of public deliberation that are especially 
widespread in non-ideal conditions—namely public hypocrisy (4.1), anger (4.2), and 
(most controversially) the occurrence of public hate speech (4.3)—have properties that 
can be made to contribute to generating trust. In saying this, I am not claiming that non-
deliberative trust-building measures are not needed. Indeed, the trust-building strategies 
I theorise often involve a mutually-supportive combination of deliberative and non-
                                                 
5 E.g., Johnson (1998), Shapiro (2003, ch. 1), Parvin (2015).  
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deliberative tools. My point is the more modest one that inclusive discussion remains 
useful even where antecedent trust and goodwill are largely lacking, because it offers 
important resources for generating trust and goodwill.  
Two preliminary observations are needed. The first concerns empirical evidence. 
The latter part of my argument considers the potential trust-building effects of 
deliberation. One might think that this is simply an empirical question, which should 
interest social scientists rather than philosophers. However, when social scientists 
gather data, they rely upon theoretical hypotheses that guide their research. As I 
stressed in earlier chapters, the conceptual insights developed by philosophers can 
contribute valuably to articulating and enriching such theoretical hypotheses. In this 
chapter, then, I articulate hypotheses informed by theoretical and philosophical work 
on topics such as trust, anger, and hypocrisy. At the same time, I will strive to indicate 
what empirical assumptions these hypotheses depend upon, how far these are 
consistent with existing evidence, and where—in light of these hypotheses—further 
empirical research may be needed.  
The second point is that the features of democratic discourse which I will suggest 
have potential for generating trust and the attending goodwill are consonant with the 
discursive norms that, on independent grounds, I defended as means of promoting 
justice. Therefore, this chapter’s defensive exploration will lend further support to the 
picture of deliberation that I have been advancing.   
 
2. The Problem of Goodwill  
 
The problem of goodwill is by no means new, and has prominently been articulated by 
James Johnson and Ian Shapiro.6 But it owes its most sustained and general 
formulation to Phil Parvin, whose argument can be reconstructed as follows:7 
 
(1) Democratic public deliberation that is effective at advancing justice 
presupposes a high level of goodwill between participants, which itself cannot 
obtain unless they trust each other to a significant degree.  
(2) Contemporary democracies involve low levels of mutual trust. 
                                                 
6 Johnson (1998, 173-174); Shapiro (2003, 22-30). 
7 Parvin (2015). 
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(3) Democratic public deliberation is ineffective at building trust and the attending 
goodwill.  
(4) So, democratic discursive processes will not be effective at advancing justice 
until greater trust arises, and will not play an important role in building that 
trust.8 
 
To illustrate, consider a concrete way in which deliberation requires goodwill. As Parvin 
observes, many accounts of deliberative democracy and of its contribution to justice, 
including Rawls’s or Joshua Cohen’s, require that deliberators be civil towards one 
another. Civility, here, means respecting one’s interlocutors by appealing only to 
considerations that are shared or public. In Chapter 2, I defended a similar norm, which 
I referred to as the Shared Reasons Constraint. According to Parvin’s interpretation, 
there is evidence that Rawls and Cohen want the norm of civility to regulate the 
deliberation of ordinary citizens and public officials alike.9  
This demand for civility, Parvin suggests, is problematic in non-ideal conditions. It 
seems unlikely that citizens will be civil unless they trust one another to reciprocate: 
plausibly, I will not commit to respectfully constraining the claims I make unless I feel 
that I can rely on my interlocutors to also fulfil a commitment to discursive civility.10 
But actual levels of trust seem too low to sustain this civility. For Parvin, “increased 
inequality, social fragmentation, and a weakening of traditional associational life in 
contemporary states has resulted in a weakening of common bonds of citizenship”.11 In 
the US, for instance, racial tensions between black and white Americans are high,12 and 
the affective dislike between Republicans and Democrats has increased dramatically 
                                                 
8 I focus on whether participants in deliberation have enough mutual goodwill to conform to certain 
discursive norms. But Parvin (2015, 408-409) is also sceptical that they will participate at all. Put differently, 
he is concerned with the rate as well as the quality of deliberation. I only examine the quality issue, as there is 
evidence that rates of engagement in political discussion are actually quite high. In their comprehensive study, 
Jacobs et al (2009, 4) find that “citizens engage in more extensive and meaningful public talking than 
previously suspected”. See also Neblo et al (2010). According to Chambers (2012, 63n3), previous studies 
(e.g., Mutz 2006) reported different findings because they adopted an inadequate operationalisation of 
deliberative participation. Nevertheless, these recent studies find that the quality of deliberation is low. E.g., 
Jacobs et al (2009, 4), Searing et al (2007, 612). Thus, the pressing question seems to be less whether mass 
participation is possible, and more whether mass participation of the right kind is possible.  
9 Parvin (2015, 409-412). 
10 Here, I am assuming Hawley’s (2014, 9-12) account of trust, where A trusts B to x when A believes B to be 
committed to x-ing, and relies on B to x. There are competing accounts of trust: for instance, others suggest 
that it involves relying on others to x out of goodwill (e.g., Jones (1999, 68-69)), or out of a lack of ill-will (e.g., 
Lenard (2012, 23)). My arguments here will not hinge on these differences.  
11 Parvin (2015, 414-415). See also Putnam (1995). 
12 Massey and Denton (1993, 91-96).  
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since the 1960s.13 What is worse, since (according to the present objection) non-civil 
democratic public debate is incapable of producing trust and the attending civility, we 
will need to generate the missing trust via policies that are external to deliberation.14 In 
this vein, Elizabeth Anderson defends expansive reforms aimed at rebuilding trust 
between black and white Americans, which include creating racially-integrated 
neighbourhoods, restructuring school practices, and adopting aggressive affirmative 
action policies.15 
Having illustrated the objection, it is worth emphasising its significance. The 
primary conclusion is that without trust and goodwill, democratic discursive processes 
are largely ineffective both at advancing justice and at generating the antecedent trust 
that would enable them to advance justice. A corollary of this is that until we build that 
trust, our instruments for generating trust and advancing justice will be non-
deliberative.16 And since we are allegedly far from having adequate levels of trust and 
goodwill,17 this means that inclusive public deliberation will not be a useful instrument 
in the near future. Given that I am concerned with how inclusive public deliberation 
can advance justice in non-ideal conditions like our own, this last upshot is devastating. 
How can we avoid these upshots? It is undeniable that significant non-deliberative 
trust-building strategies are needed. But this implication alone is not overly problematic 
for defenders of democratic public deliberation. Archon Fung, among other 
deliberative theorists, has long acknowledged that in non-ideal conditions, deliberation 
must be supplemented by non-deliberative practices.18 Instead, what we must show is 
that inclusive deliberative processes also have a part to play in non-ideal circumstances. 
To do so, I will challenge premises (1) and (3) in turn.  
 
3. Against Premise (1): What Does Democratic Public 
Deliberation Really Presuppose? 
 
The systemic understanding of public deliberation helps appreciate that justice-
promoting deliberation is less demanding in terms of trust and goodwill than it initially 
                                                 
13 Iyengar et al (2012, 412-421).  
14 Parvin (2015, 418-420).  
15 Anderson (2010). 
16 Parvin (2015, 420).  
17 Ibid., 414-415. 
18 Fung (2005). See also Mansbridge et al (2010).  
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appears. By embracing this more sophisticated understanding of deliberation, we can 
therefore substantially weaken premise (1). Since the argument here draws together 
observations made in Chapter 2—when evaluating the Shared Reasons Constraint—
and Chapter 4—when examining trust-based obstacles to the contagious transmission 
of anger—my discussion will be relatively brief.  
The systemic approach to deliberation, recall, claims that deliberation occurs in a 
system composed of many arenas, which differ in size, function, and formality, and 
which are connected more or less closely. Why does this matter? Firstly, as I observed 
in Chapter 2, different discursive norms may be appropriate in different deliberative 
arenas. Participants in formal deliberative arenas, whose primary function is to produce 
coercive decisions, should appeal to reasons that are suitably public or shared (at least 
in the final stages of deliberation). But this requirement needn’t apply to informal 
arenas (like newspaper opinion sections) whose main purpose is to help participants 
form considered opinions.19 Thus, different spheres needn’t be equally demanding in 
terms of goodwill and trust. In particular, the most demanding norms—like the Shared 
Reasons Constraint, or as Rawls calls it, ‘civility’—may well be required only of public 
officials taking part in formal deliberations. Hence, even if Parvin were right that some 
deliberative theorists hold ordinary citizens to standards of civility,20 this criticism is ad 
personam: deliberative theorists can and should recognise the appeal of civility without 
demanding it of all citizens.  
Nevertheless, further problems arise. Parvin might reply that even in arenas that do 
not involve strong constraints—such as civility constraints requiring participants to 
appeal to shared reasons—fruitful public discussion still requires excessive goodwill. If 
so, the problem of goodwill also applies to accounts of public deliberation or to arenas 
of deliberation that involve less constrained forms of communication.21 Why might this 
be? 
Inclusive public deliberation, I argued previously, matters partly as a means of 
holding one’s political opponents accountable, by making them responsive to one’s 
concerns.22 But for inclusive public debate to achieve this, one’s interlocutors must be 
willing to listen to one’s complaints. Furthermore, if one’s interlocutors listen but are 
                                                 
19 Chapter 2, Section 3.3.  
20 See, however, Chapter 2, Section 3.3, for evidence contradicting Parvin’s interpretation of Rawls on civility. 
21 Parvin (2015, 417).  
22 Chapter 1, Section 3.1; Chapter 2, Section 2.2.  
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unwilling to change their minds or try to answer honestly, it might seem unclear in what 
sense they are more responsive to one’s concerns. Call these attitudinal dispositions—
to listen, to be open to changing one’s mind, and to respond earnestly—the disposition 
to engage sincerely. Sincere engagement does intuitively seem required for justice-
promoting public debate. Accordingly, Iris Marion Young, despite largely rejecting the 
aforementioned civility constraint, claims that participants must have “a disposition to 
listen to others, […] [to] make an effort to understand them by asking questions” and 
“to be willing to change [their] opinions”.23 
This is problematic from the standpoint of trust. Intuitively, I am unlikely to listen, 
change my mind, and respond earnestly unless I trust my interlocutors to reciprocate.24 
So, in divided societies where citizens distrust each other, even the weaker attitudinal 
requirement of sincere engagement may be too demanding. Premise (1) still looms.  
One might respond to this problem by challenging the value of sincere 
engagement.25 But for now I want to accept the prima facie plausible assumption that 
sincere engagement is needed for fruitful public deliberation. Instead, my second point 
is that the systemic approach contributes to weakening premise (1) in another way, 
which Chapter 4 introduced. The systemic approach underscores how deliberative 
arenas with overlapping constituencies can interact with each other. Most significantly 
for our purposes, a deliberative system makes networked deliberation possible. Suppose A 
and C distrust each other too much to engage sincerely, but that A and B trust each 
other sufficiently, as do B and C. In such circumstances, A can sincerely engage with B 
in one sphere. In turn, B can sincerely engage with C, carrying over the information and 
arguments gleaned from her discussion with A.26 
Consider how this second point differs from the first. The first was that adopting 
the systemic approach can lower how much goodwill is required in immediate 
communicative interactions, by waiving the most stringent discursive norms in some 
spheres. The second is that even when immediate communication remains too 
demanding in terms of goodwill, we can circumvent this problem by having third parties 
mediate exchanges between distrustful participants. Contra premise (1), then, high 
                                                 
23 Young (2000, 24-25). See also Mansbridge et al (2010, 66), Schwartzman (2011, 384-387), and Bächtiger et 
al (2010, 49).  
24 Parvin (2015, 417). 
25 E.g., Markovits (2006), Runciman (2008).  
26 Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
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levels of goodwill and trust do not seem necessary for fruitful exchanges, at least not in 
the long run.  
Nevertheless, this last clause (‘in the long run’) highlights the principal limitation of 
my second point. In contexts of deep distrust, there might not be a mediator B who is 
trusted by both A and C. If so, the network of mediators connecting A and C may have 
to be extremely long, so that the process of exchanging information and arguments 
becomes excruciatingly slow. In the immediate future, then, distrust and the attending 
lack of sincere engagement may reduce the effectiveness of public deliberation at 
promoting justice. 
To overcome this problem, we must resort to substantial trust- and goodwill-
building mechanisms. But if, as premise (3) asserts, inclusive public deliberation can 
play no role in this, then its overall usefulness in the near future remains somewhat 
limited. Thus, although the systemic approach does blunt the force of the problem of 
goodwill, we should not let things rest there. Instead, we must challenge premise (3). 
Accordingly, in what follows, I will explore how deliberation supplies tools for 
rebuilding the trust and attending goodwill needed for sincere engagement. 
 
4. Against Premise (3): Can Deliberation Produce Goodwill? 
 
Why deny, as premise (3) does, that democratic discursive processes can generate trust 
and the attending goodwill? For some critics, the problem is that very little evidence 
supports this claim. Shapiro, for example, states that “there is no particular reason to 
think deliberation will bring people together”.27 Parvin goes further, asserting that 
empirical evidence largely suggests that deliberation is ineffective at bringing people 
together.28 Thus, the common claim that democratic deliberation can foster trust and 
goodwill29 may appear to be a mere dogma.  
In fact, however, the evidence is more mixed than critics suggest. While some of it 
is indeed negative,30 much of it is not.31 For instance, in a recent deliberative poll, 
                                                 
27 Shapiro (2003, 27). 
28 Parvin (2015, 418). 
29 E.g., Catala (2015, 435-436), Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 20-21).  
30 E.g., Conover and Searing (2005), Searing et al (2007, 610-611), Sunstein (2002).  
31 E.g., Dryzek and List (2003, 10-12), List and Koenig-Archibugi (2010, 103-109), Fishkin and Luskin (2005), 
Anderson (2010, 123-127). Even Searing et al (2007) who produce some of the evidence Parvin refers to, 
actually acknowledge that deliberation can produce fellow feeling (612). 
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Luskin et al invited Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland to deliberate together 
on the future of local schools. Though the issue was divisive, they found that 
deliberating caused members of both groups to regard each other as more 
trustworthy.32 
Perhaps, then, the problem is less that deliberation cannot build trust and 
goodwill, and more—as Patti Lenard worries—that the kind of deliberation that can do 
so is unlikely to arise in non-ideal circumstances.33 This refined criticism strikes home 
against many arguments for using deliberation as a trust-building tool. Consider 
Amandine Catala’s defence of deliberative trust-building. To guarantee that deliberation 
will generate trust, she recommends “implementing strict rules of deliberation […]: for 
example, listening carefully, speaking respectfully, being responsive to others’ 
contributions”, etc.34 This is unsatisfactory. We are investigating how deliberation can 
generate the trust that is necessary for sincere engagement. But in explaining how it 
might do so, Catala presupposes that participants have been made to sincerely engage with 
each other. Thus, she presupposes the very dispositions we are trying to generate.  
A related concern might apply to Luskin et al’s deliberative poll in Northern 
Ireland. Although the participants came from divided groups, deliberative polls involve 
highly atypical settings: the deliberation occurs in small groups; it often focuses on well-
defined, sometimes relatively technical, policy problems; and it is highly structured and 
facilitated by trained moderators.35 Consequently one might worry that such 
deliberative experiments do not tell us much about the more typical and larger-scale 
deliberation that pervades non-ideal societies. 
Nevertheless, some of the positive evidence supporting discursive trust-building 
does look at deliberation occurring in non-ideal conditions. Notably, List and Koenig-
Archibugi argue that the public debates which culminated in the creation of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) played a crucial part in promoting trust and 
cohesion between participants. Significantly, this case involved wide-ranging 
deliberation, rather than deliberation occurring in highly controlled and restricted 
settings: a complex network of formal and informal dialogue occurred between diverse 
                                                 
32 Luskin et al (2014, 132).  
33 Lenard (2005, 375-376). 
34 Catala (2015, 436). 
35 Luskin et al (2014, 118).  
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participants, including not just government officials, but also NGOs and activists.36 
Moreover, the discussions took place in a transnational setting, where it is typically 
assumed that, ceteris paribus, bonds of trust are weaker than in national settings. 
Consequently, their case study supplies prima facie grounds for thinking that even 
large-scale, non-ideal discursive processes can have an important trust-building 
function.37 
In citing this countervailing positive evidence, my point is simply to suggest that 
the empirical question concerning deliberation’s efficacy at generating trust is more 
open and nuanced than critics of deliberative trust-building often claim. Therefore, it is 
worth exploring further, both empirically and philosophically.  
Now, what is lacking in the above positive evidence is a detailed analysis of 
precisely what features of the non-ideal situation were instrumental in generating trust 
and goodwill. In the ICC case, was trust-building made possible despite non-ideal 
features of the situation—perhaps by the fact that participants had similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds? Or did non-ideal features also play a contributory role? 
And if they did, which ones contributed, and how? While some of the evidence 
regarding deliberative trust-building provides grounds for optimism, this lack of clarity 
makes it hard to derive much normative guidance regarding non-ideal public 
deliberation.  
To remedy these shortcomings, I wish to investigate what specific features of the 
public deliberation which characterises non-ideal conditions might play a role in 
enhancing trust and goodwill. My aim, though, remains modest. Drawing on 
philosophical or theoretical work concerning topics such as trust, hypocrisy, and anger, 
I will develop hypotheses concerning what properties of non-ideal public discourse may 
be useful, and how. Along the way, I will strive to indicate how these theoretical 
hypotheses square with existing empirical evidence, and where they call for more 
empirical research aimed at testing and refining these hypotheses.  
Thus, my intention is not to say that non-ideal political discourse always helps 
build trust overall. Clearly, such discourse is capable of damaging as well as improving 
trust and the attending goodwill. But it is to enhance our understanding of which 
features of non-ideal discourse have potential for trust-building. Armed with such an 
                                                 
36 List and Koenig-Archibugi (2010, 103-109). 
37 For more positive evidence pertaining to non-ideal conditions, see Searing et al (2007, 612), Maddison 
(2015, 1015), and Steiner (2012, ch. 2).  
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understanding, theorists and social scientists will be in a better position to explore 
under what conditions public deliberation can be harnessed to play an all-things-
considered positive role in building trust and goodwill.   
More specifically, I will explore how three features that characterise non-ideal 
public deliberation—hypocrisy (4.1), anger (4.2), and (counterintuitively) the occurrence 
of hate speech (4.3)—offer resources for promoting trust and sincere engagement.  
 
4.1. Public Hypocrisy and Trust 
 
Let us start with a pessimistic assumption about existing levels of goodwill and trust. 
Suppose A and B are publicly discussing policy issues. However, A is not disposed to 
listen, respond, or change her mind in response to B’s claims. In part, this may be 
because A simply wants to pursue her self-interest, rather than the public interest. But it 
may also be partly because, even insofar as A believes the right thing to do is to engage 
with B in a sincere and public-spirited way, she does not trust B to reciprocate. 
Even then, provided that there is a widespread expectation that participants should 
be public-spirited and sincere, public deliberation creates incentives for A to appeal to 
public or shared values. As Jon Elster famously argues, “there are certain arguments 
that simply cannot be stated publicly. In a political debate it is pragmatically impossible 
to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself”.38 
Now, Elster is almost certainly overstating his argument when he claims that brute 
appeals to self-interest are impossible. Such appeals do occasionally occur.39 But the point 
remains that public scrutiny creates pressure to frame one’s arguments in public-spirited 
terms. Therefore, even if A is solely motivated to pursue her self-interest, the need to 
gain public support for her favoured policies strongly encourages her to appeal to 
public values.  
Once A does so, it becomes possible to challenge her on these grounds. Suppose a 
politician publicly defends tax cuts for the wealthy by appealing to the value of 
freedom. Her opponents can then observe that if she truly cares about freedom, she 
should support redistributive taxation instead, since severe poverty makes people 
unfree. This puts the official in a difficult position. If she disregards the public 
                                                 
38 Elster (1997, 12).  
39 Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 126-127). 
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challenge that she is being inconsistent, or answers it in terms of self-interest, she risks 
appearing incompetent or hypocritical, and therefore losing support. Hence, the 
pressures of publicity incentivise her to answer the challenge, and to do so in ethical 
terms. 
The idea, then, is that ill-motivated participants in public debate can be induced to 
listen to ethical challenges, respond to them, and eventually change their stance, by what 
Elster calls the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”.40 Public attention creates pressure for 
speakers to hypocritically appeal to ideals that they may not believe in. In turn, the 
desire not to be exposed as hypocrites constrains them into being more responsive 
interlocutors.  
This effect of public hypocrisy is not mere theoretical speculation. Schimmelfennig 
argues that it is crucial to explaining why the European Union expanded to Central and 
Eastern Europe in the early 2000s. Although many powerful EU member states felt 
that enlargement was against their interest, they were rhetorically trapped into accepting 
the proposal. European integration had long been publicly justified by appeal to the 
ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-democratic states. Advocates of 
expansion exposed inconsistencies between their opponents’ past rhetoric of pan-
Europeanism and their later opposition to Eastern expansion. To avoid being shamed 
as hypocritical—a prospect which might have impaired future cooperation with other 
member states—recalcitrant member states publicly changed their positions.41 
One might object that public hypocrisy nevertheless does not generate the kind of 
goodwill we wanted. The question has been how to get participants to trust one 
another, to acknowledge one another as trustworthy, so that they might then be 
disposed to engage sincerely with each other—i.e., to listen, respond earnestly, and 
eventually change their minds. But the pressure of publicity on self-interested actors 
seemingly does not achieve this. After all, A is hypocritical, not sincere, in her dialogical 
                                                 
40 Elster (1998, 111). See also Chambers (2004, 405) and Dryzek (2000, 46-47). 
41 Schimmelfennig (2001, 48). Naurin (2007) offers contrasting evidence, which he believes warrants 
scepticism regarding the civilising force of hypocrisy. However, his evidence seems inconclusive. Naurin’s 
research focuses on business lobbyists. But unlike with public officials, people do not expect lobbyists to act 
according to public interest: if anything, the opposite is expected. Accordingly, Naurin (2007, 32) himself 
concedes that “lobbyists presumably have less to lose from being publicly revealed than, for instance, political 
parties”. Naurin might nonetheless persist as follows: he finds not just that there is no civilising effect of 
publicity on lobbyists’ behaviour, but that lobbyists are less public-spirited in public than in closed debates 
with public officials. Again, however, it seems possible to explain this observation without abandoning the 
hypothesis that publicity usually induces a kind of civilising hypocrisy. In private settings, lobbyists try to win 
politicians over. And since politicians face pressures to be public-spirited, lobbyists presumably need to show 
them that their proposals can be defended in public-spirited terms.  
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engagement: even if she listens to and answers B’s challenges, nothing guarantees that 
she actually believes the answers she gives. And A can change her publicly-held position 
without genuinely changing her mind.42 Similarly, A is not made trustworthy with respect 
to discursive engagement. While she might reliably engage in dialogue and answer 
challenges, she does so purely out of self-interest, not out of a genuine commitment to 
sincere engagement on these issues. Mere reliability, philosophers of trust widely agree, 
is insufficient for trustworthiness.43 So, public hypocrisy is insufficient to build trust, 
and relatedly, insufficient to make participants sincerely engage with each other. 
An initial reply is that this shortcoming is relatively unproblematic. This is because 
A remains functionally equivalent to someone committed to sincere engagement. She is 
forced, by fear of reputational damage, to listen to others, respond, and eventually 
change her stated position. Furthermore, unless her response is persuasive, she risks 
losing the support of listeners. So it may seem inconsequential whether or not she 
believes what she says: the fact that she is forced to act as if she were sincerely engaging 
in a trustworthy manner is enough to make her responsive and accountable to public 
criticism.44 Indeed, it might not matter to Eastern European states seeking EU 
membership whether member states that eventually assented really had grown to prefer 
enlargement. What matters is that public hypocrisy forced them to assent. 
We can also go further than this initial reply. Besides increasing A’s accountability 
to B, hypocritically engaging in reason-giving might actually, over time, make A 
committed to sincerely engaging with B. According to Elster, hypocritical public 
speakers persistently have to defend values they do not believe in, which is a powerful 
source of psychological discomfort. To reduce this painful cognitive dissonance, 
individuals may actually come to believe the ideals they defend.45 Hence, however 
hypocritical and self-interested to start with, publicly upholding the ideal of sincere 
engagement can eventually make A genuinely embrace this ideal.  
Some might have doubts about this first possibility, which depends on 
psychological theories of cognitive dissonance whose explanatory scope remains 
contested.46 But Robert Goodin suggests an alternative and perhaps less controversial 
possibility. Sometimes, the problem is not that individuals are purely self-interested, but 
                                                 
42 Mansbridge et al (2010, 73-74n28). 
43 See Hawley (2014), and note 10, this chapter. 
44 For this argument, see Markovits (2006, 268), Thompson (2008, 504), and Warren (2007, 278).  
45 Elster (1997, 12).  
46 For discussion, see Festinger (1957) and Cooper and Fazio (1984).  
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that they are only weakly committed to certain ideals. If so, Goodin suggests, public 
hypocrisy helps remind them of the ideals they already embrace, and underscores the 
implications of those ideals.47 This second process requires that participants have some 
measure of pre-existing commitment to the ideal in question. However, this is not 
exceedingly worrying in our context: there is good evidence that citizens are often at 
least weakly committed to the ideals of listening to, trying to understand, and answering 
the claims of other participants.48 In such conditions, public hypocrisy can reinvigorate 
the commitment that very many participants have to sincere engagement, and thereby 
make them more trustworthy interlocutors.  
Now, the present strategy for building goodwill and mutual trust, which proceeds 
through publicly-induced hypocrisy, does presuppose that some background conditions 
hold. First, as previously mentioned, there must be a widespread expectation that public 
speakers should engage in a sincere and public-spirited manner. But this, Elster 
suggests, is not necessarily unrealistic: it is consistent with many citizens not embracing 
this ideal, and with some individuals endorsing it but being too weak-willed to comply 
with it.49 
Second, the speaker’s discourse must be made public via monitoring, so that other 
participants can impose sanctions when speakers fail to act in a sincere and public-
spirited manner.50 Even so, in her detailed examination of trust and democracy, Lenard 
suggests that the sanctions in question needn’t be very heavy-handed. They could 
simply consist of reputational damage, lack of future cooperation, or, for elected 
officials, the threat of being voted out. As for monitoring mechanisms, Lenard observes 
that they already “are a regular part of democratic life”.51 For instance: media outlets 
habitually report speakers’ present claims and past statements, thereby enabling listeners 
to hold them accountable when the two are inconsistent.  
Still, one problem with monitoring speakers is public ignorance. Even if reliable 
media sources monitor public agents, participants may fail to avail themselves of this 
information. Worse, they might instead defer to unreliable sources. For now, I assume 
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role. On how to combine public and secret deliberation, see Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 114-117) and 
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that we can achieve significant levels of reliable monitoring by the public. Chapter 6, 
however, will consider the more pessimistic scenario, by directly examining contexts 
where citizens are highly ignorant about politics. 
Let us conclude. Public deliberation in non-ideal conditions is rife with hypocrisy. 
This provides theoretical grounds for thinking that such discourse can generate more 
favourable dispositions in participants even if we start from sober assumptions regarding 
their initial levels of goodwill and trust. More specifically, public hypocrisy can dispose 
participants to listen to one another, offer responses, and eventually change their stated 
positions. Admittedly, this mechanism presupposes some felicitous background 
conditions, including the existence of mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning 
public speakers. As Lenard notes, however, these are often already part of democratic 
politics. Additionally, if we make further—albeit modest—empirical assumptions (for 
instance, about cognitive dissonance), there is reason to think that public hypocrisy may 
over time generate a genuinely trustworthy commitment to sincere engagement. 
Importantly, however, what follows will not depend on those further empirical 
assumptions. Instead, I want to examine how, once we grant that participants are at 
least disposed to listen to each other, other typical features of non-ideal public 
discourse can contribute to building trust and goodwill. 
 
4.2. Anger and Trust 
 
In divided contexts, an important aspect of public deliberation is the exchange of 
personal narratives, or testimony, including emotionally-charged narratives. Chapter 2 
recommended welcoming such narratives on epistemic grounds—to remedy the 
ignorance of some citizens regarding others. But philosophers concerned with 
transitional justice frequently emphasise their usefulness for rebuilding trust in divided 
contexts. For example, citing cases like South Africa’s post-apartheid Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission—where victims and perpetrators were invited to publicly 
tell their stories—Cécile Fabre argues that sharing difficult stories regarding what one 
has endured, often in a way that is suffused with negative emotions, can contribute 
importantly to transforming damaged social relations.52 
                                                 
52 Fabre (2016, 280). See also Chakravarti (2014), Maddison (2015, 1022-1023), Mihai (2016), Steiner (2012, 
84). Importantly, the success of TRCs at generating trust is mixed. While some evidence is positive (e.g., 
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Crucially, such transitional periods involve extremely low levels of mutual trust and 
goodwill. Accordingly, drawing on the resources developed within transitional justice 
debates seems promising when challenging premise (3) of the problem of goodwill: it 
allows us to investigate how public discourse in highly non-ideal contexts might help 
generate trust and the attending goodwill.  
Let us consider what kinds of emotionally-charged personal narratives might be 
useful, and how. One might think that some kinds of emotionally-charged testimony 
can contribute to rebuilding trust, while denying that angry testimony can do so. For 
example, as Chapter 4 discussed, Nussbaum explicitly affirms that angry narratives are 
deleterious for trust.53  
But saying this would weaken my reply to the problem of goodwill. First, angry 
narratives are pervasive in non-ideal conditions, which characteristically involve 
widespread injustices. Thus, excluding them from discursive trust-building processes 
represents a significant qualification of my suggestion that typical features of non-ideal 
public speech can be made to contribute to these processes. Moreover, discouraging 
angry speech because it allegedly inhibits trust-building procedures jars with my 
recommendation, in Chapter 4, that we give a substantial place to such speech. 
For these reasons, following Sonali Chakravarti’s examination in Sing the Rage: 
Listening to Anger after Mass Violence, I focus on angry personal narratives.54 Chapter 4 
defended angry narrative by arguing that it had distinctive epistemic value, while 
accepting for the sake of argument Nussbaum’s claim that its impact on trust and 
goodwill is at best inert and at worst disastrous. I then argued that even conceding this, 
an appropriate understanding of public deliberation helps to circumvent anger’s alleged 
bad consequences on trust. Here, by contrast, I will push back against the assumption 
that the influence on trust of angry narrative is categorically negative.  
This is of course not to say that its influence on trust is always positive overall. 
Establishing when exactly its influence is overall positive remains partly an empirical 
task. But that task, as I explained in the introduction, depends on theoretical 
hypotheses regarding what specific positive trust-building effects angry testimony might 
have. These hypotheses should be informed by the conceptual work philosophers have 
                                                                                                                                               
Gibson (2004)), some is not (e.g., Shaw (2010)). My aim is to develop hypotheses regarding what might 
explain the positive side.  
53 Nussbaum (2016a, 213, 233).  
54 Chakravarti (2014, ch. 6). See also Maddison (2015, 1022).  
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done on anger, trust, and testimony. Accordingly, my aim here is to enrich empirical 
investigations by developing such hypotheses. So let us ask: assuming that discursive 
participants listen to one another, how might voicing angry personal narratives build 
trust between them?  
It will help to have a case of angry testimony before us. Chakravarti offers the 
poignant example of Lendiso Richard Ndumo Galela, an anti-apartheid activist who 
was tortured while in detention. Galela supplied the following testimony at the South 
African TRC:  
 
There is no amount of money that can pay for a person’s dignity. That is a 
fact. I am the equivalent of a corpse, I do not have any dignity left.  I have 
been stripped of my dignity and that is what I wanted to say and I would 
just like to say that even though my physical appearance seems like that of a 
man I have been stripped of my manhood and a specialist told me that it 
would give, it would take three months for me to be treated and if nothing 
happens, I should know that I would be condemned sexually. […] What I 
am saying is that I do not see what the Commission can do for me.55 
 
Why might listening to this resentful narrative induce the listener to trust Galela? A 
recurrent suggestion among theorists of transitional justice, which Fabre notably 
articulates, is that hearing such a narrative can have a humanising influence: it helps the 
listener see the speaker as a human being, whose humanity is worthy of concern and 
respect. Anger, recall, represents its target as involving a moral violation or injustice. So, 
an angry personal narrative reveals that the speaker is grappling with a powerful sense 
of injustice (“I am the equivalent of a corpse […] I have been stripped of my dignity”), 
and discloses the difficult experiences which prompted that sense (how the torture 
Galela sustained resulted in his impotence). Being confronted with the speaker’s 
psychological agitation and discovering the painful experiences he has endured already 
helps us understand who he is and where he is coming from. Accordingly, it helps the 
                                                 
55 Cited in Chakravarti (2014, 138).  
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listener perceive the speaker as an individual in their own right—as a human being with 
particular experiences and concerns.56   
This humanising influence is important. As Katherine Cramer and Elizabeth 
Anderson emphasise in their recent examinations of urban/rural divisions and racial 
divisions in the US, distrust is often driven by the fact that individuals from estranged 
social groups perceive each other solely as members of a resented outgroup, which 
erases or obscures their shared humanity.57 Insofar as this is the case, angry narratives’ 
humanising function seems promising with respect to trust-building. 
But there is another, less examined, way in which listening to anger might be 
positively associated with trust: listening to angry testimony might enhance the listener’s 
disposition to act trustworthily because, in some cases, the speaker’s angry narrative 
itself constitutes a manifestation of trust. Telling one’s story can require disclosing 
deeply sensitive aspects of one’s life, particularly in conflict-ridden circumstances. This 
seems likely not just when expressing grief or despair, but also anger. Since the 
appropriate target of anger is a moral violation,58 angry testimony may sometimes 
involve revealing how one has sustained violating or degrading treatment. For Galela, 
giving testimony means expressing anger at a deeply humiliating injustice (“I have been 
stripped of my dignity […] I have been stripped of my manhood”). In such cases—
where the injustice that the speaker’s anger targets is degrading or humiliating—
delivering angry testimony implies baring oneself, and hence making oneself vulnerable 
to one’s listeners. Now, according to philosophical analyses of trust, voluntarily making 
oneself vulnerable to others just is placing trust in them.59 Thus, in making himself 
vulnerable to his listeners, the speaker whose anger targets humiliating wrongs he has 
sustained is signalling trust in his listeners—in particular, trust that they will not take 
advantage of that vulnerability by, say, mocking him. 
Why does this matter? Pettit argues that when A places trust in B, this generates a 
new reason for B to act in a trustworthy way and eventually to reciprocate by extending 
trust. To place trust in another, Pettit suggests, is to show esteem for them. Since 
individuals typically seek the esteem of others, they desire to maintain this trust. 
Therefore, placing this trust gives the trustee a new reason, based in their desire for 
                                                 
56 Fabre (2016, 264). See also Chakravarti (2014, 153), Maddison (2015, 1021), Halpern and Weinstein (2004, 
571-579), and Aiken (2010, 185). 
57 Cramer (2016, esp. 8-9); Anderson (2010, 44-50). 
58 Chapter 4, Section 2.  
59 E.g., Baier (1986, 235), Pettit (1995, 208), Jones (1996, 12), Lenard (2012, 18-20). 
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esteem, to act trustworthily. This is what Pettit calls the “cunning of trust”.60 In making 
himself vulnerable to his listeners through his anger-infused narrative, then, Galela 
gives them a new reason to act in a trustworthy way. 
One might worry that the “cunning of trust” does not apply to non-ideal 
circumstances. This property of trust requires that the trustee desires the truster’s 
esteem. But we often recoil at being esteemed by people we deeply dislike.61 
Consequently, if the speaker and listener come from estranged social groups, one might 
think that the intended trust-building effect will not occur. 
This worry derives much of its force from the ambiguity surrounding what kind of 
esteem the speaker is signalling to the listener. What makes us recoil from the esteem of 
our enemies is typically the worry that they extend this esteem for the wrong reasons. I 
worry about being appreciated by racists because of the thought that they appreciate me 
because I am not black. But, importantly, the kind of esteem being communicated here 
does not necessarily seem problematic in this way. At least part of what the speaker’s 
trusting reliance communicates, here, is the expectation that the listener will not take unfair 
advantage of their vulnerability. Intuitively, being respected as the kind of person who does 
not take unfair advantage of others’ vulnerability is something we have good moral 
reason to seek, even from those we dislike.62  
To illustrate this last point, consider an example. During the 1963 Birmingham 
protests in Alabama, Commissioner for Public Safety ‘Bull’ Connor commanded his 
men to target civil rights protesters with fire hoses. The protesters responded by getting 
to their knees and praying. Thus, they made themselves vulnerable to police forces, and 
signalled their expectation that the police would not exploit that vulnerability. Struck by 
this gesture, Connor’s men let the marchers through.63 On one interpretation, the 
protestors’ act of trust communicated a kind of esteem that Connor’s men had reason 
to value, even though it came from a group that they otherwise (we can plausibly 
assume) strongly resented.  
So far, I have emphasised how hearing testimony charged with anger might dispose 
the listener to engage in trusting relations. But delivering the narrative, Fabre notes, might 
also help. One might be unwilling to trust others because one feels resentful at being 
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62 This reason may be overridden (perhaps a racist confides in me that she plans to commit a hate crime). But 
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63 Anderson (2010, 100). 
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ignored or misrecognised. If so, publicly relating what one has endured seems to be 
part and parcel of what is needed to restore one’s trust.64 Again, Galela’s case is 
instructive. What keeps Galela from participating in social life is partly the perception 
that his ordeal has degraded him, and that this degradation is not properly 
acknowledged (“no amount of money […] can pay for a person’s dignity”). 
Accordingly, having his terrible experiences and his resulting anger acknowledged 
seems to play a constitutive role in restoring his willingness to engage in trusting 
relations. Giving impassioned testimony and receiving uptake, then, can be part of what 
makes speakers trust their listeners.  
A closely related point, which Chakravarti emphasises throughout her analysis of 
anger in TRCs, is that giving angry testimony may also be instrumental to making the 
speaker trust others. Because angry testimony delivers facts about the world and the 
speaker’s psychological state—and more specifically, about the wrongs they see 
themselves as having sustained—it yields insights into what citizens need to restore 
trust.65 As we have just seen, Galela’s narrative indicates that financial reparations are 
the wrong kind of response to his anger. Instead, expressive acts aimed at making him 
feel dignified and respected seem a more fitting remedy. 
We have, then, several theoretical hypotheses regarding how testimonies charged 
with negative emotions such as anger might contribute to rebuilding trust and goodwill. 
They can help the listener perceive the speaker’s humanity; signal trust that incentivises 
trustworthiness; make the speaker feel recognised as a member of society; and yield 
information regarding what measures are needed to restore the speaker’s trust. 
Importantly, although Galela’s narrative arguably exemplifies all of these trust-
building functions, not all types of angry speech should be expected to perform these 
functions equally. For instance, the hypothesis that angry speech signals trust in a trust-
incentivising way applies especially to cases where the injustice targeted by the anger is 
degrading or humiliating. To reiterate, this is because these are the cases where it is 
clearest that revealing the injustice suffered makes one vulnerable, and therefore 
constitutes a signalling of trust. This restriction needn’t apply to the other trust-building 
functions of angry speech I have outlined. Delivering her testimony might conceivably 
help the angry speaker feel acknowledged, or yield information regarding how to 
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restore her trust, or make listeners appreciate her humanity, irrespective of whether the 
injustices she is reporting were humiliating.66  
Thus, far from suggesting that all instances of angry narrative will perform these 
positive trust-building roles equally, the theoretical hypotheses I have outlined help 
explain why we can expect different kinds of anger to be effective at different 
functions. In contrast, existing empirical evidence regarding how angry 
communications affect interpersonal relations often does not distinguish between 
different kinds of anger. And when it does, it rarely makes discriminations based on the 
intentional objects of the anger (e.g., what kind of injustice the anger is directed at, 
whether it targets the injustice only or also its perpetrators, etc.).67 As illustrated above, 
the philosophical hypotheses I have outlined give us reason to expect that such 
differences may influence angry speech’s impact on trust. Thus, these hypotheses can 
and should guide the empirical task of ascertaining precisely when angry narratives can 
have a positive influence on trust, all things considered. 
Even with this qualification, objections remain. First, one might worry that the 
foregoing discussion does not show much about the trust-building effectiveness of 
angry testimony itself. After all, my running example is taken from the South African 
TRC, whose discursive processes relied upon heavy institutional support. In particular, 
                                                 
66 Another dimension concerns less the kind of injustice that the anger is directed at, and more whether the 
angry speech targets the perpetrators of the injustice. Galela’s testimony hardly refers to the perpetrators. For 
instance, he uses the passive tense when saying “I have been stripped of my dignity”. Would the trust-
building effects of angry testimony decline if Galela’s anger targeted the perpetrators (“Look what you’ve 
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we are examining. With respect to how delivering an angry testimony helps the speaker trust the audience, it is 
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defensive, not trusting. Some evidence seemingly supports this worry. Steinel et al (2008) find that negotiators 
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angry that you made me this offer.”). So it remains inconclusive for angry statements like “You have stripped 
me of my dignity!” 
67 For studies that do not distinguish different kinds of anger, see, e.g., Tiedens (2001), Sinaceur and Tiedens 
(2006), Van Beest et al (2008), and Wubben et al (2009). Some studies do discriminate between different 
kinds of anger, but they typically draw distinctions that cross-cut the ones I suggest are philosophically 
interesting. Indeed, they mainly distinguish between threatening and non-threatening expressions of anger, or 
direct and indirect expressions of anger. E.g., Guerrero (2009), Sereno et al (1987). Neither of those 
distinctions concerns what the anger’s intentional object is. One exception is Steinel et al (2008), who 
distinguish between person-oriented and behaviour-oriented anger. As note 66, this chapter, discusses, 
however, their research has limitations for our purposes.  
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they were facilitated by moderators who, inter alia, reminded participants of what was 
expected of them—sincerity, openness, listening, etc. 
But even if skilful facilitation by moderators is a necessary ingredient in trust-
building, this does not undermine the more fundamental point: that given skilful 
facilitation, negative personal narratives offer important resources for building trust in 
deeply divided contexts, and (as the example of the TRC suggests) can seemingly do so 
in large-scale deliberative settings. More generally, this suggests that even if they must 
be combined with non-deliberative measures, deliberative processes can a) contribute 
to trust-building within fragmented and unjust societies, b) in virtue of some of their 
non-ideal properties (here, anger). Limited though this point may be, it still casts doubt 
on premise (3), the categorical claim that deliberation cannot contribute to trust-
building in non-ideal conditions.  
Nevertheless, a second worry arises. In exploring anger’s trust-building potential, I 
have focused on fitting instances of anger, where the angry testimony denounces 
genuine injustices. But what about unfitting anger? As discussed in previous chapters, 
many occurrences of angry speech in non-ideal conditions express unfitting or 
misdirected anger. For some, publicly revealing their impassioned viewpoint means 
expressing rage at marginalised groups. So making space for angry storytelling also risks 
letting in public expressions of xenophobic or racist rage.68 Allowing such hate speech, 
it might seem, is disastrous for trust-building. The worry is not just that such speech 
cannot perform the aforementioned positive trust-building roles. It is that, in addition, 
it risks having a highly negative impact on trust.  
Chakravarti recognises this worry, and therefore stipulates that angry speakers 
should have the freedom to tell their story “as long as it does not become hate 
speech”.69 However, this response seems institutionally problematic. We are supposed 
to make space for personal storytelling, where individuals voice the grievances they 
harbour deep down. Simultaneously, deeply misguided grievances must be excluded. 
                                                 
68 This worry is especially salient with online deliberation, which is rife with disrespectful narratives. 
According to Levmore, this is because online anonymity enables speakers to express disrespectful views with 
impunity. But there are ways of counteracting this specific problem. For instance, as Moore (2017, 20-21) 
reports, requiring online participants to supply their real names—or simply to maintain the same pseudonyms 
over time—drastically increases the respectfulness of their contributions. This suggests that online discourse 
can be made less distinctively problematic with respect to trust-building (as compared with offline discourse). 
For critical discussion of the claim that online disrespectful speech is distinctively problematic, see Brown 
(2017). 
69 Chakravarti (2014, 156).  
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But, in context, part of what is disputed just is which grievances are deeply misguided. 
Therefore, it seems difficult unambiguously to stipulate which views are ‘out’ before 
hearing people’s testimony. And given this uncertainty, excluding hateful views risks 
leading to self-censorship that defeats the aim of having people say what is really 
troubling them.  
Perhaps there is an institutional way of avoiding this problem. But I do not want to 
rely excessively on this possibility. Moreover, Chapter 3 introduced defeasible reasons 
against forcibly or legally excluding public hate speech. Hence, considerations of 
consistency militate against taking this route. Finally, even if we could suppress hate 
speech without inhibiting the expression of fitting angry testimonies, this would 
constitute a significant concession to the problem of goodwill: it concedes that we need 
heavy-handed sanitisation of public deliberation before it can be used for trust-building. 
Instead, then, the final section will introduce reasons for doubting the view that failing 
to forcibly exclude hateful public narratives would necessarily undermine the process of 
building trust and goodwill. 
 
4.3.  Hate Speech and Trust 
 
Briefly put, the concern is that public hate speech seems likely to alienate listeners, 
particularly those it targets. Hate speech denies its targets’ basic social standing. 
Therefore, if A utters hate speech which targets B, this will presumably drastically 
diminish the trust and goodwill B has towards A. Now, failing to exclude hate speech 
increases the opportunities for publicly expressing such speech. From these premises, 
one might conclude, failing to exclude hate speech is bound to have a destructive effect 
on trust and goodwill. 
But this argument is too quick. Despite accepting its premises, Marcus Schulzke 
reaches the opposite conclusion: legally permitting hate speech, he contends, is in 
important respects instrumental to rebuilding social trust. The crux of his argument is 
that, because allowing hate speech increases opportunities for publicly expressing 
hateful views, doing so helps identify who does and does not hold hateful views.70 This 
identifiability, Schulzke suggests, matters for two trust-related reasons.  
                                                 
70 Schulzke (2016, 233).  
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Firstly, it makes hate speakers and their beliefs easier targets of counterspeech. 
Once hateful views are in the open, we can publicly repudiate them, and expose their 
baselessness.71 Although this might conceivably get hate speakers to abandon their 
abhorrent views, Schulzke concedes that this is unlikely. More significant is the 
potential effect of counterspeech on third parties. “Bystanders, especially those who 
might be susceptible to becoming prejudiced, can profit from seeing public debate [...] 
that demonstrates how little evidence there is to support hateful belief systems”.72 
Persuading third parties that bigoted views are misguided through reasoned debate is 
not altogether uncommon. In 1965, for instance, civil rights activist James Baldwin 
publicly debated conservative thinker William Buckley (a man who famously referred to 
whites as “the advanced race”). That day, Baldwin’s eloquent logic easily won his 
audience over. Examples like these suggest that allowing public hate speech creates 
opportunities for counterspeakers to change the minds of those who might have been 
tempted by degrading views. This, in turn, seems good for trust: repudiating hateful 
views makes one more capable of forming trusting relations with the targets of those 
views.  
Such examples notwithstanding, Schulzke’s first trust-based argument for allowing 
hate speech needs refinement. Why not think that the greater public presence of hateful 
views will draw more people to those views? Schulzke assumes that because hateful 
views are unsupported by good reasons, counterspeech will generally show them to be 
unpersuasive. But how persuasive a view appears is not wholly determined by the logic 
supporting it. The perceived authority of the person voicing it also matters. What is 
needed, then, is not just for private citizens to respond to hate speakers. Instead, as I 
argued in Chapter 3, authoritative public officials, and ideally state-backed officials, 
must actively denounce public hate speech.  
Even with this refinement, there are limits to what counterspeech can achieve by 
way of persuasion.73 Some hateful citizens will be unwilling to change their minds. 
Worse, feeling publicly challenged might further entrench their commitment to hateful 
views. So even if Schulzke is right that the identifiability of hateful doctrines creates 
new opportunities for steering some citizens away from hateful views—and, in doing 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 236. See also Brettschneider (2012).  
72 Schulzke (2016, 236). 
73 This is compatible with Chapter 3’s argument: there, I focused not on how authoritative counterspeech 
persuades, but rather on how it blocks hate speech’s assault on its targets’ dignity. 
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so, helps to improve social trust—it nonetheless seems to have some countervailing 
bad effects on trust: in particular, the speech of hateful citizens who do not abandon 
their views will continue to alienate targets of hate speech. 
This is where the second and more important trust-related function of making hate 
speakers identifiable kicks in. To appreciate this function, consider that even if being on 
the receiving end of hate speech makes trusting the hate speaker impossible, it does not 
necessarily follow that things would be better with respect to trust if hateful citizens 
were forced not to speak their minds. There are two possibilities. Either hate speech 
bans make the existence of hate speakers wholly invisible, or they do not.  
If hate speech bans utterly conceal the existence of hateful citizens, they put targets 
of hateful views at risk of engaging in unwarranted relations of trust—that is, of trusting 
citizens who are untrustworthy. Suppose that B does not know that A is a hateful 
citizen, and, out of ignorance, relies on A. The trust B places in A seems unwarranted: 
A’s hateful belief that B does not belong in the community of equals to which A is 
accountable seems inherently in tension with a commitment to behaving trustworthily 
towards B. Now, as Russell Hardin explains, engaging in such an unwarranted relation 
of trust is undesirable: because unwarranted trust is by definition likely to be betrayed, it 
is both unstable and dangerous for the truster.74 
The second (and more empirically plausible) possibility is that hate speech bans do 
not make hateful citizens wholly invisible. Even if hateful citizens do not publicly 
express hateful views, it is still known that some people hold hateful views. But what becomes 
less well known, Schulzke emphasises, is who exactly holds these views. This lack of 
identifiability, he argues, is again problematic. Insofar as they do not know who holds 
                                                 
74 Hardin (2002, 29-32). Two points regarding consistency are worth flagging here. Firstly, this last argument 
is compatible with my claim, in 4.2, that placing trust produces a new incentive to be trustworthy. The 
difference is that, here, B places trust out of ignorance: the description of A which motivates B to extend trust is 
one that A does not actually satisfy. Consequently, A cannot justifiably think that B is signalling esteem for A. 
Second, one might worry that my more general argument in 4.3 is inconsistent with my discussion of the 
civilising force of hypocrisy in 4.1. Section 4.1 argued that informal norms can induce hypocritical behaviour 
in ill-motivated participants, which in turn can ‘civilise’ them. But if hypocrisy has such a civilising effect, why 
not also impose formal legal restrictions on hate speech, with the aim of further incentivising hypocrisy in hate 
speakers? There are several reasons to resist this recommendation. I have already introduced the first: prima 
facie, legally restricting hate speech risks interfering with making space for angry testimony aimed at 
advancing trust. Additionally, in 4.1, the civilising force of hypocrisy was used more modestly: a) it applied to 
individuals who were typically less ill-motivated. The paradigm cases were egotists and people who have 
decent values but are weak-willed. Hate speakers, by contrast, have morally objectionable views. And b) the 
aim of the civilising force of hypocrisy was less ambitious. It was to get ill-motivated citizens to engage 
sincerely with others. This seems less demanding than getting individuals to revise vilifying prejudices, which 
often resist evidence. While vilifying stereotypes might sometimes be what prevents individuals from 
engaging sincerely with others, there is no reason to think that this is generally so. Because of these 
disanalogies, the civilising force of hypocrisy may be less applicable here than in the cases discussed in 4.1. 
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hateful views, targets of hateful views must either run the risk of trusting untrustworthy 
hateful citizens, or refrain from trusting anyone from groups that are known to contain 
some hateful citizens.75  
To illustrate, consider Zimasile Bota’s testimony to the South African TRC. In her 
testimony, Bota asserted:  
 
One of my requests is that the perpetrators, the Government must bring 
them forward. We cannot work together with the police. We know that the 
police are protecting us, but we cannot work together with the police who 
have blood on their hands. […] My request is that the police must come 
forward.76 
 
Bota is claiming that because many police officers were complicit in racist apartheid 
practices, they cannot be trusted. Until those who were complicit are identified, 
working with the police seems impossible, as it is unclear which members are 
trustworthy. Restoring trust, she suggests, requires making it more visible who is and 
who is not trustworthy. 
This, Schulzke emphasises, is precisely what legally permitting public hate speech, 
while advocating (as I have done) robust counterspeech against it, would in principle 
achieve.77 Allowing A to voice his hateful views towards B, while having non-hateful 
third parties (C) denounce these views, helps B see that while she cannot trust A, she 
can trust C. This seems intuitively preferable to the two previous scenarios: 1) the 
situation where B does not know that anyone has hateful views, and therefore 
misguidedly trusts A; and 2) the situation where B only knows that one of A and C has 
degrading views, and is therefore unsure which of the two she can safely trust. Indeed, 
making hateful citizens visible helps targets of hateful views trust trustworthy citizens 
and only trustworthy citizens. 
In sum, the objection that not excluding hate speech is bound to undermine trust is 
too hasty. By making hateful citizens more visible, the practice of allowing hate speech 
while authoritatively denouncing it performs two trust-building functions: it creates new 
opportunities for persuading hateful citizens; and when persuasion fails, it at least 
                                                 
75 Schulzke (2016, 230-236).  
76 Cited in Chakravarti (2014, 69).  
77 Schulzke (2016, 230-235).  
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makes it clearer who can and cannot safely be trusted. This second point concedes that 
hate speakers and their targets will not trust each other. Even so, I have suggested that 
the fundamental trust-related problem here is the existence of hateful citizens. Their 
untrustworthiness with respect to their targets is what destabilises trusting relations, 
rather than the policy of allowing those hateful citizens to air their views. Thus, the 
more crucial point against premise (3) remains: given that hateful citizens exist, the 
policy of allowing public hate speech (while authoritatively denouncing it) arguably 




According to the problem of goodwill, inclusive deliberation presupposes unrealistic 
levels of mutual goodwill and (as a presupposition thereof) trust. Moreover, it is said 
that deliberation cannot itself contribute to generating trust and the attending goodwill 
in non-ideal conditions.  
The present chapter has articulated reasons for pushing back against this challenge. 
To begin, I showed that on the systemic understanding of deliberation, discursive 
processes presuppose less goodwill than one might think: highly demanding discursive 
norms needn’t apply to most deliberative spheres; and when the norms which do apply 
to most citizens—e.g., norms of sincere engagement—remain too demanding, the 
networked interaction between different spheres helps circumvent the communicative 
barriers raised by distrust. 
These qualifications notwithstanding, the challenge remains problematic. 
Accordingly, most of my argument tackled another claim: that the public deliberation 
which characterises non-ideal contexts cannot generate greater trust and goodwill. 
Specifically, I explored respects in which three features of such public discourse—
hypocrisy, angry speech, and the occurrence of hate speech—offer resources for 
rebuilding trust and the attending goodwill. 
Even if we start from pessimistic assumptions regarding existing goodwill and trust, 
the practice of hypocritically pretending to be public-spirited and sincere may, as Elster 
suggests, make participants more accountable to their interlocutors. Public hypocrisy 




Given a disposition to listen, other characteristic features of non-ideal public 
discourse have promising trust-building properties. Drawing on philosophical 
approaches to trust, anger, and transitional justice, I theorised several trust-building 
functions of personal narratives charged with anger. Telling one’s anger-infused story 
can have a humanising influence on the listener’s perception of the speaker, signal trust 
in a way that invites the listener’s trustworthiness, help the speaker feel acknowledged, 
and provide information that is instrumental to rebuilding social bonds. 
But one problem with making space for angry testimony in divided contexts is that 
testimonies expressing unfitting anger might conceivably veer into hate speech. 
Nevertheless, given a situation where some individuals have hateful views, it is unclear 
that allowing public hate speech while authoritatively denouncing it makes matters 
worse for trust. Instead, as Schulzke contends, there are reasons to think that it 
improves social trust by making it clearer who can and cannot be trusted. 
Notice, finally, how this response to the problem of goodwill accords with the 
normative recommendations of previous chapters. Emotionally-charged narratives, 
including angry testimony, are forms of speech I defended in Chapters 2 and 4. And 
Chapter 3 recommended legally allowing public hate speech while having authoritative 
public figures denounce it. A similar observation holds with public hypocrisy. The 
occurrence of fruitful hypocrisy results from the expectation that participants in public 
discourse be sincere—a norm advanced in Chapter 1, Section 3.1—as well as by the 
expectation that, in some spheres, participants should appeal to considerations that are 
public or shared—a norm defended in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.  
I originally defended these norms on the grounds that they play a key role in 
realising justice. But the fact that these very same norms offer prima facie promising 
resources for generating trust and goodwill in divided contexts should bolster this initial 
defence. It suggests that this normative account of democratic public deliberation is 
















Citizens of contemporary democracies are often extremely ignorant about political 
matters. Many are disinclined to seek out and accept information from trustworthy 
sources. The extent of this ignorance can be startling. American citizens commonly do 
not know which party controls Congress. Similarly, there is evidence that most citizens 
cannot name the three branches of federal government, let alone explain their function. 
And even during the Cold War, only a small minority of Americans knew that the 
USSR did not belong to NATO.1 
This ignorance constitutes a pressing political problem. In brief, ignorance about 
public affairs—public ignorance—makes citizens vulnerable to demagogues, who can 
mislead them into supporting unjust policies or unqualified politicians. This danger was 
arguably on display in 2016 when, some analysists have suggested, ignorance about the 
European Union2 and about American politics3 contributed to the UK’s decision to 
leave the EU and to the election of Donald Trump.  
Because public ignorance seems politically dangerous, political philosophers have 
become increasingly interested in how we might mitigate its negative impact. In this 
context, an influential objection holds that normative theories of democracy that give a 
central role to democratic public deliberation—to public deliberation involving ordinary 
citizens on a large scale—are uniquely ill-adapted to the fact of public ignorance. 
Fruitful deliberation, it is said, requires citizens to be more knowledgeable than they 
actually are about politics. This shortcoming is standardly taken to warrant adopting 
alternative normative models of democracy, or even non-democratic political systems. 
The present chapter will examine this pressing objection and its effectiveness 
against the normative account of democratic deliberation I have advanced. Thus, while 
                                                 
1 Somin (2013, 18-22).  
2 Somin (2016b). 
3 Somin (2016a). 
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Chapter 5 considered the objection that my framework presupposes unrealistic levels of 
goodwill and trust between participants, the present chapter will investigate the 
objection that it assumes unrealistic dispositions to acquire political knowledge.   
Though public ignorance constitutes a serious concern, I will argue that it is not a 
special problem for deliberative theories of democracy like my own. Exploring the 
alternatives to deliberation-centred democracy reveals either that their recommendations 
are equally plagued by public ignorance, or that, although their recommendations 
constitute promising remedies for public ignorance, they can be reconciled with 
deliberative democracy. 
After introducing the difficulties public ignorance allegedly generates for inclusive 
deliberation (Section 2), I briefly consider the response that ignorance does not actually 
impede deliberation’s ability to promote justice. For reasons that are partly dialectical, I 
concede that this response is unsatisfactory (Section 3). Instead, I demonstrate that if 
public ignorance is problematic for deliberative democracy, then it also undermines 
alternative arrangements. First, more minimalistic democratic arrangements—which 
either eschew deliberation by ordinary citizens or restrict it to small-scale settings—
neither avoid nor alleviate the problem, despite demanding less active participation 
from citizens. And insofar as these models do seem less vulnerable to ignorance, this is 
because of features that are ultimately consistent with deliberative democracy (Section 
4). Now, if all models of democracy are vulnerable to the present problem, perhaps the 
solution is to abandon democracy. However, I will show that the non-democratic 
arrangements touted as remedies in fact merely postpone the problem of public 
ignorance (Section 5).  
The point of this companions-in-guilt argument is not solely negative. Its positive 
purpose is to refocus normative theorising about democracy. First, it reveals that 
criticisms that move from public ignorance to the rejection of deliberative democracy 
are distracting. If alternative normative models are also plagued by widespread 
ignorance, our focus should be not on departing from deliberation-centred democracy, 
but rather on tackling the problem at its source: public ignorance itself.  
Second, to combat public ignorance, we should at least partly direct our attention to 
improving practices of mass public deliberation. Since everyone faces the problem of 
public ignorance, we should think of inclusive deliberation not as the source of the 
problem, but rather as an attempted solution to it. Given that the problem is 
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ubiquitous, and given the promise of contemporary deliberative innovations, 
conceptual and institutional, we must try to make this solution work. 
 
2. The Problem of Public Ignorance 
2.1. The Fact of Public Ignorance 
 
Empirical research indicates that most citizens are ignorant regarding various 
dimensions of politics. Their ignorance concerns policy outcomes (what the outcomes 
of given policies might be), policy availability (what policies are available), policy 
support (which political actors support which policies, and what they are doing about 
it), and the policy-making process (what role different political actors have in 
developing and enacting policies).4 
A major cause of this ignorance is that citizens typically lack the disposition to seek 
out and accept reliable political information. Some citizens hardly look for information 
at all. Others seek information, but only from a very restricted range of sources. And 
many citizens search for information but trust unreliable sources. These features are 
interrelated. Knowing very little and seeking information from few sources makes it 
more likely that one will end up trusting unreliable sources, whose distorted claims lack 
independent support. In turn, trusting unreliable sources may erode one’s disposition to 
consider other, perhaps more reliable, sources.5  
What is more, these dispositions may be difficult to alter. When there are many 
unreliable sources, and when people with different perspectives are segregated into 
different social enclaves, gathering reliable and balanced information is costly. At the 
same time, the probability of making a difference with one’s vote is minimal. Hence, 
some social scientists argue that being reluctant to search for high-quality information is 
rational.6 So, ignorance regarding public matters is widespread and originates in 




                                                 
4 For overviews, see Somin (2013, ch. 1) and Brennan (2016, ch. 2).  
5 For discussion, see Anderson (2011, 153-154), Parkinson (2006, 103-108), and Anderson (1998, 498-500). 
6 E.g., Somin (1998, 435-438). 
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2.2.  The Threat to Inclusive Deliberation 
 
This public ignorance, it is often argued, is especially problematic for conceptions of 
democracy that advocate inclusive deliberation. At this point, it is worth reiterating a 
few notable features of what deliberative theories of democracy do and do not say. 
First, although deliberative democracy morally requires active participation by ordinary 
citizens on a large scale, it is not synonymous with direct democracy. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, deliberative democrats usually take inclusive deliberation to be intimately 
bound up with political representation. That is, a significant part of what citizens are 
expected to deliberate about is their actual or potential representatives: in a 
representative deliberative democracy, citizens debate which representatives they 
should elect; they argue about whether their elected representatives are enacting good 
policies; they write to those representatives to demand justifications; and they publicly 
criticise representatives who break electoral promises.7 Deliberating about one’s 
representatives will inevitably involve arguing about the merits of different policies—
for instance, when assessing competing politicians’ policy platforms. But it can also 
involve discussing other issues, such as politicians’ character.  
Relatedly, large-scale deliberation does not require an immense deliberative arena 
that includes all citizens. As emphasised in previous chapters, we should understand 
large-scale deliberation as occurring within a deliberative system—i.e., a network 
composed of many deliberative arenas, which vary in size, formality and function, and 
are connected more or less closely to one another.8 While formal deliberative arenas—
such as legislative assemblies—are often tasked with producing coercive decisions, 
more informal arenas—like newspapers’ opinion sections or political rallies—
principally aim to help citizens develop more considered views.  
The most essential feature of deliberative democracy, then, is the central role it 
gives to public deliberation that includes ordinary citizens on a large scale. Why is 
ignorance problematic for such deliberation? The objection can be reconstructed as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
7 Chapter 1, Section 3.1. 
8 Chapters 2, 4, 5. 
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(1) Public deliberation promotes just outcomes only if participants are well-
informed. 
(2) Ordinary citizens are typically not well-informed. 
(3) So, inclusive public deliberation is typically not justice-promoting.9  
 
Premise (2), as we have seen, is strongly supported by empirical research. As for 
premise (1), it seems prima facie plausible. In earlier chapters, I argued that inclusive 
public deliberation contributes to promoting justice on epistemic and motivational 
grounds. On the epistemic side, exchanging arguments and testimonies, both 
dispassionate and emotionally-charged, helps interlocutors discover which policies are 
most just and which potential representatives are most likely to promote justice.10 On 
the motivational side, publicly questioning powerful actors helps to hold them 
accountable. Thus, public deliberation constitutes a check on powerful agents, which 
prevents them from exercising their power arbitrarily and thereby dominating weaker 
parties.11   
The problem is that both mechanisms seem to require that participants satisfy some 
threshold of knowledge. If A is highly ignorant, A might fail to notice that B’s 
arguments rest on false assumptions, that C’s emotional testimony is fictitious, or that 
D’s current assertions are inconsistent with her earlier assertions. In turn, if A cannot 
distinguish good arguments and testimonies from bad ones, the epistemic and 
motivational benefits of deliberation may disappear. Indeed, if A is equally swayed by 
spurious and non-spurious arguments and testimonies, deliberation might not make 
him more knowledgeable concerning which policies and politicians are better at 
advancing justice. Likewise, if A cannot determine whether his representatives’ claims 
are false or inconsistent, then publicly questioning them will be ineffective at holding 
them accountable. Hence, standard defences of inclusive deliberation (including the 
ones I have been appealing to) might seem to depend upon unrealistic assumptions 
regarding participants’ knowledge.  
For many theorists, this shortcoming warrants shifting to normative models of 
government that demand less of ordinary citizens than inclusive deliberation does—
and, accordingly, that seem more sensitive to the fact of public ignorance. While some 
                                                 
9 E.g., Anderson (1998, 490-491), Somin (1998, 438-442), Posner (2003, 163). 
10 Chapter 1, Section 3.1; Chapter 2, Section 4; Chapter 4, Section 4. 
11 Chapter 1, Section 3.1; Chapter 2, Section 2.2; Chapter 5, Section 4.1. 
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advocate more minimalistic theories of democracy, which remove deliberation by 
ordinary citizens or restrict it to small-scale settings, others defend non-democratic 
political systems. In what follows, I briefly examine attempts at rejecting the claim that 
ignorance undercuts the justice-promoting powers of inclusive deliberation (Section 3). 
My focus, however, will be on demonstrating that even if we accept this claim, it does 
not follow that we should embrace an alternative normative model (Sections 4-5). 
 
3. Is Ignorance Really a Problem for Democratic Deliberation? 
 
Defenders of deliberation-centred democracy often object to premise (1). Put 
differently, they argue that even if citizens are initially highly ignorant about politics, this 
is not a deep problem for deliberative democracy’s capacity to advance justice. On this 
line of argument, inclusive communication is a remedy for ignorance, which makes 
participants less ignorant than they initially were. Consequently, even a deliberative 
process that takes as its input many ignorant citizens can ultimately produce a wise and 
justice-promoting output.12 
Consider two ways in which deliberation might reduce ignorance. First, when some 
citizens—call them ‘experts’—know substantially more than others about some 
political issue, they can share this knowledge with ignorant co-citizens. Ignorant citizens 
can learn that policy x is good (bad), that claim y is true (false), etc., by consulting and 
questioning experts on political matters. This is a familiar feature of actual public 
communication. Citizens regularly turn to fact checkers, economists, media outlets, and 
opinion leaders more generally for information.13 
Second, even when no participant is an expert concerning the issue at hand, the 
relevant political knowledge might still be distributed between the participants. Thus, 
many individually ignorant citizens might pool the knowledge they have by deliberating 
together. While this claim is commonly gestured at by deliberative democrats, Hélène 
Landemore has developed it most fully. Drawing on formal mathematical models such 
as the Hong-Page theorem, she argues that under the right circumstances, a diverse 
                                                 
12 E.g., Landemore (2013, 50). 
13 On deliberation with experts, see Anderson (2011, 144) and Christiano (2012). 
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group of non-experts can put their cognitive resources together, and thereby produce 
even wiser decisions than a group of experts.14   
However, these two ways of challenging premise (1) encounter similar difficulties. 
Take the latter. This strategy seems to idealise away the social conditions that give rise 
to the problem of public ignorance. Landemore holds that the exchange of arguments 
and information between diverse non-experts can reliably make them more 
knowledgeable. But this is only true if the non-expert participants already meet a 
threshold of knowledge. As discussed in 2.2, when participants cannot discriminate 
between good and bad arguments and testimonies, deliberation can lead them to pool 
their ignorance as well as their knowledge. Hence, as many of Landemore’s critics 
complain, her answer to the problem of public ignorance seems to presuppose the 
falsehood of one of its premises—namely, that people are highly ignorant to begin 
with.15 In fact, when she states the conditions that must obtain for deliberation to be 
epistemically fruitful, Landemore requires that participants be sufficiently 
knowledgeable to recognise the best policy when they see it.16 
The former strategy—which involves consulting expert testimony—might seem less 
vulnerable to this concern. This is because the listeners are not trying to critically assess 
the arguments and testimonies on the basis of which experts arrive at judgments. They 
simply take their claims on trust.  
But this strategy quickly runs into problems. The first is dialectical. Chapter 5 
investigated how democratic public deliberation can build trust. One of the main trust-
building mechanisms I appealed to—the civilising force of hypocrisy—presupposes 
that individuals have decent political knowledge, which enables them to monitor public 
speakers. In this context, it would be viciously circular to appeal to pre-existing 
relations of trust—namely, the disposition to trust others’ testimony—to explain how 
political knowledge arises.  
Even if we bracket these dialectical considerations and assume that individuals are 
disposed to trust others’ testimony, the deeper problem is that public ignorance makes 
it more difficult for them to engage in warranted relations of trust—i.e., to trust the 
testimony of trustworthy speakers. Deferring to A’s testimony that P is the best policy 
means that one needn’t examine competing arguments regarding the intrinsic merits of 
                                                 
14 Landemore (2013, ch. 4). See also note 44, Chapter 1. 
15 E.g., Somin (2014, 160), Brennan (2016, 187-188), Gunn (2014, 68-69). 
16 Landemore (2014, 218-221).  
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P. Nevertheless, one still needs to debate and examine competing arguments 
concerning whether or not A is actually a trustworthy source, a real and honest expert. 
Competently doing so requires substantial information, for instance regarding which 
credentials A has, whether A has conflicts of interest, etc. Therefore, in conditions of 
public ignorance, individuals may well end up dismissing the testimony of real experts, 
and trusting the testimony of mere sophists instead. Even Elizabeth Anderson, one of 
the more optimistic theorists of reliance on expert testimony, concludes that “the 
dispositions to reliable assessment [of experts] depend on social conditions that are not 
realized in the U.S.”17 Like the other strategy, then, the idea of consulting experts seems 
to disregard the central premise of the problem of public ignorance: that citizens are 
typically highly ignorant. 
This objection might seem too hasty. Landemore, for instance, could reply that it 
misconstrues her point. The point is not necessarily that individuals are not ignorant. It 
is rather that even if they are, they still meet the threshold for deliberation to be 
epistemically fruitful. Put differently, critics of deliberative democracy are wrong about 
how high the knowledge threshold for deliberation to be effective is. Of course, it is 
very difficult to give a specific account of where the threshold lies. But doing so, 
Landemore suggests, is not necessary. If deliberation is in fact epistemically fruitful, 
then a fortiori, its participants—though ignorant—satisfy the threshold.18 And 
according to Landemore, there is ample evidence of the epistemic benefits of 
deliberation by ordinary citizens. Famously, when randomly-selected citizens engage in 
structured deliberation on a policy issue—as in Citizens’ Assemblies on electoral and 
constitutional reform, and so-called “deliberative polls” examining competing energy 
policies—their participants tend to become far more knowledgeable about the relevant 
issue.19 So, even if ordinary citizens are ignorant, empirical evidence suggests that this 
ignorance is insufficient to prevent them from learning through deliberation with peers 
and experts.   
However, it is unclear how generalisable this response is. Landemore’s evidence 
typically concerns deliberation occurring in highly controlled settings: the deliberative 
experiments in question involve small groups; their deliberation is heavily facilitated by 
                                                 
17 Anderson (2011, 145-149).  
18 Landemore (2014, 207). 
19 Ibid., 208-211. See also Landemore (2013, 109-110). 
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moderators and experts; and the participants often share certain aims or goals.20 
Therefore, Landemore’s defence of the epistemic benefits of deliberation tells us little 
about what to expect from deliberation between ignorant citizens in the more familiar 
arenas of mass democracy, many of which are greater in scale, less structured, and 
marked by significant ethical divisions. I will return to these controlled instances of 
deliberation in Sections 4 and 5. For now, the point is that they do not warrant 
generalisations about large-scale deliberation between ordinary citizens. 
What is worse, there is evidence that in some non-ideal circumstances, large-scale 
deliberation does pool ignorance as well as knowledge. Notably, Cass Sunstein observes 
a “law of group polarisation”. When like-minded groups deliberate, their views tend to 
shift towards more extreme versions of their original judgments. In part, this is because 
like-minded groups have access to an imbalanced pool of arguments: they mostly 
produce arguments supporting the position they already hold, and have little exposure 
to countervailing perspectives.21 While this shift towards more extreme positions can in 
principle lead to truer views, it can equally lead to falser ones. A striking example 
concerns online deliberation during the 2016 US Presidential election. Social media 
sites, like Facebook, allow news to spread extremely rapidly among like-minded 
individuals, in a way that is insulated from contestation by fact-checkers and from 
dissenting voices. In consequence, during the election, false news stories concerning the 
two candidates “were more widely shared on Facebook than the most popular 
mainstream news stories”. Many of those exposed to these false stories reported 
believing them.22 In this instance, deliberation in large-scale online enclaves helped 
circulate and amplify erroneous views rather than eliminate them. 
Perhaps some institutional remedies can improve the ignorance-reducing prospects 
of exchanging arguments with epistemic peers and of questioning purported experts in 
non-ideal conditions. For instance, Elizabeth Anderson recommends institutional 
measures aimed at guaranteeing that citizens are exposed to diverse perspectives. These 
include reorganising political districts and forcing news sites to include links to sites 
advocating opposite views. Anderson hypothesises that such measures will prevent 
groups from polarising in a truth-insensitive way, and will help deliberation produce 
                                                 
20 For criticisms of how atypical Landemore’s examples of deliberation are, see Gunn (2014, 68) and Brennan 
(2016, 66-67).  
21 Sunstein (2002).  
22 Alcott and Gentskow (manuscript, 1-2).  
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better-informed views regarding which policies are best and which experts are 
trustworthy.23 However, she ultimately concedes that “discussion of remedies is 
hampered by the lack of empirical data”.24  
For dialectical reasons, then, the rest of this chapter will not rely on the current line 
of response to the problem of public ignorance. Indeed, I do not want my response to 
the problem of public ignorance to rest solely on the disputed claim that deliberation 
between highly ignorant citizens remains epistemically fruitful, or that feasible 
institutional remedies can readily make it so. If these claims can be vindicated, then so 
much the better: my arguments in previous chapters regarding the justice-promoting 
power of deliberation, many of which explore its ability to reduce ignorance, go 
through. But in the meantime, I wish to examine what could be said in defence of 
deliberative democracy even if ignorance is highly problematic. Therefore, I will argue 
that even if ignorance undermines the fruitfulness of democratic deliberation, this is no 
reason to abandon it in favour of an alternative normative political model. In doing so, 
my aim is indirectly to support the response just considered: if adopting alternative 
political arrangements were a solution to the problem at hand, we might lose patience 
with ongoing conceptual and institutional attempts at making inclusive deliberation 
capable of reducing ignorance. However, if doing so is no solution, as I will 
demonstrate, we have little choice other than to try to make these attempts work. 
 
4. Why Ignorance Is a Problem for Alternative Models of 
Democracy 
 
If public ignorance undermines democratic theories that require large-scale inclusive 
deliberation, one might recommend adopting a conception of democracy that is more 
sensitive to the limitations of ordinary citizens. Against this influential argument, the 
present section argues that the two most promising democratic models that have been 





                                                 
23 Anderson (2011, 157-160).  
24 Ibid., 159. 
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4.1. Elite Democracy and Ignorance 
 
To avoid the problems public ignorance poses for inclusive deliberation, many 
commentators advocate a minimalistic model of democracy—elite democracy—in 
which ordinary citizens play a smaller part. Elite democracy is a resolutely 
representative form of democracy. Citizens do not vote on every policy decision. They 
merely elect more competent political representatives—elites—and throw them out in 
subsequent elections when they perform poorly. Elite democracy therefore staunchly 
opposes direct democracy. But this is not what distinguishes it from deliberative 
democracy. As discussed in 2.2, deliberative democrats typically embrace political 
representation. Instead, elite democracy’s central difference with deliberative democracy 
is that ordinary citizens are not morally required to engage in public reason-giving with 
each other and with their representatives. The only essential democratic act is voting for 
representatives.25 
This elite theory of democracy has most famously been championed by Joseph 
Schumpeter and neo-Schumpeterians such as Richard Anderson, Richard Posner, 
Jeffrey Green, and Ian Shapiro.26 On the Schumpeterian account, self-interested elites 
compete for office. Like firms targeting consumers, they develop packages of policies 
and attempt to ‘sell’ them to voters. Citizens then vote for the elites who seem most 
likely to address their concerns, shunning elites whose policies seem undesirable and 
replacing those who have proven incompetent in power. The competition for office is 
intended to guarantee that elites will offer adequate policy packages. Likewise, the 
threat of being voted out of office motivates elected elites to keep their promises.  
Besides this minimal role, however, citizens should be largely uninvolved in politics. 
According to Schumpeter, citizens “must understand that, once they have elected an 
individual, political action is his business and not theirs”.27 This passivity extends to 
deliberation. Richard Anderson, for instance, claims that citizens are not morally 
required to deliberate.28 But elite democrats generally go further. Schumpeter positively 
                                                 
25 Elite democracy’s rejection of direct democracy does distinguish it from another non-deliberative theory of 
democracy: aggregative democracy. Like elite democracy, aggregative democracy emphasises the aggregation 
of votes over inclusive deliberation. But aggregative democracy is consistent with direct democracy, where 
citizens vote on all issues.  
26 Schumpeter (1942); Anderson (1998); Posner (2003); Green (2010); Shapiro (2016, 78-83).  
27 Schumpeter (1942, 262). 
28 Anderson (1998, 494). 
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demands that citizens refrain from writing to their representatives.29 And, perhaps most 
strikingly, Green affirms that democracy should be “ocular”: the role of ordinary 
citizens is “characterized by silence rather than decision, spectatorship rather than 
activism”.30  
Schumpeter, Posner, and Anderson all take public ignorance as a key motivation for 
adopting elite democracy. And although they do not explicitly discuss ignorance, 
Shapiro and Green prefer elite democracy because they find it more realistic than 
deliberative accounts.31 There is something intuitively appealing about this. Prima facie, 
if ordinary citizens are so ignorant that deliberation is as likely to be damaging as it is to 
be helpful, it makes sense to adopt a model of democracy that is sensitive to these 
limitations. By jettisoning deliberation, and restricting citizens’ role to voting out bad 
leaders, elite democracy does this more emphatically than any other conception of 
democracy. 
But this appeal is an illusion. Public ignorance also constitutes a grave problem for 
elite democracy. Although elites are responsible for the overwhelming majority of day-
to-day politics, there remains a bottleneck of democratic decision-making—elections—
where ordinary citizens have the final say. Making just decisions during elections 
requires various kinds of political knowledge. To compare competing politicians’ policy 
platforms, one must know which policies are on offer (policy availability), which 
politicians support which policies (policy support), and what the likely outcomes of 
different policies are (policy outcome). Moreover, to hold politicians accountable, one 
must know who has been responsible for doing what in the policy-making process 
(policy-making process). These, as discussed in 2.1, are precisely the kinds of 
knowledge that ordinary citizens are said to lack. Consequently, when individuals are 
ignorant, elite democracy is problematic: there is no guarantee that politicians will offer 
proposals that genuinely cater to citizens’ interests, no guarantee that citizens will 
choose the best policy platforms among those offered, and no guarantee that politicians 
will keep their promises. 
One might nevertheless maintain that public ignorance is a greater problem for 
deliberative democracy than for elite democracy. For Somin, this is because theories of 
                                                 
29 Schumpeter (1942, 262). 
30 Green (2010, 189).  




“deliberative democracy […] require greater knowledge than less onerous ones such as 
Schumpeterian retrospective voting”.32 First, while both elite and deliberative 
democracy demand knowledge of policy outcomes, policy availability, policy support, 
and of the policy-making process, “deliberative democracy probably requires greater 
factual knowledge of this kind, because voters are expected to engage in serious 
deliberation on policy alternatives”.33 Second, because of the norms that regulate 
deliberation, deliberative democracy also requires further kinds of knowledge, “moral 
and philosophical knowledge”, which elite democracy does not require. Citing 
Gutmann and Thompson, Rawls, and Habermas, Somin claims that deliberation 
involves appealing to mutually acceptable or shared considerations.34 Hence, 
participants must know not only which vote would promote desirable outcomes, but 
also which considerations are shared.  
Neither of these two grounds for thinking that deliberative democracy demands 
more knowledge is compelling. First, it is unclear why deliberators must know more 
about policy availability, support, outcome, and process than voters in elite democracy. 
The normative appeal of elite democracy depends crucially on voters being able to 
identify bad representatives and replace them with better elites. Thus, insofar as elite 
democracy is normatively appealing, it too requires that voters reflect seriously on 
competing politicians and their policy platforms. Put differently, even if voters in elite 
democracy do not need to engage in serious interpersonal deliberation, they still need to 
engage in serious intrapersonal deliberation if they are to vote judiciously. And there is no 
reason to think that serious intrapersonal deliberation about politicians and their 
platforms demands less factual knowledge than serious interpersonal deliberation about 
these issues.  
The second suggestion—that democratic deliberation requires further kinds of 
knowledge—is more promising, but ultimately misses its mark against many 
deliberative theories of democracy, including my own. Chapter 2 observed that the 
norm according to which participants must appeal to shared reasons should only apply 
in formal deliberative sites, such as the legislature. Accordingly, the vast majority of 
citizens needn’t comply with it, and needn’t possess the corresponding knowledge. 
Now, some other kind of moral or philosophical knowledge may be required of 
                                                 
32 Somin (2014, 160).  
33 Somin (2013, 43), emphasis added. 
34 Ibid., 42-43. 
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ordinary deliberators. Deliberators are generally expected to argue for the moral 
desirability of policies, which requires knowing about moral values. But this does not 
seem specific to democratic deliberation. To vote for elites in a justice-promoting way, 
one must know not only what the causal effects of one’s vote might be, but also how 
just those effects are. That simply is moral knowledge. 
Furthermore, even if fruitful deliberation did require more information than 
competently replacing elites, it still would not necessarily follow that public ignorance is 
a greater problem for deliberative democracy. Suppose we are considering two 
strategies, S1 and S2, for achieving a goal G. Both strategies require us to have 
information that happens to be unavailable. But S1 requires less unavailable information 
than S2. Even then, if the unavailable information that S1 requires is necessary for S1 to 
achieve G, and if that information is genuinely inaccessible, then S1 may be just as 
unsuccessful at achieving G as S2. To see this, imagine that we are trying to open a door, 
and two passcodes are needed to do so. A only knows one of the passcodes, and B 
knows neither. In this case, asking A to open the door will be just as unsuccessful as 
asking B, even though the strategy of asking A requires less unavailable information 
than that of asking B. Thus, from the fact that a strategy S1 requires less unavailable 
information than S2, it needn’t follow that ignorance is a greater problem for S2 than for 
S1. Consequently, even if elite democrats established that deliberative democracy 
requires that ordinary citizens be more knowledgeable than elite democracy does, this 
would not necessarily settle the matter. In conditions of political ignorance, both might 
conceivably be equally ineffective at promoting justice. 
At this stage, elite democrats might take a different line of argument, and object that 
my characterisation of elite democracy is uncharitable. I have suggested that in elite 
democracy, elites simply present their policy platforms, before letting citizens choose. 
But this is arguably not all there is to elite democracy. Instead, Green claims, elites 
should also offer arguments for their policies. Notice that this is elite deliberation, not 
democratic deliberation: elites exchange arguments, while ordinary citizens are primarily 
tasked with listening.35 The idea is that elites’ arguments for their proposals will educate 
ordinary citizens about politics. Hence, citizens will be more knowledgeable when they 
elect elites.  
                                                 
35 Green (2010, 182-186). See above, including notes 28-30, for the lack of deliberation by ordinary citizens.  
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Deliberative democrats often object that such elite-driven discourse is deficient. 
First, elites may have substantial epistemic gaps. Indeed, as Chapter 1 discussed, 
politically-relevant knowledge is distributed between different social groups, and some 
social groups are underrepresented among elites.36 Second, even if elites had all the 
politically-relevant knowledge, Simone Chambers fears that they may be ill-motivated. 
They might collude to keep some ideas off of the agenda, while offering deceptive 
arguments aimed at making people accept policies that only serve elite interests.37  
But let us assume that some elites know what the most just policies are, are 
motivated to advance them, and offer arguments for them. The main problem is this: 
why think that ignorant voters will be swayed by the arguments of wise and benevolent 
elites, rather than by the sophistical appeals of unwise or self-interested demagogues? 
The point is that even if there are real elites, who are knowledgeable and well-
motivated, not all candidates for office are like this. Therefore, for elite deliberation to 
educate listeners, ordinary citizens would need to discriminate between the sound 
appeals of real elites and the deceptive ones of mere sophists. If elite democrats 
respond that voters know enough to tell who the trustworthy elites are, or to 
distinguish good from bad policy arguments, they are helping themselves to an 
assumption that they denied deliberative democrats, in Section 3. So, appealing to elite 
deliberation to defend elite democracy ends up making epistemic demands on ordinary 
citizens that parallel those of deliberative democracy.  
As a final response, elite democrats might suggest that candidates for office are 
actually almost invariably more knowledgeable than the average citizen, and are often 
decently motivated. And even if some are not, they might add, anyone who is elected is 
then made to learn about politics and to behave accountably by their aides and 
colleagues. If this is the case, ordinary citizens’ ignorance about politics might seem 
relatively unproblematic for elite democracy. Because all possible representatives would 
end up being politically competent, the stakes of elections are low. No matter how 
ignorant voters are, they cannot go too far wrong.  
However, this response would not give elite democracy any comparative advantage: 
if we grant its premises, deliberative democrats too can help themselves to this defence. 
The response under consideration is really an argument for representative democracy: it 
                                                 
36 Chapter 1, Section 2.1.b.  
37 Chambers (2009, 338-339). 
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says that, in conditions of political ignorance, having citizens elect representatives is 
better than having them make policy directly. But, as discussed in 2.2, deliberative 
democracy is entirely consistent with representative democracy. Accordingly, if all 
representatives really are or would become competent, deliberative democrats might say 
the following: ‘Even if deliberation between ignorant citizens about candidates were 
fruitless—i.e., even if citizens tended to ask candidates the wrong questions and to be 
swayed by bad answers—this would not be exceedingly problematic: since all of the 
candidates would ultimately be competent in office, deliberative participants cannot go 
too far wrong when they vote’.38 Thus, if representative democracy mitigates the 
negative impact of public ignorance, this helps deliberative democracy as much as elite 
democracy.   
Elite democracy responds to the ignorance of ordinary citizens by getting them to 
do less. However, it retains a bottleneck of democratic decision-making, elections, 
where there is no reason to think that ignorant voters will choose the correct elites—
i.e., those who are both knowledgeable and well-motivated. Consequently, I have 
argued, widespread ignorance about politics is just as problematic for elite democracy as 
for deliberative democracy. If, to resist this objection, elite democrats underscore the 
educational benefits of elite deliberation, they replicate the informational burdens of 
deliberative democracy. And if, instead, elite democrats appeal to the alleged 
competence of representatives, this response is equally available to deliberative 
democrats.  
                                                 
38 This reply might encourage the worry that deliberative democracy is redundant, because inclusive 
deliberation itself plays no part in avoiding the problems raised by public ignorance. This worry is misplaced 
for two reasons. Firstly, the present reply does not entail that inclusive deliberation plays no part in 
countering public ignorance. The only essential claim I am making here is that if you think political 
representation makes widespread political ignorance unproblematic, this is just as true for deliberative as for 
elite democracy. Secondly, even if inclusive deliberation did not help reduce ignorance when citizens are 
highly ignorant (as I conceded for dialectical reasons at the end of Section 3), this would not mean that 
deliberative democracy is altogether redundant or unnecessary. All it would mean is that deliberative 
democracy has no advantage over elite democracy with respect to the problem of public ignorance. Let me clarify what 
I mean by this. In previous chapters, I argued that inclusive deliberation can perform important justice-
promoting functions, such as creating knowledge or preventing domination. The problem of public ignorance 
says that for deliberation to perform these functions, deliberators must satisfy some prior threshold of 
knowledge. When they do not, deliberative democracy may admittedly have no comparative advantage over elite 
democracy. This is fully consistent with the present chapter’s central argument: I am arguing that, in such 
conditions, elite democracy also has no advantage over deliberative democracy, so that public ignorance gives 
us no reason to abandon deliberative democracy for elite democracy. Crucially, however, after the knowledge 
threshold is satisfied, deliberation’s distinctive justice-promoting functions kick in, and these give us a reason to 




Thus, elite democracy fails to circumvent the difficulties raised by widespread 
ignorance, and reemphasises the significance of deliberation when it tries to address this 
issue. In this light, inclusive deliberation aimed at making ordinary citizens more 
knowledgeable should be seen not as the source of democracy’s ignorance-related 
difficulties, but rather as an attempted solution to these. Perhaps, then, the proper 
response to public ignorance is not to eliminate deliberation by ordinary citizens—as 
elite democracy does—but rather to restrict it to more structured settings. The next 
section examines this popular suggestion. 
 
4.2. Is Small-Scale Deliberation the Answer? 
 
To evade elite democracy’s ignorance-related shortcomings, a prominent solution 
recommends reinstituting deliberation by ordinary citizens, but doing so in small-scale 
settings, or “minipublics”. According to James Fishkin and Robert Luskin, who have 
most prominently advanced this response, the fact that most citizens are ignorant and 
do not engage in high-quality deliberation is “unlikely to change very much. Not for the 
public as a whole, at least”.39 But it might change for a smaller subset of the public. 
This proposal aims to achieve the best of both worlds. Since, as 4.1 discussed, elite 
democracy is plagued by the ignorance of ordinary citizens, it aims to educate samples 
of ordinary citizens through small-scale deliberation. At the same time, it promises to 
avoid the problems raised in Section 3 with using large-scale deliberation to educate 
ordinary citizens. Small-scale deliberation, it is said, can be structured so as to enable 
ordinary citizens to learn effectively. Thus, small-scale deliberative settings avoid the 
chaotic mass public sphere’s limitations. 
These claims are not simply speculative. Political scientists have extensively 
experimented, with promising results, on the use of minipublics—small representative 
samples of the population that deliberate on specific issues—in policy-making. Section 
3 briefly alluded to some of these. In Fishkin’s early “deliberative polls”, small groups 
of randomly-selected citizens in Texas deliberated on the merits of investing in energy 
efficiency and renewable resources. In 2004, a Citizens’ Assembly composed of 160 
randomly-selected citizens was tasked with deliberating regarding which electoral 
system British Columbia should adopt. Most impressively, between 2010 and 2011, 
                                                 
39 Fishkin and Luskin (2005, 286). See also Parvin (2015, 419) and López-Guerra (2014). 
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Iceland charged groups of randomly-selected citizens with designing, via deliberative 
processes, a new national constitution.40 
Consider how these minipublics realise the goals outlined above. First, participants 
are selected randomly. The resulting groups are therefore likely to constitute a 
representative sample or ‘mirror’ of the population. So, unlike elite democracy, 
minipublics actively include ordinary citizens in deliberation. Second, the groups are 
sufficiently small (between 20 and 500) for their deliberation to be carefully structured. 
Generally, deliberation is facilitated by trained moderators, who ensure that all 
participants are heard. Furthermore, deliberation is interwoven with briefings by 
experts, whom participants can question. Finally, the epistemic results are impressive: 
Fishkin and Luskin observe that participants habitually become significantly more 
knowledgeable regarding the issues at hand, and that their policy preferences often 
change accordingly. 
But the proposal of introducing small-scale structured deliberation by representative 
samples of the population is ambiguous between two possibilities. On one 
interpretation, minipublics make political decisions themselves, thereby replacing existing 
decision-making arenas. On another interpretation, minipublics play an advisory role, 
providing information and recommendations to the broader demos and their 
representatives. Hence, they complement existing processes of mass decision-making, as 
experts might. 
Most democratic theorists who advocate using minipublics adopt the latter 
understanding.41 This is mirrored in practice. A key function of deliberative polls, for 
instance, is to inform broader public debates. Accordingly, media outlets often 
broadcast their proceedings, thereby exposing the people and their representatives to 
the views of citizens who have reflected on specific policy issues, and to the arguments 
underpinning those views. Even the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, which was 
one the most empowered minipublics, only had the power to recommend an electoral 
system, which the people then needed to approve by referendum. 
If this is the role of minipublics, then this proposal is entirely consistent with the 
kind of inclusive deliberation I have been defending. Recall that on the systemic 
understanding of deliberative democracy, the deliberative system is composed of many 
                                                 
40 Goodin and Dryzek (2006); Fishkin and Luskin (2005); Landemore (2015). 
41 E.g., Goodin and Dryzek (2006, 220), Fishkin and Luskin (2005).  
205 
 
interconnected arenas of deliberation, which perform complementary roles. Considered 
in this light, advisory minipublics are just one arena in the deliberative system, whose 
purpose is to transmit information to more empowered arenas.42 
Unsurprisingly, then, the problem that afflicted mass democratic deliberation in 
Section 3 resurfaces. If minipublics are just one arena among others, and their purpose 
is to convey information to empowered spheres, why think that the broader public 
sphere will heed their advice? Just as ignorant citizens may fail to identify experts, so 
they may fail to recognise the epistemic value of minipublics’ recommendations. The 
British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly exemplifies this possibility. Chambers complains 
that shallow rhetoric dominated public discussion of the Assembly’s recommended 
electoral system. Consequently, the proposal was ultimately defeated.43 
In light of similar considerations, Lafont concludes that “if we simply insert the 
conclusion of mini-publics in the political debate in the public sphere without any 
improvement in the deliberative quality of the latter, then this would make no 
difference whatsoever”.44 The idea is that for deliberative minipublics to have any 
positive impact, we would already need to have improved deliberation in the broader 
public sphere. Thus, introducing small-scale minipublics in a complementary role does 
not help mass deliberative democracy avoid the problem of public ignorance.  
Lafont’s pessimism may be too strong. Minipublics have distinctive features that 
arguably make them more capable of transmitting knowledge to the broader public 
than, say, experts. According to MacKenzie and Warren, because of the way in which 
minipublics are selected, ordinary citizens can more easily recognise their 
trustworthiness than that of experts. First, random selection means that minipublics, 
unlike typical groups of experts, are likely to be descriptively representative of the 
population. So insofar as people are more likely to trust individuals from similar social 
backgrounds, they are more likely to trust minipublics.45 There is some evidence 
supporting this: Americans, for example, tend to trust the verdicts of citizen juries more 
than those of judges.46 Second, Alex Guerrero argues that because minipublics are 
selected randomly, they do not rely on electoral campaign financing, and are therefore 
                                                 
42 Dryzek (2010, 168-170). 
43 Chambers (2009, 331).  
44 Lafont (2015, 58). 
45 MacKenzie and Warren (2012, 105-107).  
46 Rasmussen Reports (2014); Harris Interactive (2008). 
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less vulnerable to co-optation by powerful lobbies. If so, minipublics may be more 
visibly trustworthy than elected officials or the experts they appoint.47 
Admittedly, whether MacKenzie and Warren are correct here is an empirical claim 
that some might dispute. For my purposes, the main point remains that using 
minipublics in an advisory capacity is entirely compatible with large-scale deliberative 
democracy. Hence, if minipublics can serve as trusted information proxies in the way 
MacKenzie and Warren suggest, deliberative democrats can and should happily 
embrace their use. Indeed, if this result holds, minipublics enhance the deliberative 
system’s ability to educate ordinary citizens. Thus, they alleviate the worries outlined in 
Section 3. Understood in a complementary advisory role, then, employing small-scale 
deliberative initiatives at best helps to solve the ignorance-related problems of large-
scale deliberation, and at worst simply reproduces those problems.  
Because using minipublics in this complementary role risks reproducing the 
problems of large-scale deliberation, one might recommend employing minipublics in 
the more radical way. On this understanding, recall, small lottery-selected deliberative 
groups are empowered to actually make legislative decisions. Thus, they replace normal 
sites of mass democratic decision-making, such as legislatures composed of elected 
officials. In recent years, Alex Guerrero and Claudio López-Guerra have both defended 
this proposal.48 Following Guerrero, let us call this proposal ‘lottocracy’. In our context, 
lottocracy’s appeal is straightforward. Since the randomly-selected deliberative group no 
longer needs to have its recommendations ratified by the broader public, these are no 
longer hostage to widespread ignorance. Lottocracy apparently circumvents the 
problem of public ignorance.    
An immediate concern is that lottocracy may seem undemocratic. Decision-makers 
are not selected through elections where citizens have an equal vote. Consequently, 
citizens are subjected to rule by individuals who are not formally accountable to them.49 
Lottocrats could respond in two ways. First, like Guerrero, they could argue that rule by 
randomly-selected deliberative groups is democratic in important respects.50 
Alternatively, they might claim that it is relatively unproblematic that lottocratic 
arrangements are undemocratic. This might be because (contra my suggestion in 
                                                 
47 Guerrero (2014, 164).  
48 Guerrero (2014); López-Guerra (2014).  
49 Lafont (2015, 42-54). 
50 Guerrero (2014, 167). 
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Chapter 1) they deny that democratic decision-making procedures have intrinsic value 
from the standpoint of justice. Or, like López-Guerra, lottocrats might think that 
democracy’s intrinsic value is outweighed by the instrumental value of having a political 
system that overcomes the problem of political ignorance—i.e., that is epistemically 
capable of producing just outcomes despite widespread ignorance.51 
To sidestep these responses, the rest of this chapter will develop a different line of 
criticism, which does not appeal to democracy’s intrinsic value.52 Put differently, this 
criticism will apply even if you deny that democracy is intrinsically valuable for justice. 
So far, I have only examined solutions to the problem of public ignorance that are 
traditionally democratic—where ‘traditionally democratic’ means that, unlike in 
lottocracy, ultimate decisional authority lies with the entire demos, each of whom at 
least has an equal right to vote. However, because all the proposals examined so far are 
traditionally democratic, they involve a bottleneck of inclusive decision-making where 
ignorance generates difficulties. Ignorant citizens are liable to be swayed by the wrong 
arguments or testimonies (2.1, 3), to vote for the wrong elites (4.1), and to disregard the 
recommendations of randomly-selected deliberative minipublics (4.2). If you are 
unconvinced that democracy is intrinsically valuable, you might therefore wish to 
remove the democratic bottleneck, and opt for a non-democratic response to public 
ignorance. The next section will show that this temptation is misleading: the most 
influential non-democratic strategies for avoiding the problem of public ignorance—
including lottocracy—merely postpone this problem.   
 
5. Why the Problem of Public Ignorance Extends to Non-
Democratic Views 
 
The present section demonstrates that the problem of public ignorance does not 
recommend shifting to non-democratic systems: contrary to what one might expect, 
non-democratic systems merely postpone the problem. Now, one might worry that 
whether or not this is true depends on the non-democratic system in question. I will 
focus on the two most prominent non-democratic arrangements that have been 
                                                 
51 López-Guerra (2014, 26-28, 52-56).  
52 In Chapter 1, Section 3.1, I suggest that democracy is intrinsically valuable for justice. But I avoid relying on 
this here to sidestep controversies concerning 1) whether lottocracy could meaningfully count as democratic, 
2) whether democracy’s intrinsic value persists in conditions of political ignorance, and 3) how democracy’s 
intrinsic value compares to the instrumental value of producing good outcomes. 
208 
 
advanced in response to widespread ignorance. I begin by examining epistocracy—rule 
by knowers—before returning to lottocracy. Starting with epistocracy, which is more 
obviously non-democratic, will be useful for two reasons. On the one hand, its 
shortcomings serve to highlight the prima facie appeal of lottocracy. On the other, the 
argumentative strategy developed against epistocracy will help identify how lottocracy 
also falls short. Although I restrict my focus to specific attempts at realising epistocracy 
and lottocracy, I will supply reasons for thinking that the problems they encounter do 
not depend on their institutional specificities.  
 
5.1. Epistocracy and Ignorance 
 
Epistocracy is a political system that distributes decision-making power on the basis of 
prior knowledge. Though its most famous incarnation is Plato’s proffered rule by 
philosopher kings, Jason Brennan has influentially rearticulated this ideal. Against the 
background of widespread ignorance, epistocracy’s appeal is clear: it proposes to 
empower those and only those who are knowledgeable. So, if epistemically privileged 
knowers exist, and if they can be identified and empowered, then epistocracy 
straightforwardly avoids the problem of public ignorance. 
One might doubt that there are privileged knowers in politics. Here, let us bracket 
such concerns. Instead, the key question for epistocracy is how knowers are to be 
identified and empowered. How do we transition to rule by knowers? Brennan’s 
principal suggestion is that we establish a voter qualification examination. The 
examination asks questions regarding basic facts that are crucial to making competent 
political decisions. Only those who perform sufficiently well are then enfranchised.53 
However, this recommendation only pushes back the transitional question. Even if 
there could be an adequate qualification examination, the question becomes how we are 
to design and implement it. Here, the problem of public ignorance resurfaces. A first 
option, which Brennan leans towards, is that democratic decision-making should decide 
what counts as competence.54 But why think that the demos—ignorant as it supposedly 
is—will be competent at designing the examination? The examination tests citizens for 
knowledge that is crucial to good political decision-making. Hence, insofar as democratic 
                                                 
53 Brennan (2016, 211-214).  
54 Ibid., 224.  
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decision-making can identify the knowledge requirements that the examination tests 
for, it is capable of good political decision-making. Putting the same point differently, 
insofar as democratic decision-making is incompetent at identifying good options—as 
the problem of public ignorance purports to establish—it is incompetent at identifying 
the examination’s knowledge requirements. (Notice that this observation equally applies 
if the demos is supposed to identify competent individuals who then design the test. 
Insofar as the demos can do so, it can elect competent representatives). The key point 
is not that it is impossible democratically to design a voter qualification examination. 
Rather, it is that Brennan’s proposal for implementing epistocracy works only insofar as 
public ignorance fails to undermine democratic decision-making.55   
If the democratic route to designing and implementing the voter qualification 
examination is unpromising, maybe, instead, those who are knowledgeable should 
somehow forcibly impose the examination. However, this recommendation is question-
begging, in the way Chapter 1 discussed.56 In political contexts, very often, what is in 
dispute just is who is knowledgeable regarding what we should do. Parties in political 
disagreements typically take themselves to be right, and their adversaries wrong. 
Moreover, a characteristic feature of non-ideal conditions characterised by widespread 
ignorance is that (as Brennan himself suggests57) the powerful and the wise seldom 
coincide. 
Putting these two observations together yields an undesirable result. If most 
competing political actors take themselves to be knowledgeable, and if the powerful 
and the knowledgeable rarely coincide, we have reason to expect that the question-
begging recommendation at hand will in practice not achieve rule by the 
knowledgeable. Rather, it will achieve rule by whomever the powerful believe—
however erroneously—to be knowledgeable. Thus, even on this alternative proposal, 
public ignorance plagues the transition to epistocracy: when the powerful many are 
                                                 
55 Though Brennan considers this objection head-on (2016, 224-226), his answer is unsatisfactory. He 
challenges the assumption that if you know what the competence requirements are then you are yourself 
competent, by suggesting that you might know the competence requirements de dicto but not de re. Simply 
put, you might know that rulers should know the basic facts of economics, without knowing what the basic facts of 
economics are. But if this is what Brennan means when saying that democratic decision-making bodies should 
decide what counts as competence, it again merely postpones the transitional question. If democratic 
decision-making only determines the competence requirements de dicto, then elaborating the test still 
requires having someone determine what they are de re. But how are they chosen? If the answer is 
‘democratically’, the problem resurfaces. 
56 Chapter 1, Section 2.1.c. 




ignorant and the knowledgeable are few, a policy of having the knowledgeable impose 
epistocracy seems ill-suited to achieving rule by genuine knowers.    
Epistocrats might respond that these worries about transitioning to epistocracy are 
simply theoretical, and rest upon speculative claims—e.g., about whether or not the 
powerful many and the knowledgeable coincide. But the theoretical worries I have 
raised are far from speculative. The real-world track record of voter qualification 
examinations is terrible. In the American South, Jim Crow laws implementing literacy 
tests were widely used to disenfranchise black Americans after the Civil War. Nor is the 
worry merely historical. Voter identification laws are regularly used to keep black 
Americans from voting.58 If voter identification requirements continue to be misused, 
we may worry that, were they to exist today, voter qualification requirements too might 
well be misapplied.  
Brennan considers this observation, and retorts that it only shows that voter 
qualification examinations have been poorly implemented in the past. “These tests were 
administered in bad faith […] the fact that governments used to hide their racism 
beneath an epistocratic guise does not show that epistocratic exams are inherently 
objectionable”.59 But this response jars seriously with the broader epistocratic challenge. 
The relevant question, Brennan continuously stresses, is not ‘is democracy inherently 
objectionable?’ or ‘is epistocracy inherently objectionable?’ Brennan persistently 
criticises democratic theorists for defending theories which, though not inherently bad, are 
overly idealised and therefore impracticable in real-world conditions.60 Nor is this 
specific to Brennan. The whole point of the ignorance-based objection to deliberative 
accounts of democracy is that, though such accounts may be appealing in the ideal, they 
operate under unrealistic assumptions regarding participants’ cognitive dispositions. So, 
on pain of inconsistently applying their standards, epistocrats should be asking: given 
realistic assumptions about what people are like, which political system should we strive 
for? In this context, the empirical evidence regarding epistocratic arrangements, 
including voter examinations, is frightful.61 And this is no accident. It accords with the 
theoretical argument I offered for thinking that, in non-ideal conditions where power 
                                                 
58 E.g., Ingraham (2016).  
59 Brennan (2016, 223-224).  
60 Ibid., 69-73, 186-187, 206-207.  




and knowledge come apart, we should expect epistocratic experiments to be 
misapplied.  
While I have focused on Brennan’s epistocracy, the worries his account faces 
should generalise. What unites all epistocratic theories is the claim that political 
decision-making power should be distributed on the basis of prior knowledge. 
Consequently, they all face the transitional question of how we are to identify and 
empower knowers. This is precisely the question that replicates democracy’s ignorance-
related difficulties.  
Crucially, the fact that the transitional question plagues epistocracy is far from a 
superficial criticism. As discussed, epistocrats are explicitly committed to answering this 
question, insofar as they purport to offer normative guidance for non-ideal 
circumstances. Fittingly, then, it is the question Plato persistently encountered in The 
Republic and which—by his own admission—he struggled to address.62 Thus, 
epistocracy does not avoid the problem of public ignorance. It simply relocates it to the 
prior and crucial issue of how we should transition into and maintain epistocracy.  
 
5.2. Lottocracy and Ignorance 
 
This problem might motivate a turn to lottocracy. Unlike epistocracy, lottocracy does 
not distribute power on the basis of prior knowledge. It distributes power randomly. In 
turn, once decision-makers have been randomly selected, they undergo a competence-
building process where deliberation features centrally. And as 4.2 discussed, there is 
substantial evidence that deliberative competence-building processes significantly 
improve the knowledge of randomly-selected citizens.  
 Thus, López-Guerra claims, by breeding rather than screening for knowers, lottocracy 
improves on epistocracy’s attempt at avoiding the problem of public ignorance.63 It 
achieves rule by knowers, thereby keeping power away from ignorant hands. But since 
there is no need to screen for pre-existing knowers, it apparently circumvents 
epistocracy’s transitional troubles. 
Predictably, however, lottocracy only postpones the problem of public ignorance. 
The crucial premise underpinning lottocracy’s appeal is that a competence-building 
                                                 
62 Plato (2007[c. 380 BC], 490e-496e). 
63 López-Guerra (2014, 25-26).  
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process can make randomly-selected citizens sufficiently knowledgeable to rule well. 
Correspondingly, the crucial question is how this competence-building process 
operates. Either the competence-building process substantively involves interventions 
by experts, or it does not. If it does not, then, in the present context, it seems unclear 
why deliberation would make the randomly-selected group more knowledgeable. After 
all, in Section 3, deliberative democracy was criticised precisely on the grounds that 
deliberation among ignorant ordinary citizens is allegedly epistemically fruitless. If, 
however, experts do play an essential role—and this is what theorists of minipublics 
generally suggest64—then we have another iteration of the problem epistocracy faced: 
transitioning into lottocracy requires identifying and selecting expert knowers. Just as 
public ignorance plagued epistocracy with respect to this issue, so it should plague 
lottocracy.  
Guerrero’s influential articulation of lottocracy brings this out. Like all lottocrats, he 
asserts that expert presentations constitute an essential feature of the competence-
building process.65 Now, in some cases, he claims, it is “relatively uncontroversial 
whether someone counts as an expert”.66 But insofar as this is true, the suggestions 
Section 3 entertained regarding how deliberative democracy helps eliminate ignorance 
should also work. Indeed, recall that one of the main deliberative strategies for reducing 
ignorance involved having citizens seek out and question experts. 
In other cases, Guerrero acknowledges that who counts as an expert is more 
controversial.67 How do we identify experts in such cases? If the answer is through 
democratic decision-making, then Guerrero cannot consistently hold both that this will 
work well and that democratic decision-making will be incompetent at electing 
representatives. As in the critique of epistocracy, the point is that if—as the problem of 
public ignorance purports to show—democratic decision-making is ineffective at 
identifying competent and well-motivated representatives, it is unclear why it would be 
effective at identifying competent and well-motivated experts. So this strategy for 
identifying knowers functions only insofar as public ignorance fails to undermine 
democratic decision-making.  
                                                 
64 Among lottocrats, see Guerrero (2014, 156), López-Guerra (2014, 35-37). Among defenders of advisory 
minipublics, see Fishkin and Luskin (2005, 288-289), Goodin and Dryzek (2006, 223-224).  
65 Guerrero (2014, 156). 




Alternatively, if the suggestion is that some competent agency should impose 
experts through non-democratic means, we have seen when critiquing epistocracy that 
this solution is objectionably question-begging: in context, who is competent just is 
what is in dispute. And since the powerful and the knowledgeable often come apart in 
non-ideal contexts, there are reasons to expect that the most powerful, rather than 
those who are actually good at identifying experts, will get their way.68 Ultimately, 
Guerrero concedes that “a full defense of the lottocratic alternative will have to do 
more to specify the details about the [expert] qualification assessment process”.69 Thus, 
he acknowledges that the selection of experts in contexts of ignorance is a problem for 
lottocracy, without offering a solution. 
Because of these difficulties, lottocrats might be tempted to criticise the other horn 
of the dilemma, and suggest that small-scale deliberation remains epistemically fruitful 
even without experts. Guerrero, for instance, briefly mentions the possibility of 
“eliminat[ing] the expert stage”.70 The problem with this suggestion is that the evidence 
supporting the epistemic value of deliberative minipublics overwhelmingly concerns 
cases involving expert contributions. Deliberative polls explicitly involve interventions 
by panels of experts. The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly enlisted experts who 
taught the assembly about different electoral systems. And the Icelandic Constitutional 
Assembly was facilitated by experts who supplied templates of what a suitable 
constitution might look like. 
This is not definitively to say that deliberative minipublics cannot build competence 
without experts. Rather, the point is that if they take this route, lottocrats cannot appeal 
to the existing empirical data on minipublics. Therefore, they lose a key incentive for 
embracing lottocracy: one of the central motivations for advocating small-scale 
deliberation that replaces large-scale deliberative democratic processes was the concrete 
evidence that small-scale initiatives are epistemically fruitful. Thus, while involving 
experts replicates the ignorance-related difficulties epistocracy faces, eliminating experts 




                                                 
68 For related worries, see Shapiro (2003, 33). 
69 Guerrero (2014, 162). 





Ignorance regarding political matters threatens to undermine the effectiveness of 
democratic public deliberation at realising justice. Many have taken this to warrant 
rejecting democratic theories that promote inclusive deliberation. In resisting this 
argument, two strategies stand out. The first denies that widespread ignorance impedes 
public deliberation’s ability to promote justice. On this view, inclusive deliberation can 
eliminate ignorance by pooling knowledge that is distributed across the demos. This 
strategy has merit. In previous chapters, I explored various respects in which inclusive 
deliberation contributes to reducing ignorance.71 The main concern, however, is that 
inclusive deliberation can only do so when ordinary citizens already meet a certain 
threshold of knowledge. When they do not, this response may be unsuccessful.  
 But the present chapter has argued that another strategy is available. Even if 
ignorance undercuts the justice-promoting powers of deliberative democracy, it is 
equally problematic for the normative models offered as alternatives. Elite democracy 
does not avoid the problem, since it relies on ordinary citizens to select elites. Nor is 
advocating small-scale deliberation within minipublics viable as an alternative to 
deliberative democracy. Not only does public ignorance pose difficulties for using 
minipublics in an advisory capacity, but—more importantly—even insofar as there are 
reasons to think that advisory minipublics help attenuate public ignorance, their use is 
entirely consistent with deliberative democracy. A more extreme alternative 
recommends departing from democracy altogether. However, neither of the two most 
promising non-democratic proposals—rule by empowered minipublics and rule by 
knowers—truly circumvent the problem. Instead, they simply relocate it to an earlier 
stage, where we ask how we are to transition to these non-democratic models. So, if 
widespread ignorance seriously threatens deliberative democracy, then it also seriously 
threatens the models advanced as replacements. Everyone should be afraid of public 
ignorance. 
  Where does this argument leave us? Its positive aim is to refocus our attempts at 
dealing with public ignorance. First, because ignorance plagues all the competing 
political models, it does not recommend departing from deliberative theories of 
                                                 
71 Chapter 1, Section 3.1; Chapter 2, Section 4; Chapter 4, Section 4. 
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democracy. Since inclusive deliberation is not the source of the problem, our focus 
should not be on deemphasising it. It should be on tackling public ignorance itself.  
 Second, given that all normative political models face the problem of public 
ignorance, inclusive deliberation is better understood as an attempted solution to this 
problem, an attempt at offsetting widespread ignorance. Now, one sobering conclusion 
of this chapter is that such deliberation cannot be the only solution to widespread 
ignorance, for the reason discussed in Section 3: that its effectiveness at reducing 
ignorance presupposes that some threshold of knowledge has already been met.  
 Nevertheless, inclusive deliberation may be a fruitful part of the solution. The 
present chapter has encountered some grounds for thinking so. For instance, as 
discussed in 4.2, there are prima facie reasons to expect that using minipublics as one 
arena within the deliberative system facilitates the transmission of knowledge to the 
demos. This, recall, is because deliberative minipublics may be easier to identify as 
trustworthy. The promise of such innovative deliberative practices suggests that despite 
the difficulties inclusive deliberation faces in countering ignorance, it would be a 
mistake to jettison it altogether.   
 In sum, the present chapter should steer deliberative theorists away from the siren 
songs calling for us to abandon deliberation-centred democracy. Because public 
ignorance is a problem for all accounts, it supplies no reason to depart from inclusive 
deliberation. Instead, deliberative theorists should keep their attention directed on a 
more productive task: to rethink democratic deliberation, both conceptually and 
institutionally, in a way that makes it a better tool for dispelling ignorance and thereby 
advancing justice under realistic conditions. If abandoning inclusive deliberation 
allowed us readily to avoid the problem of public ignorance, we might lose patience 
with this arduous task. But since alternative models do not avoid this problem, we 












1. Summary of the Argument 
 
I have articulated an account of what norms should govern democratic public 
deliberation for it to be effective at realising justice in non-ideal conditions. Inclusive 
public reason-giving, as we have seen, can relate positively to justice in at least two 
important ways. The first is instrumental: inclusive deliberation contributes to pooling 
knowledge that is distributed across society, and thereby helps us identify just policies. 
The second is intrinsic: participating in public deliberation is a way of holding other 
political actors accountable. Thus, because discursive processes constitute a check 
against arbitrary uses of power, they are constitutive of non-domination.1  
 By way of summary, recall how the discursive norms I have advanced are meant to 
achieve these justice-promoting functions. Firstly, the requirement that participants in 
formal deliberation appeal to shared considerations constitutes an important bulwark 
against domination. By facilitating political contestation, this constraint makes it more 
difficult for political power to be exercised arbitrarily.  
 Nevertheless, this norm might seem overly exclusionary. In divided settings, even 
its weakest formulation excludes some considerations that should have a place in public 
discourse. To offset these exclusionary implications, I argued that public deliberation 
should also welcome emotionally-charged narrative, which plays a valuable epistemic 
role by publicising the experiences of misunderstood social groups.2 In particular, 
because of anger’s distinctive phenomenology, anger-infused narratives can play an 
indispensable role in highlighting overlooked injustices and enhancing listeners’ 
understanding of these injustices.3 
 However, inviting impassioned personal narratives may seem to be inviting too 
much. Some citizens’ impassioned narratives may (and often do) express highly 
disrespectful views. When this is the case, one might worry that public deliberation will 
enact injustice rather than oppose it. To counteract such public hate speech, I argued 
that democratic public discourse should be governed by robust norms of state-
                                                 
1 Chapter 1, Section 3.1.   
2 Chapter 2.  
3 Chapter 4. 
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sponsored counterspeech aimed at protecting the good standing of targets of hate 
speech.4  
 Now, this account of public deliberation may seem too demanding in terms of 
goodwill and of political knowledge. Both problems are real and of vital practical 
relevance. But philosophical considerations, I have suggested, can go some way towards 
alleviating them. Firstly, in light of the systemic understanding of deliberation, inclusive 
deliberation demands less trust and goodwill than critics often suppose. Secondly, there 
are prima facie philosophical reasons to think that trust and goodwill can partly be 
generated via deliberation. Indeed, philosophical work on trust, hypocrisy, anger, and 
hate speech provides theoretical reasons to expect that even non-ideal deliberation 
offers important tools for rebuilding trust and goodwill.5  
 Of course, the second part of this answer depends on empirical considerations as 
well as philosophical ones. Nonetheless, I have suggested that existing empirical 
evidence, though incomplete, seems congruent with these theoretical hypotheses. 
Furthermore, the theoretical hypotheses concerning deliberative trust-building that 
philosophical work generates should help direct and enrich future empirical research on 
this topic.   
 The problem of public ignorance is perhaps the most daunting concern facing 
deliberative accounts of democracy. In keeping with the last chapter’s sobering 
conclusion, the normative account of deliberation I defend sometimes depends on 
participants having met a certain threshold of knowledge. Accordingly, public ignorance 
may undercut deliberation’s justice-promoting powers. But public ignorance, I have 
shown, is just as problematic for alternative normative political models, democratic and 
non-democratic.6 
 The upshot is this. Before the threshold of political knowledge for deliberation to be 
fruitful is met, public ignorance also plagues alternative normative models. Here, then, 
deliberative theorists have no reason to abandon inclusive deliberation for an 
alternative political arrangement. After the threshold is met, the justice-promoting 
functions of inclusive deliberation come into play. In these conditions, the virtues of 
inclusive deliberation that I have theorised can play a positive part in combatting 
ignorance and counteracting domination.  
                                                 
4 Chapter 3. 
5 Chapter 5. 
6 Chapter 6.  
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 So, deliberative theorists should resist the urge to abandon inclusive deliberation 
because of public ignorance. Instead, going forward, they should focus on more 
productive endeavours: they should examine how public ignorance might be reduced; 
and in parallel, they should continue investigating how we might refine the deliberative 
ideal, conceptually and institutionally, to make it more capable of realising justice 
despite political ignorance. 
 
2. The Challenge Ahead 
 
My defence of this account of deliberation does not purport to be exhaustive. As I have 
noted throughout, the account I have offered motivates further, more targeted, lines of 
investigation, philosophical and empirical. Some pertain to social and moral psychology. 
While my thesis clarifies the democratic role of emotional speech by exploring angry 
narratives, the discussion of anger itself invites further research. Under what social 
conditions, we must ask, is angry testimony most capable of arousing anger in listeners, 
and thereby performing its distinctive epistemic function? Relatedly, are the kinds of 
expressions of anger which perform these epistemic functions of the same type as those 
which, I have suggested, facilitate trust-building? 
 Another concerns philosophy of language. Authoritative counterspeech can block 
one of public hate speech’s most significant harms—the way it erodes its targets’ 
assurance of their good standing. But philosophers of language have theorised 
numerous other speech-based harms. Consequently, we must explore how far the 
template I have offered for countering hate speech can extend to other speech-based 
harms. While this is partly an empirical task, concerning the expected causal 
consequences of hate speech when authoritative speakers denounce it, it is also 
conceptual. Determining whether counterspeech is a fitting response to hate speech 
requires conceptualising the nature of the harms hate speech is liable to enact.  
 Lastly, while I have argued for norms of public deliberation, I have only gestured at 
their institutional manifestations. If counterspeech is needed, how can we empower 
political agents to perform it systematically and authoritatively? And if angry narrative 
has a legitimate role to play, how exactly might we alter existing parliamentary and 
judicial practices to accommodate it? Further social scientific work is needed to 
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determine precisely what institutional policies would best realise the picture of public 
deliberation I have sketched. 
 Investigating these complementary lines of research is a challenging task. But this is 
no reason not to undertake it. We have seen that attempted ‘shortcuts’ which jettison 
inclusive deliberation actually reproduce some of its greatest problems. Furthermore, 
arduous though this task may be, it is also extremely rewarding. By integrating the wide-
ranging insights of philosophers and social scientists within democratic theory, it yields 
a deeper understanding of the democratic ideal, of its relation to justice, and of the 
place of speech within that ideal. The reward is also political. Where democratic public 
speech is intimately bound up with exercises of power, and where that speech circulates 
in increasingly complex ways, we urgently need a theoretical framework that enables us 
to evaluate and improve upon existing rhetorical practices. The present thesis has 
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